- Hubert Walas
As we're approaching two months since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, we can try to draw the first general conclusions. All the more so as we have recently seen Kyiv shifting the Ukrainian 9th Army Corps with the 10th. On the other hand, Ukraine warns that Russia has amassed 100,000 troops, along with 900 tanks and 370 MLR systems, in the direction of Kupiansk.
Let’s start with the traditional look at the map, and we’ll finish with the assessment of the current state of the war based on Konrad Muzyka's trip to Ukraine, together with Franz Stefan-Gady, Mike Kofman, and Rob Lee.
Kharkiv Direction
The overall operational situation in Kharkiv Oblast remained unchanged. The Russians have continued tactical attacks near Masyutivka, Lyman Pershyi and Synkivka. Over the weekend, a Russian source said Russian forces had captured several positions near the first two settlements.
According to Hanna Malyar, Ukraine's deputy defence minister in the Kupyansk direction, the Russians had been actively conducting assault operations to push the Ukrainians across the Oskil River. However, these attempts were unsuccessful.
Although we could not confirm these developments, a Russian source claimed on Monday that Ukrainian activity near Kupyansk was high, indicating preparations for an offensive. Elements of the 95th Air Assault Brigade were reportedly observed near Synkivka. Indeed, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that the Ukrainian 95th Air Assault Brigade had launched a counterattack near Masyutivka and Petropavlovka, suggesting that the Ukrainians were conducting limited ground attacks in the region.
The almost complete lack of visual evidence of any change in the front line hampers our understanding of the current state of affairs in the Kupyansk axis. In general, we haven't noticed any significant changes in the Russian military's involvement in the Kharkiv region, and we don't expect any major changes in their operations in the direction of Kupyansk. On the other hand, we must emphasise that just because there's no evidence yet doesn't mean that no such preparations are ongoing.
Luhansk Direction
In recent weeks, the Ukrainians warned that the Russians had deployed 100,000 men, backed by more than 900 tanks and 370 MLR systems, in the direction of Luhansk and Kharkiv. At the same time, the Russians tightened control over the residents of the occupied territories in the Luhansk region to prevent them from providing information on the movements of Russian forces to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). Additional checkpoints were set up in the Svatove district and movement between villages was restricted.
In this context, Russian sources reported that Serhiivka and Nadiya had been captured on 25JUL. The Russians also made a breakthrough eight kilometres wide and seven kilometres deep. The source added that if the Russians were to capture Kopanky, two kilometres from the front line, they would gain control of all the dominant heights. The next target would be Borova - the main logistical centre of the entire Ukrainian grouping in the direction of Lugansk.
A Ukrainian source said that while some stability was achieved on the southern flank near Karmazynivka, the Russians indeed seized Serhiivka and Nadiya. The source also added that Novojehorivka was under Russian control.
Some Russian sources claimed that the Russians had crossed the Zherebets River near Novoyehorivka and extended the bridgehead. Ukrainians said the Ukraine forces had launched counter-attacks, pushing back Russian units. However, it was not until Friday evening that the first geolocated imagery emerged, confirming some Russian gains in recent days. Another Russian source claimed that the Russian units captured 59 square kilometres during the week near Karmazynivka.
The overall situation in these sectors thus remains unclear. Speaking to CNN, the spokesman for the Eastern Grouping of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Serhii Cherevaty, said, “We do not confirm this. The tactical line there has not changed much”.
According to a Russian source, the Russian offensive ran along the entire line between Synkivka – Torske, but from our point of view, the focus is more on the northern part of this front.
Moving further south, Russian claims on the capture of Novoselivske were not confirmed, although the Ukrainian source said that Russian operations were focused on Stelmakhivka. Another Ukrainian source said that, near Novoselivske, which has already changed hands more than ten times, the Russians conducted local attacks on foot at night but without success.
Here we must note that you can check out each of the "sources" mentioned in the episode by subscribing to Rochan on substack, where you'll find a link to each of them.
No changes were reported in Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported any near Terny, Yampolivka and Nevske. Same applies to the Bilohorivka area.
In the Kreminna area, positional battles continued in the Serebryansky forest. Although Russians reportedly made some gains therein, no detailed information was provided about these developments.
In recent weeks Russian press reports indicated Ukrainian operations in the Lysychansk direction. Over the past seven days, reports about Ukrainian attacks there continued to surface. Yet, Russians presented no evidence confirming any major Ukrainian activities near Lysychansk.
Donetsk Direction
Ukrainian Armed Forces continued attacks in the Bakhmut area, which remained the centre of gravity for both sides. Again, based on social media reports, they made some progress south of the city, but these claims have not yet been independently verified.
In the north, there were no changes near Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka and Ivano Darivka.
According to the Russian source, on 22 JUL, Ukrainians pushed the Russian troops back to Khromove while repulsing a Russian counterattack near Hryhorivka. Small-scale Russian counterattacks also occurred near Bohdanivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. No changes occurred in Vasiukivka, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka, and Vesele.
Speaking of Bakhmut - based on Ukrainian officials’ comments, Kyiv remains committed to liberating Bakhmut by conducting flanking manoeuvres. In the south of the city the Ukrainians continued to engage Russian forces. According to Hanna Malyar, the UAF have been carrying out successful attacks in this sector and are advancing gradually and steadily. On Monday she claimed that four square kilometres of territory had been liberated in the Bakhmut sector over the previous seven days. In total, the Ukrainians probably have retaken 35 square kilometres south of Bakhmut since mid-May.
One of the most important developments since our last episode is the battle of Klishchiivka, which Ukrainians try to retake. Latest reports suggest that Ukrainians captured Hill 197 and moved into the centre of the village, but the northern part of it was still under Russian control.
What’s more the Ukrainian forces made progress in advancing near Andriivka. On Monday, Andriy Kovalyov, a spokesman for the General Staff, claimed that Ukrainians almost approached the settlement. On Tuesday, a Ukrainian source said that Russians had been pushed out of some parts of the village.
Moving south - neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Keramik, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, Berdychi, Novokalynove, Vesele and Kamyanka. The same pertains to areas which previously saw heavy battles, such as Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Tonenke, Severne, Vodyane and Nevelske.
Russian attacks near Mariinka and Krasnohorivka continued but decreased in intensity over the past seven days.
Southern Ukraine direction
On Wednesday, the 26th of July, Ukrainians committed elements of the 10th Corps in the Orikhiv axis. This development probably marked a rotation of the 9th Corps elements, which offensive potential was exhausted following seven weeks of heavy battles. Available data shows that the Ukrainian forces progressed south and captured several Russian strongholds and trenches east of Robotyne. They have not yet reached the first defensive line, and their further progress hinges on whether they can sustain the forward momentum.
Ukrainians are thus committed to their attacks towards Tokmak.
However, let’s first start with the Velyka Novosilka axis.
After liberating Rivnopil on 26th of June, recently Ukrainians carried on their attacks and gradually moved towards Staromaiorske. On Wednesday, they reportedly gained a foothold in the village and took it on Thursday. We understand that following the liberation of Staromaiorske, Ukrainians subsequently tried to advance towards a nearby Urozhaine, but no information about the situation in this village was published.
We are unaware of any ongoing rotations of Ukrainian forces fighting in the Velyka Novosilka axis. Attacks are still conducted by units involved in the counteroffensive since the start. If no additional forces are deployed, Ukrainian offensive potential, already significantly stretched, could culminate.
Ukrainian units also attacked Russian positions near Pryyutne, but no information appeared in open sources confirming any territorial gains near the settlement.
Going West, as of Friday, Kyiv committed the 10th Corps to attacks east of Robotyne to reinvigorate their attacks in the Orikhiv axis.
On Wednesday, Ukrainians launched a major mechanised push south of Orikhiv. This was the largest use of armour since the counteroffensive began in early June. The Russian MoD assessed that the attack was carried out by three battalions reinforced with tanks. To recap, the initial attack undertaken by the 47th Mechanised Brigade involved three reinforced companies. A Russian blogger claimed Ukrainians deployed 80 armoured vehicles, others said 30, although the extent to which either claim is true is unclear.
From the frontline perspective, Ukrainian units managed to advance east of Robotyne. Meaning some Russian defensive lines were breached, although Ukrainians still had not reached the first main Russian line. Russians also still maintain positions in Robotyne. The deployment of the 10th Corps probably triggered the commitment of the 1429th Motor Rifle Regiment into the area to stall Ukrainian attacks.
When the counteroffensive occurred, the 10th Corps was held in reserve and was presumably to be deployed to exploit gaps in Russian defensive lines when the first echelon forces (9th Corps) achieved a breakthrough. As no such thing happened, the 10th Corps remained uncommitted. The deployment of the corps can bring multiple dividends. The unit is fresh, equipped with western-made equipment, and its command (including the Southern Operational Command) had the time to reflect on the initial days of the campaign when the 9th Corps was stopped after a brief advance. On the other hand, the 10th Corps in combat means that the Ukrainian command does not expect a sudden breakthrough as no large forces are held in reserve. In general, a lack of available reserves could also hinder Ukrainian operations over the medium term. It is safe to assume that the 9th Corps will now have 6-8 weeks to rebuild its combat power before being redeployed to the frontline.
Almost no direct fighting occurred in the western part of the Orikhiv axis. Some offensive attempts appeared on Tuesday but did not change the frontline.
Kherson & Crimea direction
The situation in the Kherson Oblast did not undergo any significant changes recently. Russian forces continued routine artillery strikes on Kherson and Ukrainian positions north of the Dnipro River.
On Wednesday (26JUL), Russians launched the third-highest wave of missiles since early March. They fired 43 missiles, including three Kalibrs, 36 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and four Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed to have shot down three Kalibrs and 33 Kh-101/Kh-555. No Kinzhals were officially intercepted.
The attacks were again aimed at Odesa and its port infrastructure. The latter strike hit a cargo terminal and a guardhouse, killing one person. As such, Russian attempts to prevent Ukrainian agricultural products from being exported continued. But we assess that Russians will not be able to sustain such heavy strikes on Odesa over the coming weeks.
The number of Shaheds employed also decreased recently. But, on the other hand, Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, said this week Russians were launching Shaheds that had been assembled in Russia. This is evidenced by the markings on the remains of the UAVs that were found after the latest attacks.
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Now, as we are reaching 2 months after the start of the counteroffensive, let’s try to distil key takeaways based on Gady, Muzyka, Kofman, and Lee's trip to Ukraine.
Primarily, infantrymen, supported by artillery, carry this battle, making progress slow and calculated due to limited mobility. Mechanised units see less action due to little equipment for manoeuvring, such as de-mining tools, air defences, and ATGMs.
Minefields hamper advancement, but the key impediment to Ukraine breaking through Russian defences is its inability to execute synchronised and coordinated larger attacks. Rather than being coordinated, these operations unfold consecutively, resulting in slow progress and an increased vulnerability to Russian ATGMs and artillery. Thus, beyond equipment, the issue lies in the lack of strategic dismantling of Russia's defence system.
The sight of any vehicle, particularly armoured ones, provokes immediate ATGM or artillery response, countering Ukraine's superior technology like Bradley or Leopard 2A6. Despite improved survivability in armoured units, their usage is currently limited.
For Ukraine's Western equipment to be strategically decisive, improved synchronisation and adaptation of tactics are needed. This slow change is occurring. Gady argues that most NATO armies would have trouble synchronising such an attack effectively, but that is no consolation for Kyiv. Ukrainians can carry out small-scale attacks but struggle with larger coordinated offensives, as was evidenced by the failure of initial strikes by the 47th Mechanised Brigade.
Moreover, the absence of a capable mid-range air defence network allows Russian Orlan-10s to fly near the frontline largely undisturbed. While they can be targeted, it isn't cost-effective given resource constraints and the risks of moving air defence closer to the front.
Ukraine's counteroffensive largely depends on direct attacks on Russian positions, complemented by a basic deep battle approach. Due to the high density of Russian ISR, ATGM, and artillery, Ukrainian strikes are often limited to platoon-sized units.
Frequently, Storm-Z units constitute the first line of the defence, either retreating or fighting to the end. Again - Ukraine incurs losses against what Russia views as expendable forces, akin to previous battles like Bakhmut.
Consequently, Ukraine's strategy has shifted to attrition, favouring sequential fires over manoeuvre. This explains the critical role of cluster munitions, as they weaken Russian defences enough to enable manoeuvring.
The viewpoint that Ukrainian progress is solely hindered by insufficient weapon supplies is overly simplistic and isn't echoed by frontline commanders and soldiers. While an attrition war demands consistent artillery and hardware supplies, the absence of progress is often attributed more to poor tactics, lack of unit coordination, bureaucratic issues, Soviet-style thinking, and stiff Russian resistance.
The last six months saw Russians effectively preparing for defence in southern Ukraine, and these efforts paid off. Despite Ukrainian preparations, their limited time and soldier experience hampered coordinated attacks. The likely outcome is a gruelling attritional fight, with gradual reinforcements in the coming weeks and months.
To rekindle the counteroffensive, Ukraine's high command had to introduce fresh troops. Operationally, the commitment of the 10th Corps changes a lot. Mechanised attacks proved tactically fruitful, pushing the frontline southwards near Robotyne. However, maintaining this momentum will be challenging for Kyiv as Russian fortifications intensify. As the Russians fall back to new positions, the Ukrainian attack pace and resources are likely to degrade. The next few days will answer how the 10th Crops is progressing and what we can expect in the next few weeks.
The coming weeks and months will certainly not be easy. The above assessment of the situation is certainly not pleasant, but it is vital to communicate these problems. To win, Ukraine needs transparency and truth, even if it is difficult.
