- Hubert Walas
As the threat of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south has increased, the Russians have begun to redeploy their human and equipment resources near Kherson, in effect doubling their capabilities in that direction. Russian forces maintain the overall initiative in this war, but due to major manpower problems, they are only able to operate effectively in two directions simultaneously. Currently, this is the Bakmhut and Kherson directions. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians continue to neutralize Russian logistics, bridges and command centers, causing panic among Russian vacationers in Crimea.
Kharkiv front:
This is currently the calmest direction in terms of ground operations. The Russians are deeply entrenched in the areas north of Kharkiv and, despite sporadic attacks, cannot gain more ground. Similarly, the Ukrainians, with their current forces, cannot push the Russians out. The front line thus remains static, and the situation is not expected to change any time soon. On the other hand, the Kharkiv region is the second most heavily shelled region in Ukraine, this way, the Russians want to tie up Ukrainian forces and prevent them from concentrating in other directions.
South of Kharkiv, Ukrainians have pushed back the Russians from Krasnopilia and Dolyna along the M03 road. Barvinkove continues to remain under the control of Kyiv forces. Due to a lack of manpower, Russia had to let go of some areas of the front. Near Izyum, it replaced about five BTGs with two or three. This drop in presence allowed the Ukrainians to gradually gain positions south of the city.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces are also launching attacks on targets inside Russia, such as an arms depot in Timonovo, 31km from the border. Another potentially valuable target is Urazovo, 23km south of Timonovo. The Ukrainians are most likely carrying out these attacks with their own capabilities rather than HIMARS so as not to strain American confidence. Currently, the Russians maintain some 15 BTGs in this direction.
Siversk/Bachmut front:
Last week, the aggressors began testing the defenders' lines south of Siversk, near Vyimka, but this attempt was fruitless. The Ukrainians control Ivano-Dar'ivka and Spirne to the south, and Serebrianka and Hryhorivka north of Siversk. Russian attacks have no effect and are unable to punch a hole in Ukrainian defensive lines. But even if they did succeed, they lack the reserves to exploit the gaps and make rapid advances.
Moving further south, the Russian presence in Soledar has not expanded. The attackers are concentrating on the Yakovlivka area. If this area is captured, it will allow them to move closer to the main road connecting Bakhmut and Siversk. The coming weeks will show whether this is the plan.
Currently, one of the main Russian targets is Bakhmut, where Moscow's forces remain very active. However, in this area as well, Russian gains remain small. The Russians are probably now in the Bakhmuts'ke area, some 6 km east of Bakhmut. South of the city, the Russians are present in Vershyna, but attacks on Zaitseve and Vesela Dolyna were unsuccessful. The Russians captured Siemyhirja but were unable to advance to Kodema. Meanwhile, maintaining control of Kodema is crucial because of the hills west of the city, which help keep the Russians away from Mykolaivka Druha and the road connecting Horlivka to Bakhmut.
Donetsk front:
Operations near Donetsk have also intensified in the past month. The Russians have been on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka for two weeks now. In addition, they may have captured Opytne, although this information remains unconfirmed. This village's fall would be substantial because it would allow the Russians to approach Avdiivka from behind. There is no conclusive information on Pisky. The Russians continue to claim that the town is almost under their control and have begun a push toward Pervomais'ke. The Ukrainians deny these claims, and the Russians have provided no evidence that this has happened.
Zaporizhia front:
Although the overall situation in Zaporizhia remains stable, the Russians are launching pinpoint attacks. Last week they attacked Yehrorivka. Rochan maintains that Russian forces in the area are primarily tasked with protecting the right flank of Russian and proxy forces deployed in the Kherson region and preventing any Ukrainian attempts to break through Russian lines and approach Melitopol.
Kherson Front:
The Ukrainians are maintaining their presence near the south side of the Inhulets River, probably between Bilohirka and Andriivka. However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces appear to be expanding their presence horizontally, not vertically. In other words, the Ukrainians cannot build up depth. They have little room to maneuver due to the Inhulets River behind them. Last week, the Russians made counterattacks in the region, but to no avail.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on weapons depots, transportation hubs, or bridges severely hampered Russian logistics near Kherson. The Antonovsky Bridge and the bridge in Nova Khakovka are under constant attack. Attacks are renewed as the Russians try to repair these bridges quickly. As a result, Russian supply lines are severely strained but are not completely paralyzed.
The Russians primarily use two main routes to transfer troops and equipment to the Kherson region:
The first is: Kerch - Dzhankoy - Armyansk - Kherson
The second: Kerch - Dzhankoy - Novooleksiivka - Kakhovka
A recent attack on an ammunition depot in Maiske near Dzhankoy caused minor traction damage. Nevertheless, damage to the rails near Dzhankoy could significantly complicate Russian logistics in the region.
That said, it should be noted that the Russians are making large transfers of men and weapons to the southern theater of operations. Before the Russian concentration, Moscow had about 13-15 BTGs in the region north and south of the river. Now that presence has doubled. The Ukrainians have not made any advances in the area for weeks. Nor is the city threatened from the east or west. Instead, the Russians are moving both heavy and light equipment to the northern part of the region. Their positions have been strengthened, not weakened. For this reason, Rochan maintains that a major Ukrainian counterattack in this direction is currently unlikely.
So far, the Ukrainians' plan in the Kherson region has been to isolate Russian formations north of the Dnieper River by destroying bridges, degrading Russian ability to command their units by attacking command&control centers, and destroying Russian long-range air defenses by attacking forward deployed S-300 batteries with US-supplied AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles. Recent attacks, especially against targets in Crimea, indicate that this tactic will continue.
The Ukrainian attacks also have an essential PR dimension. Thousands of cars trying to leave Crimea and Belgorod do not speak well of Russian air defense capabilities and the overall deterrence capability of the Russian Armed Forces. Moreover, the number of very similar strikes over the past week in Crimea probably indicates that the Ukrainians have their own ballistic missile capabilities, and this is not Tochka-U.
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The impact of the Ukrainian attacks confirms the FIRMS data, which shows a decline in the number of fires recently. The decrease in the number of fires goes hand in hand with the reduction of artillery strikes reported by the Russians. This likely indicates the inability of Russian artillery units to maintain their previous pace of attacks. It is unclear whether this is due to Ukrainian attacks on Russian ammunition depots, dwindling artillery stocks, or both at the same time.
Despite the significant influence of the HIMARS and the tough stance of the Ukrainians, it should be noted that the Russians still maintain the overall initiative in this war. However, due to major manpower problems, Russian advances are very limited. For example, the Russians tried for two months to capture Novoluhanskie near Donetsk, which was very close to the front line before February 24. They finally achieved the goal in late July, but certainly at a high cost. Personnel problems the Russians are trying to patch up with so-called "Volunteer Battalions." The recruitment goal is to create a battalion of about 400 soldiers in each of Russia's 85 regions, bringing the total to 34,000 fighters. Recruitment began in June and reportedly picked up pace in July. To entice people to sign up, Moscow is offering high salaries, an equivalent of $2,100-$5,000 a month, as well as bonuses. However, the combat capabilities of such battalions are minimal.
A potential Ukrainian offensive in the south, due to the opponent's concentration of large forces, is much less likely now than it was even a month ago. There have been no recent deliveries of heavy equipment from Western Europe, highlighting the limit of what Europe can and is willing to pull from its stockpile. Poland has likely committed to sending another 400 tanks, but this process will take several years. Warsaw is unlikely to transfer its tanks until it begins receiving K2s from South Korea and Abrams from the United States in 2023.
Whereas, it is unclear if the Russians will want to cement their current gains by declaring a referendum and annexation at all costs. Such a move, when the situation in the contested regions continues to heat up, could look hasty and unprepared and therefore be read as a sign of weakness.
Last week, Aleksandr Lukashenko spoke about the possibility of Belarus joining the war. He claimed that he had no intention of sending ''his children to fight,'' but ''we will continue to bomb Ukraine'' from our territory. He added that not Ukraine, but NATO is at war with Russia. The conflict should have ended long ago, but the United States and Poland still ignite it. Earlier, Lukashenko warned Kyiv against Belarus targeted aggression, saying that in such a case, the Belarusian army would strike Kyiv immediately, without even entering Ukrainian territory. These are, of course, empty threats since Belarusian missile forces by themselves do not have enough potential to threaten Ukraine realistically. Lukashenko is flexing his muscles in fear of potential Ukrainian retaliation against military targets within Belarus., Rochan estimates that the chances of a ground attack by Belarus against Ukraine remain illusory.
Also, looking more broadly at the entire theater of warfare, there is little indication of a dramatic change on the battlefield anytime soon.
