- Hubert Walas
After the strategic successes of the Ukrainians at Kyiv, Kharkiv or Kherson, came a period of positional fighting. The front line has stabilised. However, this by no means indicates peace. On the contrary, the Ukrainians are advancing on Kreminna and eliminating several hundred Russian soldiers with a singular rocket attack on a school; on the other hand, the Russians continuously put pressure on Bakhmut, despite the Ukrainians' recent counterattack.
Kharkiv/Luhansk Direction
Ukrainians keep the initiative in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts. The changes are not sudden, but the Armed Forces of Ukraine are moving forward. The Ukrainians probably captured Chervonopopivka and cut off the road connecting Svatowe with Kreminna. In general, Ukrainians are approaching the latter city. Their presence is confirmed in a heavily forested area south of Kreminna. The Ukrainians will probably reach Kreminna soon, but the city is unlikely to be captured immediately.
Although the fall of Kreminna would be a tactical success for Kyiv, it will not have a significant operational impact. The entire area is quite heavily urbanised. Cities like Rubizne, Lysychansk and, above all, Severodonetsk will still pose a significant challenge for Ukrainians fighting in this direction.
In an ideal scenario, Kyiv would like to surround these cities from Rubizhne to Borivske, while the Siversky Donets river would limit the Russian depth and thus limit the Russian manoeuvre. A simultaneous attack from Spirne in the direction of Borivske would then cut off the Russian forces in the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk area. This is just one of the likely scenarios that Kyiv can pursue.
The Russians are trying to retaliate with counterattacks, as well as transborder attacks. According to the Ukrainian staff, the Russians carried out a cross-border attack on Ternova. They did not capture the village and were probably pushed back by the Ukrainian territorial defence forces. However, this event demonstrates Russia's ability and readiness to carry out small-scale attacks or airstrikes across the border, mainly to force Kyiv to keep troops on the border with Russia. Such attacks will probably continue in the future.
Moving south, since the capture of Kyslivka by the Ukrainians, we have not seen any major changes in the front near Dvorichne. Kyiv forces tried to advance on Nizhnya Duvanka, but these attempts did not bring any changes on the front. The Russians have been expecting a bigger Ukrainian push towards Nizhnya Duvanka for weeks, but this has not happened. Both sides have also been fighting for Novoselivske for weeks. The Russians probably control the settlement, but it can be assumed that the entire area around the R-66 road is heavily contested.
The relationship of forces in this direction is confirmed by the words of the governor of the Luhansk region, Serhiy Haidai. In early December, he stated that the Russians are building a third line of defence near Starobielsk. The first is based on the Oskil River, and the second is set between Svatove and Kreminna. It can be assumed that the Russians are considering a scenario in which their forces at Swatowe surrender and will be forced to retreat behind another line of defence. Starobilsk is located about 50 kilometres or 30 miles from the current frontline.
Donetsk Direction
Just as the Ukrainians retain the initiative in the Kharkiv and Luhansk directions, the Russians are generally the dominant party in the Donetsk direction.
For months, the Russians have been advancing on Bakhmut literally meter by meter. However, the December attack by the Ukrainians effectively wiped out the last few months of Russian territorial progress. As a result, the Russians were driven back from Bakhmut and Opytne. The attack coincided with President Zelensky's visit to the city, which has become the epicentre of recent military operations.
Last week, however, confirmed that the Russians' determination to capture Bakhmut remains strong, and its combat potential in this region is not exhausted. As a result, the Russians have already managed to recapture most of Opytne and again bite into Bakhmut.
In addition, the Russians maintained a general thrust in the Siwersk direction by attacking Verkhnokamianske and Spirne. Capturing Spirne would allow Moscow to cut off the Ukrainian forces at Bilohorovka. However, even at the height of their artillery attacks in the summer and after the fall of Lysychansk, the Russians failed to approach Siversk. We expect no changes in this respect. But, it must be added that the Russians tried to extend their attacks horizontally towards Siwersk, trying to break through the Ukrainian defences near Vesele, towards Vyimka. Recently, however, they have not achieved any gains in this area, and the front line has remained unchanged.
The capture of Yakovlivka facilitated the attack on Vesele. Capturing this village allows the Russians to advance either north towards Vesele or west, north of Soledar. So far, Moscow seems to have chosen the first option, but it is likely to shift its forces to another axis if attacks to the north fail to produce the desired results.
The Russians also remained offensively engaged in the Avdiivka area and the outskirts of Donetsk. They attacked Avdiivka almost every day, and artillery attacks on the city were regular. However, the front line in this area has not changed. Despite the ongoing fighting in Mariinka, the situation in the city has hardly changed. Although the situation is fluid, it can be assumed that control over the city is divided in half.
Rochan still maintains that the Russians must be dispersed to avoid being annihilated by HIMARS attacks. Yet, this is not a permanent practice in Russian forces, as was shown by the massacre in Makiivka, in the Donetsk region. On Sunday, information appeared about the HIMARS strike on a school in Makiivka, where mobilised Russian reservists were located. What's more, the building was also supposed to be a storage place for ammunition. The number of dead is not verifiable. The Russian MOD reported 89 victims of the attack, but unofficial reports say up to 600 dead and wounded. Russian Telegram accounts described the attack: "slaughter, tragedy, mass grave". Interestingly, the attack was to be carried out on New Year's Eve and during Vladimir Putin's speech. With Ukrainian access to Western intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT) and weak operational security in the rear, Russian forces are very vulnerable to such strikes.
Zaporizhzhya Direction
In the past weeks, we have not noted any major developments on the frontline in the Zaporizhzhya region. Military activity is limited to artillery exchanges on the front line and ground fighting. There are also no indications to suggest that either side is preparing for a large-scale attack to break the stalemate in this direction.
Still, two long-term developments can be discerned. The first relates to Russian defensive actions in anticipation of a Ukrainian ground attack and the second to Ukrainian precision attacks on Russian targets in southern Ukraine. Confirmations of these assumptions can be noticed. Firstly, the Russians started to build fortifications in Rozivka, on the approach to Mariupol.
Secondly, Kyiv continues to strike Russian targets. According to the Ukrainian staff, a rocket strike destroyed an anti-aircraft missile complex, an ammunition depot and five pieces of military equipment near Polohy and Velyka Bilozerka. A missile strike was also carried out against an S-300 system in an unspecified area in the Zaporizhzhya region, destroying various pieces of equipment and injuring 150 people.
There were reports on social media that the Russian reservists' base in Tytove had also been hit, while the Ukrainian General Staff said that a missile strike near Novobilozerivka had injured up to 100 Russian service members, 15 of whom were serving in the FSB.
It appears that the Ukrainian strategy in Zaporizhzhya resembles that of Kherson. As a result of the constant threat of HIMARS attacks, Russian forces will have to remain heavily dispersed, with their logistical lines and command and control centres under constant attack. Consequently, the likelihood of a large-scale Russian counterattack is minimal. Time will tell whether this will also lead to a concentration of Ukrainian forces for another offensive later this winter. According to Russian sources, in December, the Ukrainians assembled three manoeuvre brigades and five territorial defence brigades in this direction. This is an insufficient force for a large-scale counter-attack, although it may indicate the early stages of a build-up of forces.
Kherson Direction
As in the Zaporizhzhya region, recent times have not brought any changes in the Kherson region. Here, too, there is no indication that either side is preparing a large-scale operation. Russian forces in the area are too weak and too dispersed to undertake a river crossing operation of high complexity. Such an operation is beyond Russian capabilities at this stage, and there is no indication that the situation will change over the winter.
The Russians are concentrating their efforts on patrolling the islands on the Dnieper and conducting artillery strikes against Ukrainian military and civilian targets north of the river. The Russians regularly shell Kherson, Nikopol, Oleshki and Ochakiv in southern Ukraine.
Ukrainian artillery also remains active. According to the Ukrainians, 200 Russian service members were killed due to a missile strike near Fedorivka. Other Russian concentration sites i.e. Chaplynka, Velyka Lepetykha, Kakhovka, and Radensk were also allegedly hit.
Belarus Direction
Belarus remains unknown. In the last month, both Sergei Shoigu and Vladimir Putin made trips to Belarus, which is not a frequent event. Many read this as a growing argument that Minsk will soon join the war. Rochan estimates the chances of this eventuality at 50%. Belarus continues to conduct multi-unit readiness exercises, but their scale is unclear.
In mid-December, The Economist published an interview with General Valerii Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces. Zaluzhnyi stated that Moscow is preparing about 200,000 fresh soldiers (reservists) and that there is no doubt that "Russia will attack Kyiv once more". Rochan thinks that's not completely certain. A strike from Belarus creates opportunities, but it is also loaded with high risk. The level of readiness, experience and equipment of the Ukrainians differs from that of February 2022. Kyiv has been preparing for such a scenario for months. The topography is also not helping attackers, because swamps, rivers and other watercourses complicate the operations of armoured formations and make it easier for defenders to channel the movement of advancing formations into minefields or areas covered by massed artillery fire.
Russia Direction
In addition to ongoing sabotage activities, the Ukrainians occasionally carry out drone strikes against targets in Russia proper. The most important such event recently was the Ukrainian strikes on the Russian long-range airbases in Saratov (Engels-2) and Ryazan (Dyagilevo). Ryazan is about 500 km from the Ukrainian border, while Saratov is about 600 km away. Combat damage assessment indicates that the Tu-22M3 ("02 red" RF-34110) and the APA-80 ground propulsion unit at Dyagilewo were damaged. Satellite images published by ImageSat Intl. show traces of burning near the Tu-22M3 bomber in Dyagilevo. According to the Russian Ministry of National Defense, it was Soviet jet drones (probably Tu-141) that struck air bases to disable Russian long-range aircraft. According to the Russians, anti-aircraft defences intercepted unmanned aerial vehicles near the bases, and falling debris and a "fragments explosion" slightly damaged two aircraft. The losses have a marginal impact on the Russian bomber fleet, but they prove that Kyiv can fight back even without ATACAMS missiles. It is possible, however, that due to this strike, some aircraft were moved to other bases.
Attacks on Ukrainian targets throughout the country, but on a much larger scale, are constantly carried out by Moscow. On the day of the attack on Russian bases, Kremlin forces launched another wave of attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure targets. In total, more than 70 rockets were fired, of which, according to the Ukrainians, more than 60 were shot down. Thus, the impact on the power grid was relatively limited. Repairs were made quickly, but the planned power outages, depending on the intensity of Russian strikes, will remain in Ukraine until spring due to the power deficit and damage to transmission lines.
Recent weeks have shown that the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense is constantly increasing. Ukrainians are able to shoot down 80-85% of incoming missiles or drones. There were situations when all incoming objects were shot down. Therefore, the Russians try to shift their tactics and attack one target with more missiles, with the so-called saturation attack, they try to dominate the anti-aircraft defence in a given area, increasing the chances of hitting the target. On the other hand, this approach consumes more rockets.
A few more puzzles that make up the entire Ukrainian air defence system will be added by the Patriot battery, which the Americans have committed to deliver to the Ukrainians. Recent reports suggest that the Patriot unit may appear in Ukraine as early as February, which is very soon. We do not want to speculate, but Ukrainians can already train in using the system. A typical Patriot battery consists of up to eight launchers, each equipped with four tubes. As a result, the battery can fire up to 32 rounds in one salvo. One Patriot battery will not drastically increase the range of Ukrainian air defence. It will allow for filling some gaps, but its protection area is relatively small.
On the other hand, it increases Western support for Ukraine, thus making Kyiv's struggle more sustainable in the long run. It also probably paves the way for deploying additional batteries and possibly other systems in Ukraine.
This may be necessary given the recent speeches of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. There is no indication that both sides are willing to engage in real negotiations. In early December, Putin said that Russian actions in Ukraine could be a "lengthy process" and that the territorial gains were "very significant results for Russia." Putin described the Sea of Azov as "the inner sea of the Russian Federation".
Three days later, Zelensky replied that the war did not start in 2022, but in 2014 when the Russians grabbed Crimea. He stated that the war could end only when the Ukrainians regained the Crimean peninsula. "The return of Crimea will mean the restoration of real peace," Zelenski said.
Therefore, it can be said with great confidence that it is implausible that Ukraine will enter into negotiations with Russia, which will not result in the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. Kyiv largely maintains the initiative and has achieved significant operational successes since September. Access to Western-made equipment and ammunition, and Western-provided intelligence, favor Kyiv in this war. There are also no signs of a sudden international situation change, in which support for Ukraine, e.g. due to the cold winter, would decrease. That said, both sides need to be prepared for months of fierce fighting ahead.
