- Hubert Walas
The Kyiv battle victory, the Kharkiv region's recapture, and now the liberation of Kherson. Since March, when the Russians reached the peak of their territorial invasion, the Ukrainians have liberated more than 50% of the occupied territories, some 75,000 square kilometers, the equivalent of the area of the Czech Republic. The moral of the Ukrainian military is soaring, but the Kremlin is putting up a mass of under-equipped and inadequately trained recruits as a human shield against them. Let’s see how the current reshuffle on the front line looks and the prospects for the coming winter.
Kherson Direction:
On November 9th, news of the retreat of Russian forces from Kherson broke out. Rochan admits that although it had expected that the front might break through, the speed at which the Russian defensive lines collapsed was a surprise. We also did not expect Kherson to be surrendered virtually without a fight. Moscow also seems to have learned nothing from the Kharkiv offensive, which wreaked havoc in the Russian public sphere and on Russian Telegram channels. The retreat from Kherson was neither orchestrated nor organized, but it was planned. It is likely that Russian forces near the front line consisted of mobilized reservists and operational formations of ground troops. Most likely, the former were to cover the retreat of the latter. These poorly trained and equipped forces were never able to fulfill this task. This would explain the overnight chaos and speed of the Ukrainian advance.
As previously reported, Russian positions in the northern parts of the Kherson region were untenable due to the successful Ukrainian campaign targeting Russian command posts, logistics centers, bridges, etc., that were located in the area. From a military point of view, the decision to withdraw from the region was a sound one, although probably taken too late. The withdrawal frees up some of the Russian units that were previously deployed in Kherson. These formations are already bolstering the Russian presence in other parts of Ukraine to shift the tactical balance in Russia's favor.
With the loss of Kherson and areas north of the Dnieper, Russia lost more than 50% of the territories it controlled at its peak in March 2022, with most of the areas liberated by the Ukrainians between August and November.
After the withdrawal from the right bank of the Dnieper, Kherson becomes a frontline city, and the Russians are already beginning to shell it. However, for the time being, attacks on the city are sporadic, not systemic. We expected the city to come under regular shelling, as it did in Mykolaiv for several months.
On the other hand, one of the main Russian logistics bases in southern Ukraine at Chaplynka airfield is now within range of Ukrainian HIMARS. Already, the logistics center at Chaplynka has been hit almost daily as the Russians rush to export their equipment. It is still being determined whether the Ukrainians are simply hitting these areas because they are easy targets or whether this is part of a long-term strategy to shape the battlefield, wearing down the Russians and degrading their defensive capabilities. Russian forces have reportedly moved their artillery systems 15-20 km away from the Dnieper to avoid Ukrainian artillery strikes. This would mean that the Ukrainians beat the Russians in that direction with artillery range.
Therefore, the Russians will be forced to redeploy their assets to Crimea. The withdrawal from Kherson also means that Mykolaiv will be out of range of Russian frontline MLRS systems. Only heavy rocket artillery systems could attack the city, but this is unlikely as Moscow saves them for more valuable military targets.
Lugansk Direction:
To the north, Russian defensive lines appear solidly entrenched on the Oskil River. In contrast, going south, the Ukrainian army's attention is primarily focused on the Svatove-Kreminna line. However, despite constant attacks from both sides, we have yet to see any real advances by either the Ukrainians or the Russians near Svatove and Kreminna. It appears that the Ukrainian attacks have stalled, and given reports of Russian reinforcements arriving in the Lugansk region, it seems unlikely that the Ukrainians will break the stalemate quickly. According to the Ukrainian staff, Russian forces from the Kherson region have reached Novoaidar in the Luhansk region. We need to find out how strong and numerous these forces are, and whether they should be followed by more. But it is clear that Moscow is moving its troops from the Kherson region to almost the entire front, including the Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and now Luhansk regions.
Last week, Ukrainians concentrated their attacks on Kuzemivka, Chervonopopivka, Novoselivske, Kolomychivka, Makiivka, Ploshchanka, and Dibrova. It is yet to be known whether any of these attacks were successful.
Interestingly, geolocated footage released by Ukraine's 80th Assault Brigade shows the destruction of a Russian TOR-M2 air defense complex in the village of Dachne, just west of Svatove. The event demonstrates that by using small UAVs, Ukrainians can launch precision strikes against Russian forces behind the front line. Dachne is about 10 km behind the advancing Russian forces. In addition, HIMARS continues to wreak havoc, including in the east. Last week, Kyiv reportedly used HIMAR systems to strike Myrne, Zymohiryja, Starobilsk, Svatove, Bairachky, and Kadiivka.
On the other hand, the Russians attacked near Novoselivkse and Stelmachivka, confirming that both sides are strongly contesting the area. The Russians also attacked in the direction of Biylohorivka, but these attempts were repelled.
Despite much activity on both sides, the front line remained unchanged.
Donetsk direction:
This is an area where Russia clearly maintains the initiative, continuing its attempts to capture Bakhmut and surrounding villages. Given the number of clashes in recent weeks, it also appears that combat operations in this direction are being prioritized. Indeed, the Russians made some territorial gains in the Donetsk region last week, but these changes have not affected the overall operational and strategic picture. Despite attempts to capture Bakhmut since late July and early August, Russian troops have only succeeded in capturing neighboring settlements, with many areas still heavily contested. Even assuming that Bakhmut falls, the Russians will still be more than 20 kilometers away from another town, Kostyantynivka. Russian forces have maintained a general offensive posture toward Spirne and Soledar, but these assaults were unsuccessful last week.
At this point, the Ukrainians are fending off the Russians in Bakhmut, but it is unclear who controls the areas northeast and south of the city. This is particularly true of Opytne, Ivanhrad, and Bakhmutskie. Last week there were reports that the Russians had seized Ivanhrad and Bakhmutske, but the veracity of this claim has yet to be confirmed. Ukrainian reports from Bakhmut describe many Russian attacks as pointless and senseless, disregarding military tactics.
On the other hand, Russian units have captured Pavlivka, although their positions in the settlement are difficult to hold. The village is located lower than neighboring Vuhledar, and Ukrainians holding the latter are in a good position to launch artillery strikes against Russian positions in Pavlivka.
Zaporizhzhya Direction:
There is growing uncertainty about the situation in the region. It appears that Russian forces withdrawn from the Kherson front are being redeployed to Zaporizhzhia, most likely to tip the local balance in their favor. So far, there is no evidence that the Russians are setting up defensive lines similar to those currently being established in the Kherson region. The exception is the areas near Mariupol, but these actions do not appear widespread. This may indicate that Moscow does not plan to remain on the defensive in Zaporizhia in the medium to long term and that offensive actions are likely.
Belarus Direction:
Forces unleashed from the Kherson direction may also end up in Belarus to renew the threat from the north. Kyiv is strongly concerned about the situation in the north, which is not being treated merely as an element of tying down forces. The threat is real. However, it is not about a renewed attack on Kyiv, Ukrainians are more concerned about an attack in the direction of Lviv and Rivne, where the nuclear power plant is located.
Now that we have discussed the operational situation on the battlefield, let’s take a step back to consider the bigger picture.
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First - mobilization. More and more concrete numbers are coming. It can be assumed that Russia has already managed to send approx. 50,000-60,000 mobilized reservists to the front, while 150,000-200,000 continues to receive training in Russia and Belarus. So the total number is comparable to what Russia sent to Ukraine in the first days of the war. Even if training and equipment is poor, which is a fact, one simply must recognize the force that will arrive in Ukraine in the coming weeks and months, no matter how disorganized the mobilization has been. The withdrawal from Kherson, Kharkiv, and the mobilization also plays to Russia's advantage regarding the density of forces on the front lines.
Moscow will have more troops per square kilometer than at any time since early March.
Meanwhile, Moscow is trying to force Kyiv, particularly the West, to the negotiating table. The tool it uses for this purpose is massive attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, primarily energy.
The previous weeks have seen another round of attacks on critical infrastructure targets, which at one point left 10 million Ukrainians without electricity. Ukrainians are intercepting most, they say as many as 80%, of the missiles heading in their direction, but those that reach their targets are causing key damages. Continued attacks could lead to another wave of migration from Ukraine and a humanitarian crisis due to continued power outages and limited access to heating and water. We expect these attacks to continue, especially once winter arrives.
There seems to be an expectation among the broader public that observes the ongoing war that winter will lead to a significant reduction in military activity on both sides, which will open up some room for negotiation. Rochan believes that both assumptions are wrong. First, while the pace of attacks may decrease, military activity is not expected to slow down significantly, especially when it comes to Ukrainians. There is an understanding within the Ukrainian military establishment that Russian forces will be at their weakest during the winter months. Weak logistics, poor access to heavy weapons and inadequately equipped personnel, will weaken Russian forces and make them more susceptible to withdrawal if pressure is exerted by Ukrainian formations. Last week, new videos surfaced on social media showing the poor housing conditions of Russian soldiers in frontline areas. Such conditions will not improve during the coming winter, and Ukrainians will try to use this opportunity to their advantage.
Ukrainians have retaken over half of the territory Moscow controlled at its peak in March 2022. After huge successes in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, Ukrainian forces are on a roll. Morale is incredibly high. Western equipment provides the Ukrainians with an advantage. However, at this stage, Kyiv will find it increasingly difficult to push back the enemy forces. Russia still has enormous manpower potential that could significantly affect the situation in the coming weeks and months. Along Russian lines, there are no longer any obvious weaknesses that can be easily exploited, as was the case earlier this fall. It will therefore be very difficult for the Ukrainians to create the conditions that would ultimately lead to a maneuver that would lead to a large-scale defeat of Russian forces. They are poorly equipped and poorly trained, but their numerical superiority is significant. Moscow is not looking at the quality of its troops - but at holding the line, especially in the short term.
That said, there is a consensus among Ukraine's political-military command that the war can be won within the next two years, which would mean at least a return to the pre-February 2022 borders. However, Western support invariably remains crucial.
