- Hubert Walas
The Russians have fired 300 missiles and 200 drones at Ukrainian cities in five days, resuming a campaign of terror against the Ukrainian population, killing or wounding hundreds. At the same time, the Kremlin's forces are pressing along almost the entire front. The Ukrainian positions on the axis of Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Robotyne are particularly threatened. The situation is difficult, and so the calls for mass mobilisation are growing in the public domain.
Kharkiv Oblast Direction
The Russians are continuing artillery bombardment of civilian infrastructure in the region. According to Oleg Synehubov, head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, the targets of recent shelling included Veterynarne, Synkivka, Petropavlivka and Kupyansk, among others.
Significantly, according to Synehubov, the Russians have not given up their intention to attack Kharkiv again. However, Kremlin forces would first have to retake the critical railway hub of Kupyansk. So, according to Ukrainian reports, the Ukrainian forces are improving their defensive capabilities, including building fortifications - a constant theme along the front.
Luhansk Oblast Direction
The Russians have the initiative in this area. They continue their attacks towards Kupyansk and Lyman, making some territorial gains but without breaking through. Heavy infantry fighting took place near Ivanivka. The Russians aim to gain a bridgehead at Synkivka.
Both sides confirmed the Russian advance east of Terny. This is the key settlement supplying the Ukrainian grouping on the left bank of the Zherebets River. Heavy fighting also continued near the Serebryansky Forest.
According to a Ukrainian source, the Russians have managed to capture two Ukrainian positions southwest of Kreminna. The Russians are said to be attacking with a numerical advantage of 1:5. Russian sources confirm that the Russian offensive in the Serebryansky Forest is continuing and that they have managed to advance up to three kilometres in some places. However, the Ukrainians have put up fierce resistance and are launching attacks of their own.
Donetsk Oblast Direction
The Russians remain heavily committed in the direction of Donetsk. The axes of Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Mariinka remain a priority, and the Russian command is sparing no expense in manpower and other resources to push the Ukrainians out of these - now non-existent - towns.
The changes on the front line, week by week, are not spectacular, but the Kremlin's cumulative gains over the past two months are noticeable. This can be seen in our animation below, which compares the current front line with that of early November. The biggest Russian advances have indeed been in the Donetsk region and can be seen on the axes of Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Mariinka.
But let us turn to the current situation. A Ukrainian source reports that the Russians are advancing on Chasiv Yar. The situation is similar at Bohdanivka, where the aggressors are said to have advanced up to 500 metres into the settlement.
Ukrainian forces are holding their positions near Khromove and Ivanivske. However, the Russians are pushing along the road from the Dachi side. It appears that the Russians expect that once Bohdanivka is under their control, the Ukrainian defence of Chasiv Yar will crumble and the Ukrainians will be forced to withdraw. There have been no recent developments in Bakhmut itself.
Nevertheless, some Ukrainian sources believe that the overall situation on the Bachmut axis is worse than in Avdiivka. The reason for the worsening situation near Bakhmut is to be the deployment of fresh Russian reserves, which have pushed Moscow's forces forward. As a result, the Russians have gained more ground on the Bakhmut axis than in the Avdiivka area. As a reminder - all the sources mentioned in this material can be found in the Ukraine Conflict Monitor report on Rochan’s substack - link in the description.
The Russians were also supposed to launch more attacks on the approach to Ocheretyne. The aggressors were also to enter Stepove, from which Ukrainian forces have been pushing them out every day. A major Russian attack near the Avdiivka coke plant took place on 22 December, but the Ukrainians managed to repel it. Heavy fighting is continuing near Novokalynove. The Russians are also trying to push towards Novobakhmutivka.
However, there are still reports of Russian infantry refusing to obey orders. Such reports have appeared twice in the last week, on two different occasions.
The situation in Avdiivka itself remains unchanged. The town is still ringed on three sides. The Ukrainian pocket is about 4 kilometres wide. Commenting on the situation in the city on Tuesday 26 December, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Valeriy Zaluzhny, said that within 2-3 months Avdiivka could suffer the same fate as Bakhmut, i.e. total destruction. He went on to say that if the Ukrainians "don’t have enough force and we (will) see what is better to save people, we will make that decision. We will save the people and then recapture it. It will depend on the situation”. This statement seems to indicate that Zaluzhny is considering withdrawing from the area if he deems it necessary. This approach contrasts with previous Ukrainian operations, particularly in Bakhmut, where the town was defended for too long, resulting in significant losses of Ukrainian manpower and artillery.
Despite the Russian onslaught from three sides, Oleksandr Shtupun, spokesman for the Joint Press Centre of the Tavriia (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts), said that there was currently no real threat of an encirclement of Avdiivka. He explained that Moscow is losing 300-400 soldiers a day (killed and wounded). Although the Russian attacks do not stop, Shtupun added that the Ukrainians are withdrawing reserves and regrouping to deal with the situation.
Looking ahead - the Russians are also advancing on Sjeverne and Pervomaiske. Almost all of Marinka is also now in Russian hands.
On Monday (25 December), Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian troops had completely liberated Marinka. But the Ukrainians say they are in possession of several streets. However, 90% of Mariinka can be considered to be under Russian control. The town itself no longer exists. The Ukrainians are building fortifications on the outskirts of the ruins of Mariinka.
The Russians are also attacking the outskirts of Novomykhailivka, as well as Pobieda and Heorhiivka. These locations are expected to be key to an offensive on Novomykhailivka from the north, opening the way to the key Ukrainian logistics hub of Kurakhove, which feeds into the Vuhledar units. There have been no major developments in Vuhledar itself recently.
Southern Ukraine Direction
The Zaporizhia front line has remained essentially frozen over the past two months. The biggest change is the turnaround on the Orichiv axis. The Russians managed to reduce the breach near Robotyne, where the Ukrainians lost part of their hard-won territory.
Ukrainian sources report that the Russians are continuing their 'meat assaults' at Robotyne, but lately, their progress has been non-existent and their losses enormous. Similar attacks continue from the Verbove direction.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources have reported developments near Novofedorivka and P'yatykhatky.
Kherson & Crimea Direction
The Ukrainians continue to maintain bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. The one at Krynki is even slightly larger than it was two months ago. But in principle, the chances of extending this presence are slim. The Ukrainians tried to push south of the settlement but were stopped.
On Saturday 23 December, the Ukrainian air force command reported that the Russians had lost three Su-34s fighter planes. It is not clear how this happened, but it is likely that the Ukrainians moved some of their Patriot batteries closer to the front line and attacked the Russian bombers from a distance. It is also unclear who provided the targeting data, but some sources suggest that it was a NATO AWACS that assisted the Ukrainians in this successful operation.
In addition, on the night of 26 December, Lieutenant-General Mykola Oleshchuk, commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, confirmed that the Ukrainians had carried out a successful strike that destroyed the Russian Large Landing Ship (LLS) Novocherkassk (Ropukha-class, design 775) in Crimea. At around 02:30, Ukrainian aircraft fired cruise missiles at the Novocherkassk while it was in the port of Theodosia. It was not specified how many and what type of missiles were used. Sevastopol News later reported that 74 sailors had been killed and 27 wounded in the attack. Explosions after the attack showed a very large blast, indicating that the ship was carrying ammunition. Rochan estimates that more such attacks on Crimea are likely in the coming months.
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Coming back to the big picture.
On Friday 29 December, the Russians launched their second biggest to date missile attack on Ukraine. They launched a total of 158 missiles, including Shahed 131/136 drones, air defence missiles, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and anti-ship missiles. By comparison, the Russians launched 160 missiles on the first day of the war. The Ukrainian air defence managed to deal with less sophisticated targets (cruise missiles and Shehed drones). At the same time, it did not intercept any Iskander or Kinzhal ballistic missiles. 39 people were killed.
The Russians attacked Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Lviv and Zaporizhzhia. They destroyed a shopping centre and blocks of flats, but also military installations, some of which were linked to the production of missiles and drones. It is, therefore clear that the Russians' main objective was to limit Ukraine's ability of missile and drone production, especially long-range ones. The Russians are continuing their campaign of terror against the civilian population. What’s more a Russian missile is reported to have violated the airspace of a NATO country - Poland. The missile entered Polish airspace at 7.12am local time and left after three minutes. Polish and allied systems tracked the missile's flight path. In the evening of the same day, the Poles engaged their F-16s due to increased Russian long-range aviation activity.
On Saturday, the Russians mostly stopped their rocket attack, while the Ukrainians responded with their own attack on Belgorod. Twenty people were killed and 100 injured. Explosions were also heard in Sevastopol, Crimea.
In the following days, the Russians resumed the missile campaign. On 31 December, 49 objects were fired, on 1 January 122, on 2 January 130. The last one only, on 2 January, killed or injured 130 people across Ukraine. In total, Russia used about 300 missiles and 200 drones in 5 days.
Overall, the emerging trend is clear. The Ukrainians are on the defensive all along the front. The Russians are making some tactical gains, particularly in the Donetsk region, which is now the centre of gravity of the war - this is also the aim of the Russian political command. However, the offensive posture of the Russians is not leading to operational, let alone strategic, success.
There are two main reasons for the current war situation. First, the Russian manpower advantage, which is reinforced by the Russian command's much greater propensity to lose resources, especially human resources, in massive attacks on Ukrainian positions.
Secondly, the a lack of artillery ammunition on the Ukrainian side. In the Bakhmut area, the Russians now have a 4/5:1 artillery advantage over the Ukrainians, whereas in the summer the ratio was 1:1. As Rochan writes, based on his own field interviews in November, this change in ratio is not necessarily due to the increased number of Russian artillery attacks. Since the summer, the Ukrainians have fired fewer projectiles because the West has failed to deliver on its promises and pre-agreed timetables. As a result, the Ukrainians are suffering from missile hunger and need to conserve ammunition in case they need to increase their rate of fire immediately.
This is confirmed by the words of Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, Commander of the Tavriia (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts) Operational Strategic Group, who said in an interview with BBC Ukraine that the situation on the front line has not yet reached a stalemate, but admits that it is complicated. The Russians have intensified their operations along almost the entire front line. The strategic objective remains the elimination of Ukrainian statehood.
The Ukrainians are, therefore, looking for answers to the challenges of the current stage of the war. The first is to intensify the construction of fortifications, as Zelensky himself admits. First and foremost, he says, around the cities in the east - most likely Avdiivka and Bakhmut, and between Kupyansk and Lyman. These are undoubtedly the regions that Kyiv considers most at risk.
Another answer, this time much more difficult, is mass mobilisation. This issue was raised on 17 December by the head of the Ukrainian intelligence service, General Kyrylo Budanov. He said that Ukraine currently has no alternative to (mass) mobilisation. Regardless of its effectiveness, voluntary recruitment will not provide the numbers needed to meet the needs of the armed forces. Budanov rightly noted that Ukrainians who were willing or able to fight joined the armed forces or other organisations (such as the National Guard) within the first six months of the full-scale Russian invasion.
Budanov emphasised two important points. First, if Kyiv wants to deploy new forces on the battlefield, it needs mass mobilisation. Other 'recruitment drives' will not suffice. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Budanov admitted that the armed forces have reached a dead end when it comes to voluntary recruitment. Ukrainians do not want to go to war. This is nothing new. A senior Ukrainian military intelligence officer Rochan spoke to in Ukraine in July said precisely the same thing.
Many soldiers of the Ukrainian armed forces have been fighting in the war for more than a year. They are exhausted and receive very little time off from the front line. Changes are being made to allow 30 days of leave, which can be taken over the course of a year. Even so, Kyiv should begin to consider demobilising some of its forces, especially as there is growing discontent among the families of those who are permanently serving.
Mass mobilisation would resolve this issue. But more importantly, it would allow Kyiv to withdraw some of its most experienced units from the front lines, regenerate them and prepare them for the 2024/25 offensive. Continuous deployment close to the front lines, coupled with a lack of time for training, was one of the most common complaints we heard in Ukraine in November, admits Rochan. The establishment of fortified lines should also reduce the density of forces needed to protect critical areas, meaning that even more personnel can train in the rear to increase their overall combat effectiveness.
Referring to Budanov's comments, President Zelenski said on Tuesday, 19 December, that the General Staff wants to mobilise 450,000-500,000 troops. Zelenski called the mobilisation issue "delicate and costly”. He explained that mobilisation in the format suggested by the General Staff would cost US$13 billion. Zelensky also wants to know more details: "What will happen to Ukraine's million-strong army? What will happen to these people who have been defending our country for two years? We have issues with rotation and leave. It should be a comprehensive plan."
Zelenski faces a very difficult choice. On the one hand, many young Ukrainians may be conscripted, but Zelenski hopes that this generation will rebuild the country after the war. On the other hand, if Ukraine loses the war, there will be nothing to rebuild, and young Ukrainians may leave the country en masse. From the point of view of the armed forces, mobilisation is crucial if Ukraine wants to try to regain lost territory. Time is also not working in its favour. The later they mobilise, the less time they will have to train and the less effective the soldiers will be. All the more so, as the Russian armed forces are expected to grow, especially their assault elements. Putin's concerns about mobilisation, on the other hand, may relate to labou r market shortages.
While the decision to mobilise and construct fortifications remains in the hands of the Ukrainians, Kyiv has much less control over the shortage of artillery ammunition. The Ukrainians want to produce Western ammunition in Ukraine and have tentatively agreed with two US companies to produce 155mm ammunition. However, this is a delayed solution as production will not start for another two years. Artillery ammunition is, therefore, an area where Kyiv is completely dependent on the will and capabilities of the West - we have discussed these issues in more detail in our recent international situation Reports.
And so at the beginning of 2024, the Russians have the preponderance of firepower and equipment. They will continue ground attacks in the Donetsk region, a priority area for the Russian political-military command. Ukrainian soldiers face very difficult months ahead, as insufficient artillery shells and poorly developed fortifications will limit their defensive potential. Further losses are likely, especially around the village of Robotyne (including the village itself).
The Ukrainian political leadership also faces difficult choices in terms of mass mobilisation. The question is for the Ukrainian population itself. To what extent is it ready to make such a sacrifice? It is possible that such a decision would also lead to a greater willingness to provide arms and ammunition from the West, as this would be a strong argument for those who work on further support for Ukraine abroad, particularly in the United States.
