- Hubert Walas
“A well-prepared operation, including in terms of military-technical means, breakthroughs on a fairly wide front and to a very sensitive depth, access to operational space and maneuverable actions.” - This is the description of a significant incursion by the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the territory of the Russian Federation, near the town of Sudzha, Kursk region. However, this description does not come from Ukrainian or Western analysts, but from Russian milblogger Svatoslav Golikov.
Golykov added that the Russians' defensive action for the time being was chaotic and ad hoc, and he calls the entire offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces Balakliya 2.0, i.e. the humiliating for the Russians and at the same time successful for the Ukrainians 2022 Kharkiv offensive, which ended with the seizure of Kupyansk and Balakliya, among others.
The Ukrainian attack, according to the Russians, began on Tuesday at 8am, when Ukrainian forces crossed the border between the villages of Nikolayevo-Daryino and Oleshnya, heading northeast.
After 72h, the Ukrainians entered at least 10km deep into Russian territory and began pushing in two directions. They took the R200 road toward the town of Sudzha, with a population of about 6,000.
The second axis went northwest toward Koronevo and Malaya Loknya, where, according to Russian milblogger Rybar, the goal may be to reach the city of Lgov. There, according to the Russian channel, the equipment of additional defense lines and the planned evacuation of the population in case of an enemy breakthrough have already begun.
A state of emergency has been declared in the Kursk region. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the Ukrainian incursion a "large-scale provocation" and summoned his top advisers to discuss what he called "indiscriminate shelling of civilian buildings, suburbs and ambulances with various types of weapons.”
Here we see Putin's meeting during the National Security Council.
The Americans were not warned about the Ukrainian attack, but according to State Department spokesman Matthew Miller, it is not surprising, "It's not unusual, it's a war that they're conducting. We provide them with equipment. We provide them with advice"
It is uncertain how many soldiers are involved in the operation. The bottom estimate, according to the Russian side, is 2,000 soldiers. Western analysts, however, believe that this is not a raid as we know it from the actions of the so-called "white Russians" of the "Freedom of Russia" legion or other similar groups, but a much broader - centrally planned - action, in which 2 to even 4 brigades may be involved, and that means 10,000-20,000 soldiers.
The 82nd Airborne Brigade is certainly involved in the attack, as well as the 22nd Mechanized Brigade - both are quality formations, well-equipped and, above all, highly mobile. The 80th Airborne Brigade, and the 61st Mechanized Brigade are also most likely to participate.
Selected Russian milbloggers have criticized the Russian Defense Ministry for failing to take sufficient detection and preemptive action before a Ukrainian attack. Rybar also criticized Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov for failing to audit the combat command system to remove ineffective commanders after becoming defense minister, and called on the Russian government to punish incompetent officers and liars. He added that " what is happening in the Kursk region is further proof of strategic miscalculations. It is proof of the problem of nepotism, covering up ineffective and promoting useless commanders."
It is known that the Ukrainians are bringing in more technical equipment and deploying high-value radio-electronic and anti-aircraft combat units. ISW reports that the Ukrainians have certainly passed at least two Russian defense lines. According to Russian informants, the Ukrainians have penetrated up to 350 square kilometers of Kursk Region territory, including at least 11 settlements.
According to Russians, the Ukrainians captured Sudzha on August 8 and are expanding the scope of their operations by bringing in new units, including engineering forces. Unconfirmed information even speaks of the presence of Ukrainian units in the village of Anastasyevka, towards the city of Lgov. Ukrainians are also said to have entered administrative buildings in Koronevo.
"Judging by the emerging control zones, Ukrainian formations are currently relying on breaking unprepared lines, bypassing them and cutting off Russian reinforcement groups that are trying to stabilize the situation" Rybar reports.
All of this means that we are dealing with the largest and fastest offensive action of the war (regardless of side) since the Kharkiv offensive in the second half of 2022, and Ukraine's largest cross-border attack since the beginning of the war.
What are the Ukrainians up to, and why are they risking quite a lot?
Looking at the strategic points located in the area, we can point out at least a few of them.
First of all, the Kursk nuclear power plant, located 50 km from the border. A facility of the highest national priority. The fact that the Ukrainians might actually be thinking of going that far into Russia is suggested by the fact that they are heading to Malaya Loknya and then on to Lgov, as Rybar points out. From Lgov it is "only" 20 km to the Kursk NPP.
However, considering the distance and the high risk of such an action, this is not very likely, at least at this stage. More important seem to be the facilities within the direct reach of the Ukrainians. These include Gazprom's gas transit station in Sudzha, located about 600 meters from the border. Sudzha is one of the main gas entry points into Ukraine. Gas pipelines later go to Slovakia and Hungary, among other countries.
Withholding supplies on its own initiative may come at a cost to Kyiv, but damage to a major transit station could be portrayed in the light of "wartime force majeure," which Viktor Orban, who complained about Ukraine to Brussels, will find hard to argue with.
The target could also be the cutting of a very important logistic railroad line that passes through Sudzha and reaches Belgorod, as pointed out by X user Intelschizo. The railway line also suggests to us why Lgov could be the operational target of the Ukrainians. The city is the main railway junction of the region, connecting lines coming from Kursk, but also from the north from the direction of the city of Oryol, which ultimately reach Moscow. The seizure of Sudzha, let alone Lgov, will be a major logistical complication for all Russian logistics in the region, with implications for many sections of the front.
What's more, Sudzha is crossed by a power line that supplies Belgorod and other cities with electricity generated at the Kursk nuclear power plant.
This shows that the area is covered with at least a few sensitive points for the Russians.
However, even for such vital targets, risking several brigades equipped with invaluable equipment for the Ukrainians may seem questionable, even more so in the context of what is currently happening in the Pokrovsk direction.
So let's get back to Ukraine.
Compared to our last visual report in early July, Russian forces have made noticeable progress, advancing nearly 10 kilometers in a month and coming within nearly 15 kilometers of Pokrovsk, which is Moscow's current operational objective. We discussed why Pokrovsk is important in one of our recent materials:
The Kremlin forces entered such settlements as Prohres and Vesele, and in the direction of Novooleksandrivka approached the H-32 road to less than 6 kilometers.
To the north, the Russians also approached Toretsk by about 2 kilometers, and the front engulfed the town of Niu-York. To the east of the town, a gap, only 2.5 km wide, has been created, where Ukrainian forces are in danger of being encircled.
Compared to this, the situation on the rest of the front is relatively stable, although the Russian Federation remains on the offensive. Of note are Russian advances in places such as:
- Pischane
- Makiivka
- Spirne
- Rozdolivka
- Chasiv Yar
- Krasnohorivka
- Vuhledar
- Urozhaine
In all these places, the Russians managed to make territorial gains of one to several kilometers in the past month. In addition, after many months, the Krynky bridgehead, the legitimacy of which is doubted by many observers, has been eliminated.
All of this means that the situation on the front remains very difficult, and the past month has brought an intensification of the Russian advantage in a tangible way - the loss of controlled territory and the risk of serious problems on the Pokrovsk-Chasiv Yar axis.
Analysts, including the friendly Konrad Muzyka, note that the current months are the last "window of opportunity" for the Russians due to the introduction of additional fresh reserves by the Ukrainians and a wider introduction of Western equipment, unlocked after months of deadlock in the US Congress. The first F-16 fighter jets are also already flying in Ukrainian skies.
So the sight of a large-scale Ukrainian action targeting Russian territory has left many observers scratching their heads, pondering its rationale and potential profit-and-loss calculus.
The logic is clear - aren't these equipment and men needed more in Pokrovsk, Toretsk and Chasiv Yar? It is too early to say, but we can ponder on the the thinking process of the Ukrainian commanders.
Among those doing so is Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general who actively observes the war. Ryan identifies several goals that are not mutually exclusive.
The first is obvious - to tie down Russian forces. The Ukrainians can count on the Russians to shift resources from Ukraine to Russia to protect their (poorly defended) own heartland, making the task easier for Ukrainian defenders. However, this is quite a gamble. Ryan believes that the Russians are unlikely to weaken their strategic direction: Pokrovsk, Toretsk, or Chasiv Yar, but they are likely to weaken their defenses in other, less prominent directions. This means that new defensive weaknesses could emerge, creating new opportunities for the AFU.
The general aim is also certainly to weaken the Russian momentum in general, and at the same time to improve the war atmosphere and the morale of the Ukrainian people and soldiers. Although here it should be noted that the risk is to fall into the trap of a "PR goal," at the expense of real gains - this is what observers fear. Precisely by those who see the protracted battle for Bakhmut, or the holding of the Krynki bridgehead, as wasteful and illogical.
Ryan concludes, however, that in planning this operation, the Ukrainians may have simply followed the logic of exploiting the enemy's biggest weaknesses. In war, the element of surprise, of taking advantage of unpreparedness, of striking at the soft underbelly is crucial - and the Kharkiv offensive demonstrated this. Highly mobile brigades, capable of covering up to several dozen kilometers a day, are involved in the action.
Russian milbloggers have widely reported on the innovative tactics of the Ukrainians based on the introduction of radio-electronic warfare equipment already at the spearhead of the assault, along with dozens of drones. Added to this was anti-aircraft warfare - which resulted in downed planes and helicopters.
In other words, the Ukrainians could once again “smell the blood” and decided to go for it.
All the more so, since they received reports that the Russian side was playing down the problem. According to the Cheka source, two weeks ago the commander of the State Border Guard Group, deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant-General Esedulla Abachev, reported to Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov on the Ukrainian armed forces' preparations to invade the Kursk region. In response, Gerasimov reportedly urged Abachev "not to create panic" and "not to fall for the enemy's disinformation”. Moreover, in anticipation of an offensive by the Ukrainian armed forces, Gerasimov was to withdrew forces and resources from the area that he felt were not needed there!
But even if one accepts the motivation of exploiting the element of surprise and "easy" terrain gains, in such a situation, will the win-loss calculus be positive if the Ukrainians lose the H-32 road, Pokrovsk, or Chasiv Yar? Especially since, remember, they can't use US missiles on Russian territory, meaning e.g. HIMARS.
Again - it's hard to judge anything at this stage.
Nevertheless, "cheaply won territory", especially when it comes to the Russian heartland, is not necessarily "cheap" at the negotiating table. In other words, the Ukrainians may want to hold on to this territory precisely for the purpose of possible peace talks. Then hundreds of square kilometers of the Russian homeland will weigh extremely heavily.
In addition to the strategic goals mentioned above, the psychological element is no less important. The fact that Russian territory remains occupied by an enemy that is ten times smaller sounds like a bad joke to the Kremlin and undermines the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the population and the decision-making establishment.
Two and a half years ago, Sumy was one of the main axes of the Russian advance. Could the soldiers of that column, if they are still alive, have imagined that two years later the attack would come out on the same axis, only in the opposite direction?
“The more pressure is exerted on the aggressor that brought the war to Ukraine,” said President Zelensky in his evening address, “The closer peace will be.”
“Just peace through just force.”
Will this be just a short-lived PR rally that begins to disintegrate as we publish this material, or are we witnessing something bigger?
That remains to be seen as we write these words, but given the circumstances, one thing Ukrainians cannot be denied is: courage.
Sources:
- https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024
- https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c9d1yx9nwjx
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/07/ukraine-incursion-into-russia-kursk-region-continues-into-second-day
- https://x.com/WarintheFuture/status/1821344203504287933
- https://www.svoboda.org/a/33069581.html
- https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/gas-station-power-line-from-kursk-npp-and-1723041859.html
- https://t.me/philologist_zov/1189
- https://x.com/RALee85/status/1820857236387704932
- https://x.com/RALee85/status/1820905716284039405
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