- Hubert Walas
In the background of the media hype around the Leopards, heavy winter fighting continues on the frontline. The centre of gravity continues to fall on the Donetsk region and settlements such as Bakhmut and Soledar. The latter was recently taken by the Russians, largely thanks to suicidal frontal attacks, ordered by the Wagner PMC commanders. Bakhmut, on the other hand, continues to stand.
Kharkiv-Lugansk Direction
Neither side in the Kharkiv-Lugansk direction can gain clear dominance. The general trend of Ukrainian thrust has been neutralised, with the Russians taking the initiative in selected sections.
Moving away from the front line last week, the Russians conducted numerous artillery strikes near the state border in the Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv regions, where no ground operations are being conducted. The Russians continue to harass Ukrainian forces deployed in these areas in this way, fixing them and targeting residential areas to cause damage to civilians.
In the Kharkiv region, the Russians hold their positions east of Dvorichne and occupy the remaining few per cent of the region.
Moving south, the battle for Novoselivske continues. However, it is difficult to estimate precisely how much territory each side controls. Some sources say that the Ukrainians have pushed the Russians to Kuzemivka, while others suggest that Novoselivske is still contested. Regardless, the capture of both villages will bring Ukrainian forces closer to Nyzhna Duvanka. To the west of the village flows the Kobylka River, potentially hampering Ukrainian operations in that direction.
The Ukrainians made no significant progress towards Svatove. The Russians tried to push the Ukrainians out of Makiyivka across the Zherebets River, but the Ukrainian defensive lines east of the village remained intact.
There are still no confirmed reports about Chervonopivka. Last week, the Ukrainians claimed that their forces had cut off the R-66 road running through the town. However, no visual evidence was provided to confirm this event. The locality remains disputed.
Same with the Kreminna area. This sector remains heavily contested. Battles continue to take place in the forested areas south of Kreminna. Some Ukrainian commentators are predicting Russian attacks from the Kreminna area towards Lyman, and indeed in recent days, we can see Russian initiative in this area.
The Russians also remain deeply entrenched in Kuzmyne and have pushed the Ukrainians out of Dibrova. Kremlin forces are pushing westwards in this direction.
Donetsk Direction
After five months of fighting, Russian forces took Soledar and pushed the Ukrainians back to the T0513 road linking Siviersk and Bakhmut.
The Russians launched their attack on the town in early August, helped by the Ukrainian withdrawal from Popasna. In this context, it took Russia 2 months to move the Ukrainian defensive lines 17km towards Soledar and 5 months to take the town. There was no profound tactical concept behind the course of the attack. The Russians sought to overwhelm the Ukrainian positions by sheer numbers of troops and intensity of ground attacks.
These attacks took place throughout the day and night to tire out the Ukrainians and their ability to fight. Indeed, Rochan sources claimed that the 61st Mechanised Brigade withdrew uncontrollably from the Bakhmutskie area, allowing the Russians to half-circle Soledar from the south and causing a significant deterioration in the Ukrainian ability to defend themselves without reinforcements.
Rochan believes that the Ukrainian General Staff never planned to defend Soledar at all costs and that the withdrawal, apart from the 61st Mechanised Brigade, was orderly.
The seizure of Soledar is the first Russian success since the seizure of Lysychansk in early July 2022. Since then, the Russian posture has been defensive across almost the entire frontline. The Donetsk region is the only area in Ukraine where the Kremlin Forces have shown an offensive posture for a long time, but the results of the territorial gains of this posture have been minimal.
In this context, the fall of Soledar changes nothing. Russia sacrificed a great deal of strength and resources to capture the city. The striking fist was primarily the Wagner Group, often composed of former prisoners. Soledar was taken mainly due to Wagner's command readiness to sacrifice its own soldiers. They maintained relentless pressure on the defending Ukrainians by constantly sending men to conduct, often suicidal, frontal attacks. From Wagner's perspective, this approach is unsustainable over the long term. There are anecdotal reports that the scale of losses on Wagner's side is so significant that the company's level of combat readiness has been drastically reduced.
Rochan sources in the area claim that the Ukrainians "did not suffer heavy losses" during the Battle of Soledar and that a similar approach will continue as long as the Russians continue to bleed. The Ukrainians seem confident that the current Russian methods, which mostly focus on frontal attacks, are unsustainable over the next weeks and months, and that their offensive potential is shrinking due to heavy losses.
The main question is how much it costs Kyiv to maintain this approach. While the aforementioned sources claimed that losses were not high, other comments on social media claim that as many as 14 Ukrainian battalions were lost during the defence of Soledar and the subsequent withdrawal from the city. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.
Following the fall of Soledar, the Russians continued to press on Ukrainian units in the Bakhmut area and stepped up attacks around Vuhledar. Outside these two sectors, the front line remains unchanged despite heavy artillery and ground attacks.
Ukrainian soldiers confirmed their withdrawal from Soledar, especially from the railway station, which administratively belongs to Soledar.
Russian operations north of Soledar are limited by the Bachmutovka River, which 'protects' the left flank of the Russian advance. Wagner PMC fighters captured Krasnopolivka, which they had failed to seize two weeks earlier. In addition, attacks on Rozdolivka began. Relying on Bachmutovka as a natural obstacle, it is possible that the Russians' objective will be to reach Siversk from the south and attempt to trap Ukrainian forces around Vyimka. That said, the pace of the Russian advance has been very gradual. They have only managed to cover about four kilometres in that direction in a week. Siversk is about 20 kilometres from Krasnopolivka, so there is still much fighting ahead for Wagner.
The situation in Bakhmut remains essentially unchanged. The Russians may have captured a few blocks in the residential areas of the city (the eastern parts), but the defensive lines have not been breached. It is apparent, however, that the current priorities lie in storming the villages around Bakhmut rather than the town itself.
South of Bachmut, the Russians are in full control of Opytne and Ivanhrad. After a long battle for Klishchivka, the Russians also finally captured the village. Not only did this allow them to fire the T0504 road linking Bakhmut with Konstantinivka, but they also launched an assault on Ukrainian positions south of Ivanivka. If the village falls, the only viable supply route to Bakhmut will be via Chasiv Yar. Nevertheless, it remains easy for the Russians to pound the road with artillery.
Rochan assesses that the Ukrainians will not defend Bakhmut fiercely. It seems that the Ukrainians are slowly retreating under the weight of Russian attacks. However, this is by choice rather than necessity. If Kyiv really wanted to defend the city at all costs, it would have directed the appropriate capabilities to do so. One of Rochan's sources deployed near Bakhmut told that the aim, as with Soledar, is to bleed the Russians slowly and, if necessary, withdraw in an organised fashion. If the current pace of operations is maintained, the town could fall by the end of winter.
The second notable recent event was the Russian attack on Vuhledar. The situation there is unclear, as both sides present conflicting information.
The Russians launched a series of attacks north of Pavlivka and Mykliskie. However, although there may have been some tactical changes, the Russians did not enter, let alone capture Vuhledar, and the situation in the area remains stable.
Overall, the capture of Soledar brings the Russians somewhat closer to taking control of the rest of the Donetsk region, which is a key Russian objective for the second phase of this war. However, Russian offensive operations are not expected to gain significant momentum after the capture of Soledar and even in the event of the fall of Bakhmut. Although Kramatorsk is only 30 km from Soledar (in a straight line), operationally, Russian forces are not yet ready to launch a large-scale attack in the western direction. In addition, the areas to the east of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are elevated, so the Russians have to fight uphill.
Zaporizhzhya Direction
The situation in the Zaporizhzhya region has remained largely unchanged in recent weeks. Both sides concentrated on positional fighting. The Russians maintained the overall initiative, but the impact of their ground assault on the front line was minimal.
According to Russian sources, a fortnight ago, Russian units carried out several attacks on Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhzhya region, mainly south and southwest of Orichiv. While Ukrainian sources reported that these attacks did not result in any changes on the front line, various Russian sources reported that several settlements were captured. These included Mala Tokmachka, Maly Scherbaky, Lobkove and Kamyanskie. However, no evidence was ever provided to support such claims. Overall, Russian attacks in Zaporizhzhia are opportunistic in nature and exploit Ukrainian weaknesses in that direction.
Kyiv's representatives claim that Moscow has so far not gathered enough forces to launch a major offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region.
On the other hand, Vladimir Rogov, head of the occupation of the Zaporizhzhya region, stated that Kyiv is preparing to attack Melitopol and Berdyansk in the coming months. Presumably in response to this statement, other Russian bloggers made various claims about the heightened level of readiness of Ukrainian forces in the Orichiv sector.
While another Ukrainian offensive may indeed take place in this direction, for the time being, there is no indication of a large-scale Ukrainian build-up of forces at Zaporizhzhya.
Kherson Direction
The Kherson direction also remains relatively quiet. There are also no signs of an offensive from either side. Both sides remain focused on fighting for islands on the Dnieper and artillery attacks. However, the Russians are targeting civilian sites, while the Ukrainians are targeting concentration areas, logistical bases and command centres.
In addition, the fear of HIMARS deters the Kremlin's forces. The Russians wanted to establish Melitopol as their main logistics hub for the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, but US systems covering the city dissuaded the Russians from this decision. The HIMARS were also intended to degrade Russia's ability to dispatch Iranian kamikaze drones, which were deployed south of the Dnieper. As a result, they were redeployed to Crimea and Krasnodar Krai.
The main event last week in Kherson was reports of a Ukrainian reconnaissance mission on the left (south) bank of the Dnieper. According to Russian and Ukrainian sources, there were two such operations.
One of these was carried out on the night of 23-24 January. The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine posted footage assumably showing a special forces infiltration raid near Nova Khakovka (however, the attack actually took place in Dnipryany). The MoD reported that Ukrainian special forces personnel destroyed a Russian command post during the attack and successfully retreated. Russian sources, however, assert that Ukrainians attempted to infiltrate Russian positions, but the attempt was repulsed. Regardless, footage suggests that the attack indeed did take place, but the results were likely limited. The Ukrainians claim to have killed 12 Russian soldiers. Yet, it is doubtful that the Russians would have held an important command post so close to the front line.
We still do not expect any significant changes in this direction, at least until the end of winter. There is no indication that either the Russians or the Ukrainians are preparing a river-crossing operation that would change the status quo.
Belarus Direction
Russian forces continue to be rotated in Belarus, but more troops are coming into the country than leaving. Combat readiness checks are also continuing in many parts of the country. The most important check took place on 11 January and concerned the 72nd Combined Training Centre in Borisov. The centre is the leading mobilisation site of the Belarusian Armed Forces. 200 tanks, 490 amphibious combat vehicles, 240 armoured personnel carriers and 180 pieces of artillery equipment are located there.
An attack from Belarus remains possible, but there is little indication that it will happen any time soon.
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A map of Russian fortifications drawn up by Twitter user Brady Africk also sheds an interesting perspective on the current battlefield. The data is based on satellite images of fortifications that the Russians have established over the past few months.
How to read this? The fortifications clearly show the areas that the Russians consider most at risk. The first such area is the Luhansk region, where Moscow began setting up defences in the immediate aftermath of the Ukrainian Kharkiv offensive. The line runs from Troitske, near the Russian border, to Popasna in the Donetsk region. However, there is a gap between Kreminna and Lysychansk, where no fortifications have been built. The Russians may be hoping to channel the movement of Ukrainian units in this direction. Secondly, it is interesting to note that, no defences have been made in depth in the Luhansk region. This can be clearly seen in comparison with how they were set up in the Zaporizhzhya region. There, defensive lines run not only along the main roads but also around towns such as Tokmak, Ocheretuvate, and Kamianka. What's more, the Russians are also building fortifications on their side of the border, in the Belgorod region, as well as at the entrance to the Crimean Peninsula, which is particularly evident in the vicinity of Armyansk.
