- Hubert Walas
The Ukrainian counter-offensive, one of the most important moments of the most important war in years, is underway. Immediately after the destruction of the dam on the Dnieper, the Ukrainian Armed Forces started offensive actions in several directions. Despite the imposition of a tight information blockade by Kyiv, let’s try to analyse the first events of this long-awaited campaign.
----
The report was created on Monday, 12 June, at 1 pm and presents events up to that point.
Kharkiv Direction
The situation in the Kharkiv Oblast has not changed.
Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that fighting continued near Masiutivka but that the Russians failed to make any gains in the area for another week in a row. In addition, some skirmishes were also reported next to Hryanykivka and Krohmalne, but without any results.
A Russian source said that Russian units managed to capture Ukrainian fortified positions near Novomlynsk and cross the Oskil River. However, this information remains unverified. At the end of the week, a Ukrainian source claimed that the Russians had withdrawn Storm-Z units from the Masiutivka area. If this information is confirmed, the likelihood of a further breakthrough in the area will diminish.
Luhansk direction
The past week has brought no change in this direction. We estimate that the priority for this area will be reduced at the expense of operations near Bakhmut, Vuhledar and other directions in the Donetsk and Zaporizhia regions.
Russian attacks near Terny, Torske and Nevske have been repelled, but at the same time the pace and intensity of Moscow's attacks in these areas appears to have slowed last week. All Russian attacks on Bilohorivka have also been repelled.
Donetsk direction
Starting from the northern part of the region, there were no developments in the vicinity of Spirne, Vekhnokamyasnke and Vyimka, although there was offensive activity near Spirne, where the Russians attempted to attack Ukrainian positions. Still, the Russians maintained some pressure on Ukrainian forces near Vesele and launched several unsuccessful assaults in that direction.
According to reports, Ukrainians succeeded in attacking near Orichovo-Vasilivka and occupying hills near the M03 road. The source said Ukrainian units tried to reach Paraskovyivka to attack Bakhmut from the north.
What is clear and confirmed is that the Ukrainians have continued their attacks on Russian lines near Berchivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka, but their progress in the area is unclear. On Monday, Yevhenii Prigozhin, head of PMC Wagner, confirmed that part of the Berchivka settlement had been lost and Russian troops had withdrawn from their positions.
As for Bakhmut, the situation is stable. Wagner's forces have withdrawn and have been replaced by regular Russian army formations and possibly Storm-Z troops. What’s important, no attacks have been launched from Bakhmut towards Chasiv Yar, and this situation is not expected to change in the coming weeks. The Ukrainians still claim to occupy a small part of the town in the southwestern part of Bakhmut, which means that the Russians are not fully occupying the town.
The Ukrainians were clearly active south of Bakhmut, where fighting continued near the Siverski Dontesk-Donbas canal and near the dominant hills north of Klishchivka. Earlier in the week, Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Malyar said that despite Russian resistance and attempts to hold their lines and positions, Ukrainian units had advanced in several directions during the fighting. In the direction of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Paraskoviivka by 200 to 1,600 metres, whereas in the direction of Ivanivske, Klishchiivka by 100 to 700 metres. The Russians also reported that the Ukrainians had counter-attacked in Mariinka.
The Ukrainians are also continuing to attack Russian positions near Vuhledar. UAF forces have crossed the Shaitanka River and entered Novodonetske, from where they have most likely been pushed back later. The area remains a no-man's land at the time of writing.
Another Russian source said that on Monday Kyiv forces resumed attacks on Russian positions near Vremivka and attacked in two directions: near Novodarivka and Rivnopil.
Southern Ukraine Direction
On the night of 7-8 June, Ukrainian armed forces launched large-scale probing attacks on Russian positions south of Orichiv in the Zaporizhia region. These attacks were in addition to ongoing operations south of the settlements of Velyka Novosilka, Vuhledar and Bakhmut.
On the Vuhledar axis, the Ukrainians attacked Pavlivka and Mykilske, but are unlikely to have made significant progress in this sector.
The situation was different at Axis Velyka Novosilka, where the Ukrainians deployed several brigades. This allowed them to make some territorial gains. They captured Novodonetske, but this was retaken as a result due to a Russian counterattack. Nevertheless, the commitment of additional brigades moved the front line southwards.
By Monday, it was confirmed that Ukrainians had liberated Neskuchne, Novodarivka, Storozheve, and Blahodatne. Ukraine's Deputy Defence Minister, Anna Malyar, confirmed that Makarivka had also been liberated, which was also visually confirmed later.
Rochan estimates that the Ukrainians are currently operating seven brigades in this axis, but these have not been fully committed.
Most of the kinetic action took place, along the Novodonetske - Neskuchne - Levadne line, although heavy fighting also continued from Lobkove to Mala Tokmachka. In addition, the Russians reinforced the village of Staromlynivka. Also in this direction, the Ukrainians noted the presence of Storm-Z troops. The question is whether Moscow decided to employ ex-convicts to first tire out the Ukrainians before committing more valuable (operational) reserves, or whether the hastily assembled Storm-Z units are the only reserves.
Initially, the Ukrainians broke through the Russian defensive lines, but many of the gains were quickly wiped out by Russian counter-attacks. This was also the case near Mala Tokmachka, where the Ukrainians initially lost eight Bradley IFVs and one Leopard 2A6 tank.
However, the Ukrainians achieved some success along the T0408 road linking Novodanylivka with Robotyne, advancing some 5km towards the latter. Also near the village of Robotyne, the Ukrainians destroyed a Russian TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system. It was probably in this area that the Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter attacked the Ukrainian armoured column.
On Saturday, Ukrainians released a video showing an attack on a Russian column in the Zaporizhia region. The column in question was part of a force being transferred from Kherson to Zaporizhzhia following the destruction of a dam on the Dnieper River. Secondly, the footage was taken by a Polish-made FlyEye UAV operating more than 60 km from the front line, or 30 km from Ukrainian territory on the north bank of the Dnieper. This means that Ukraine is trying to isolate the battlefield in the Zaporizhia region, at least in terms of possible reinforcements from the Kherson region or the deployment of operational reserves.
Pro-Ukrainian sources also reported that Ukrainian guerrillas destroyed a railway bridge in Yakymivka and also in Crimea, limiting Russian ability to send reinforcements to the Zaporizhia region. Both attacks, however, remain unconfirmed.
Kherson-Crimea Direction
The destruction of the Kachovka dam forces Russia and Ukraine to move inland in their respective areas and, at least temporarily, forces Ukraine to abandon its operations, including special forces raids on the Dnieper Delta islands. The prospects of a Ukrainian landing across the river are currently non-existent.
Rochan, analysing the effect of the annihilation of the Kachovka dam, concludes that the potential of Ukrainian units deployed in that direction did not allow for a river crossing operation. Therefore, the likely objective of the Ukrainian units was to engage and tie down the Russian troops in the Kherson direction. To achieve this, the Ukrainians carried out special operations, air strikes, reconnaissance and artillery strikes.
The dam's destruction limits the manoeuvrability of any forces towards Kherson and renders the area useless for military operations, probably for four to eight weeks. As a result, Moscow no longer needs to maintain the previous level of military presence in the area, which was designed to prevent Ukrainian units from crossing the Dnieper. This fact corresponds with the redeployment of troops to the Zaporizhia direction, which has been targeted by Ukrainian artillery.
All Ukrainian gains on the islands of the Dnieper Delta have been wiped out due to flooding. The Ukrainian administration of the Kherson region reported that 32% of the flooding affected the right bank of the river (controlled by Ukraine), while 68% was concentrated on the left bank (controlled by Russia).
This week, until the flows of the Dnieper stabilise, we are likely to see artillery exchanges and deep Ukrainian attacks on targets in Crimea and north of the peninsula. Once the river level stabilises, we expect the Russians to resume regular artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian areas north of the river.
Belarus Direction
The past week has brought no change in the posture of the Belarusian armed forces. Many units held mobilisation classes. Belarus has also deployed its S-400 system near Minsk. The deployment of nuclear warheads is expected after 7-8 July.
--
To conclude, a few sentences of summary.
Before the main phase of the counter-offensive began, President Zelenski stated that Ukraine was ready for it. However, he highlighted the shortage of Western fighter jets and that many Ukrainian soldiers would lose their lives as a result.
As we stated in the May episode, among others - the counter-offensive had already started a few weeks ago. It included attacks of the Russian Volunteer Corps in the Belgorod region or the counterattacks on the flanks of Bakhmut or near Vuhledar, which had the 'battle shaping’ character. Their aim was the same: to create confusion in the Russian command and force it to grapple with the dilemma of which operational direction to support more, especially given reports of an impending counter-offensive in the Zaporizhia region.
The opening of new axes of attack in the Zaporizhia region has created the next batch of dilemmas. The Ukrainians are attacking along three main axes: Orikhiv, Velyka Novosilka, and Vuhledar. This is a front of over 150 km, but in reality, given how the attacks were located, the front is actually about 80 km long, the longest being near Orikhiv. But it was near Velyka Novosilka that the Ukrainians were most successful, breaking through the Russian front line and liberating several villages.
Nevertheless, we still do not know which axis is the main one. The Orichiv axis clearly targets Tokmak (and then presumably Melitopol), which is the quickest way to break the land bridge to Crimea. Recognising the importance of this area, the Russians heavily fortified the approaches to Tokmak and erected at least three defensive lines north of the city. The fortifications south of Velyka Novosilka appear less complex, while here, the aim is presumably Mariupol. At the same time, the route to Mariupol is the longest and exposes the Ukrainian left flank to Russian counterattacks south of Donetsk. Therefore, the Vuledar axis is important for the Ukrainians because it allows Kyiv to maintain pressure on the Russians near the city of Donetsk and immobilise their forces there, making regrouping impossible.
Rochan assesses as he himself admits perhaps wrongly, that Ukraine will not be able to focus on two axes equally. As a result, one axis will be primary and two secondary.
The Ukrainians suffered losses in the first four days. According to Oryx, the initial attacks cost Kyiv 17 M2A2 Bradley IFVs, one Leopard 2A4 and three 2A6s, two AMX-10 RC fighting vehicles and three Leopard 2R Heavy Mine Breaching Vehicles. These losses represent 15%, 2%, 14%, 5% and 50% respectively, of the Western vehicle types delivered to Ukraine. The loss of Bradleys and anti-mine vehicles in such numbers at such an early stage of the counter-offensive is particularly worrying. On the other hand, Oryx believes that of the 17 Bradleys lost, only five were destroyed, and the rest were damaged and abandoned. These vehicle could be salvaged. The same applies to the Leopards 2R. What’s more, on Tuesday, the US administration said Washington would cover the Ukrainian loss of Bradleys. The whole US stock of Bradley IFV is about 4000.
The risks are high. As Ukraine does not have air superiority over the area, its Short Range air defence capabilities also appear inadequate. The Russians released a video last week showing a Ka-52 helicopter attacking a Ukrainian column of Bradleys using a Vikhr-1 anti-tank missile. So Ukraine needs to bring its Short Range Air Defence assets, such as the Osa system, closer to the front to follow the advancing forces and to detect and attack low and slow-flying Russian targets. Thus, Zelensky's comments about the lack of air superiority and the resulting high losses partly came true.
So far, Ukrainian operations have been relatively limited. The attacks near Orichiv are being carried out by at least three brigades (only one newly formed with Western-made equipment), while the Velyka Novosilka axis includes seven. Kyiv, therefore, has sufficient reserves to engage in battle and maintain momentum. The main thrust has probably not yet begun.
That said, as of Monday, 12 June, the Ukrainian counter-offensive is underway and has met with measured success. As stated in previous analyses, we expect this attack to be more like the summer offensive in Kherson than what took place in the Kharkiv region. It will likely be a protracted campaign lasting weeks if not months. Ukrainian units are about 8-10km from the first lines of Russian fortifications on both the Orichiv and Velyka Novosilka axes. It is in these areas that the Ukrainians are likely to encounter strong resistance. We will analyse these developments with Rochan in future episodes of the Mapped series.
