- Hubert Walas
Quest for triumph.
449 days of war are behind us. A war that will define the destiny of Europe and perhaps even the world. Yet we remain uncertain as to its final outcome. However, the last few days have been marked by very significant events, including President Zelenski's visits to London, Berlin and Paris, which resulted in a new offensive of aid pledges from the Ramstein coalition. And somewhere in the background looms the spectre of a Ukrainian counter-offensive, which some believe is already underway.
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It is extremely difficult, in the constant chaos of information and disinformation, to outline the precise direction in which the war is heading. Even when observers agree on certain facts, they interpret them differently and give them different weight. Thus the deteriorating Russian economy can be portrayed as the slow-moving nail in the Russian coffin that will lead to the Kremlin's defeat in the war. Or as an economy in trouble but still significantly better than Ukraine's. As one that is doing well, given where the country is, regardless of the fact that state statistical agencies artificially inflate all the metrics.
Still, there are trends that are hard to interpret in two ways.
The first is the map. Here is how the front has changed over the past year, between 16 May 2022 and 16 May 2023. The blue colour is the Ukrainian gains, and the dark red is the Russian ones. The map leaves no illusions about the trend of territorial control, and this excludes the compromising Russian withdrawal from the Kyiv region. In fact, a similar comparison made on 1 April looks even worse for the Kremlin. It should be remembered that at the same time, we are in the aftermath of a major Russian winter counter-offensive, which resulted in the seizure of Soledar, but its overall outcome was modest, to say the least. And at the same time, more importantly, we are ahead of the spring-summer Ukrainian counter-offensive.
The second trend is equipment quality and availability. Over the last 450 days, all those who were sceptical about the need for states to maintain heavy equipment in the 21st century have been brought down hard. At the same time, this situation has caused consternation in many centres of power, which have realised how fragile their military situation is.
Moscow was entering this war with equipment possessing, literally-many times larger, the military hardware stock of the Ukrainian army. Not to mention the missile arsenal. This was the main reason why Kyiv was doomed to lose both before the war and ever after the first weeks of heroic fighting. Although, indeed, much of Russia's potential was wasted through the incompetence of commanders or corruption, but still, the enormous weight of the Russian war machine was to roll over the Ukrainian defences, which would eventually succumb.
They have not succumbed. Since the Russian march was halted and the territorial trend reversed, the equipment trend has similarly reversed. The Ukrainians steadily massacred Russian columns, especially in the first weeks of the fighting, while simultaneously taking over Russian equipment en masse and being steadily supported by the West. The Allies were by no means a monolith. Decisions on deliveries varied from country to country, the same as the timing of deliveries. Still, the cumulative combat value steadily increased on the Ukrainian side while it steadily decreased on the Russian side.
This is well illustrated by 'Dynamics of the Balance of Power', a graphical overview maintained by Ukrainian analyst Volodymyr Dacenko. In terms of personnel, the situation fluctuates, but at the moment, it is similar on both sides. However, the distribution of heavy military equipment is different. Russia entered the war with a fourfold advantage in tanks, now both sides are expected to have the same number. Armoured vehicles? The Kremlin's sevenfold advantage has shrunk to just two. Artillery systems? Moscow had three times as many, now it has only 50% more. Moreover, this comparison does not take into account the combat capability and quality of specific systems, a fact that strongly favours Kyiv.
This trend was symbolically illustrated on 9 May during the annual Victory Day parade in Moscow. From a Russian nationalist point of view this rather depressing parade, included only 51 vehicles, compared to 131 the year before and 197 two years before. Moreover, to get to 51 pieces of equipment, the Russian military had to borrow 10 Ahmat vehicles from Ramzan Kadyrov's army. The only tank to appear on Red Square was an old T-34.
But that is not all. The depressed mood among Russian personnel may have been exacerbated by the outcome of President Volodymyr Zelensky's recent three-day trip. The Ukrainian leader visited four capitals - Rome, Berlin, Paris and London - and brought back further and very significant pledges of military aid. The visit began in Rome and at the Vatican, with Zelenski describing the Italian stop as "quite encouraging". After that, things only got more interesting.
Berlin has announced the largest single military aid package to date, worth nearly $3 billion. The package includes 30 Leopard tanks, 20 Marder vehicles, more than 100 other armoured vehicles, 200 reconnaissance drones, 18 howitzers, IRIS-T systems, and thousands of rounds of ammunition.
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Now coming back to the episode - it is fair to say that German decision-making was sluggish for a long time, but it has finally arrived.
Paris - Zelensky's next stop, as if not wanting to be inferior to Berlin - also announced the dispatch of 'more armoured vehicles and light tanks' to Ukraine in the coming weeks.
The finale was a visit to London. On Monday, the UK declared hundreds more air defence missiles, as well as attack drones with a range of more than 120 miles, or nearly 200 kilometres. This declaration came after Rishi Sunak's government announced the delivery of Storm-Shadow long-range cruise missiles, which represent a significant augmentation of Ukrainian capabilities to degrade Russian logistical and command centres. So far, the official range of Ukrainian systems was up to 120km - the range of the GMLRS missiles. Stormshadow extends this range by up to 100 kilometres to 250 kilometres or 160 miles. This means that the Ukrainian range includes, among others, the entire Crimean peninsula.
All Russian command centres and bases that had been deliberately moved out of range of the GMLRS are now within range of Stormshadow missiles. What's more, the French in their package, announced deliveries of SCALP-EG missiles, which are the French equivalent of Storm Shadow.
The aid is important for another reason - it removes Moscow's illusions about Western Europe's gradual downplaying of Ukraine. When only rusty, 60-year-old tanks are leaving Russian warehouses, Kyiv receives further state of the air military equipment worth billions of dollars. All of this represents another extremely important component of the Ukrainian strike system on which the biggest counter-offensive of the year will be based in the as-yet undetermined but short future.
A counter-offensive that - according to some analysts - is in fact already underway. This is the view of, among others, the Rochan Consulting, which we cooparte with. Rochan notes that “Last week delivered significant changes on the battlefields in Ukraine. Kyiv’s posture transitioned to the offence near Bakhmut, where Ukrainians managed to liberate areas southwest and northwest of the city. Ukrainians also made some territorial gains near Vuhledar. The addition of long-range cruise missiles allows Kyib to strike critical Russian targets in depth. We assess that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has begun.” - says Rochan. He goes on to elaborate: “Based on all Ukrainian ground activity last week, we believe the Ukrainian counteroffensive commenced, and the war transitioned to the offensive phase. Although Kyiv made relatively significant gains near Bakhmut, we do not consider this area the main Ukrainian focus point. As stated previously, the counteroffensive will probably have one main axis of advance and a few auxiliary axes. Bakhmut falls into the latter category. However, Ukrainian gains should not be dismissed. Not only did Kyiv relieve pressure on the key road linking Bakhmut with Chasiv Yar, but its attacks exposed fundamental Russian weaknesses: a lack of coordination between regular Russian formations and Wagner units, poor communication and morale, all of which led to more or less disorganised withdrawals. It is also particularly noteworthy that Ukrainian gains were achieved without using major Western-supplied platforms, such as Bradley IFV or Leopard tanks. It, therefore, seems that Russian defensive lines are easily penetrable, at least near Bakhmut. ” You can read more in Rochan's full report on Substack - link in the description.
Thus, depending on one's definition, one can conclude that a creeping counter-offensive is already underway and that preparations for its main impact are an integral part of it.
What, on the other hand, is the state of the Russian armed forces? Moscow responded to the news from the West with a complex saturation attack on the Ukrainian capital. Sea-launched, air-launched and ground-launched missiles, as well as drones, descended on Kyiv. Individually, this was one of the largest, if not the largest, air battle between air defence and air attack systems. In this footage, you can probably see a Patriot system firing 30 missiles in quick succession. At the end of the video, there is a glow from a ground-based explosion, which some interpret as a hit on the launcher. However, Ukrainian personnel do not confirm this information, stating that all incoming missiles and objects were shot down, including nine Kalibr missiles and six Kindzal hypersonic missiles, which, until recently, the Kremlin had touted as invulnerable to Western air defence systems. Analysts have calculated that the overnight strike cost Russia around $120 million. The cost to the defending side is likely to have been similar or higher. But there is no price that can be put on the lives saved by the provision of Western systems.
Kyiv is not backing down but is continuing to target objects of strategic value, in contrast to Russia's terror strategy. In all likelihood, the Ukrainians have already made their first successful strike using Storm Shadow missiles, hitting Russian command centres in Luhansk. The British missile, as Rochan notes, combined with the AGM-160B MALD decoy missile, which can mimic the signature of various aircraft, can form a harmonious duo, increasing the chances of successfully targeting Russian strategic centres..
Growing pressure, on the other hand, is prompting pro-Russian civilians to evacuate gradually, especially in the Zaporizhia direction. The whole picture of the Russian military's attitude, in strong words, is summed up by the Russian nationalist and blogger, Murz. Translation thanks to Dmitri from war translated: “In short, I cannot remember a single military campaign in history in which one of the sides so systematically prepared its own catastrophic defeat. Unfortunately, this side is our military-political leadership”.
Later, Murz describes the tactics he would use if he were in charge of the Ukrainian armed forces. These include bleeding the remnants of the Russian reserves in Bakhmut, Marinka and Avdiivka. Provocations on the Dnieper to thin the enemy lines. Murz says he would also carry an auxiliary attack on the far flank, e.g. near Bakhmut, to draw back further the Russian reserves, which would also roll with a rocket attack. Finally, there would be a major attack on the great Zaporizhzhia front - somewhere between Zaporizhzhia and Vulhedar, cutting the land bridge and trapping Russian troops to the west, forcing them to flee to Crimea. Sounds very familiar, given the current reshuffling of the front. The Russian notices that the enemy is indeed engaged in a battle of attrition and exhaustion and that it "seems to have unlimited access to ammunition".
Murz concludes: “by the end of the summer, you can get a lot of interesting things - not only the front on the western outskirts of Mariupol and in the residential areas of Donetsk but also serious “political upheavals” in Russia. ”
Facts can be interpreted in different ways, but the reality is non-negotiable and will sooner or later reveal itself in full force. Meanwhile, all trends indicate that it will reveal itself in ways that are not necessarily kind to the Kremlin.
