- Hubert Walas
Himalayan clash.
Chinese-Indian antagonism along the Himalayas goes back centuries. Both countries want a permanent border in the Himalayas, yet the physical geography, cultural landscape, and political history of the largest mountain range in the world prevented any simple division. The current impasse is portrayed by Indian and Chinese tanks on the disputed border that, in some places, are only a dozen meters apart. 100,000 soldiers on both sides are stationed at altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 meters above sea level with temperatures falling as low as -30 degrees Celsius. Why is the Himalayan dispute growing in importance?
The Line of Actual Control
The origins of these conflicts are to be found in the treaties concluded during the era of the British Empire. In short - the Indians believe that they have inherited the borders established by the British Empire, while the Chinese do not recognize any arrangements made in the so-called “century of humiliation,” or before the communists took power in 1949. Over the years, many rounds of talks have been undertaken to determine the final status of the region, but have not resulted in a solution to the border issue.
"LAC - the line of actual control," is a hypothetical border demarcation line between China and India. It stretches for 3,488 km and is divided into 3 sectors: Eastern - Arunachal Pradesh; Middle - Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim; and the Western - Ladakh. Virtually each of these regions in recent times has experienced border conflicts, which we will describe later.
From the 1840s on, the British tried to establish a hard border between India, Russia, and China. These attempts, confronted with the extremely difficult topography of the Himalayas, were not fully effective. The Anglo-Saxons finally opted for the watershed principle to define the border. However, limited geodetic research left the main sections of the would-be border undefined. Beijing and Delhi did not intend to leave this issue open, all the more so since letting go of these areas would inevitably lead to their takeover by the other side. Hence, from the moment the communists took power in China, the struggle for the Himalayan periphery and gaining control over them began.
Initially, Beijing's attention was focused more on the western territories. In 1956, China built the G219 road through the contested Aksai Chin area connecting Tibet and Xinjiang, which led to the first disputes. In the following years, including in 1967, 1975, and 1986, there were more clashes. Each time, the reason for escalation was border violations. Between 2016 and 2019, 1,025 cases of border transgressions were recorded.
Doklam
The region has several trouble spots. One of them is Doklam - the disputed territory occupied by China and Bhutan, located close to India's border with both nations. At the outset, it should be said that India and Bhutan have a special relationship. Both countries are close to each other in terms of religion, culture, and geography. India is also Bhutan's largest trading partner. Moreover, as stipulated in the Friendship Treaty signed in 1949, India assists Bhutan in managing international relations as well as arms imports. Which makes Bhutan, de facto, under the quasi-protectorate of India.
It turns out that the Chinese were quite selective in choosing which British treaties they renounced. One of those that they decided to respect was the "Tibet-Sikkim" convention of 1890. Here, for the first time, we see the specifics of the area. It should be remembered that all the described disputes take place in extremely demanding conditions, in very difficult to access areas with high elevations.
In Doklam, the trouble spot is establishing a specific location, where the borders of China, Bhutan, and India meet. China, citing the 1890 treaty, maintains that this point is Mount Gipmochi, while India and Bhutan believe it is Mount Batang La. Additionally, the Chinese are rather reluctant to pinpoint a specific location for Mount Gipmochi. The Tibet-Sikkim treaty does not provide any maps or research to show this. The confusion is intensified by the existence of another mountain nearby - Gyemochen. The first attempts to reliably demarcate the border of Bhutan began in 1963 and were completed by 1971. They showed that the real point of the border tripoint is located 200 meters from Batang La and results from the division of the Teesta and Amo Chhu river basins. Finally, the countries reached an agreement in 2012. China accepted the catchment principle and pledged to maintain the status quo, which stated that no one country would try to resolve the disputed status of the area on its own.
China stood by this decision for 5 years and although Chinese troops had already breached the Bhutan border before, the Doklam conflict of 2017 brought a serious impasse. The Chinese entered the region with the strategic goal of changing the status quo. They arrived in considerable force, carrying construction materials along. As a result, we had the longest confrontation between India and China in recent times. The 72-day stalemate was started by the Chinese People's Liberation Army that began building a road through the disputed Doklam territory, controlled by Bhutan. The Indian army has entered the territory of Bhutan, to defend the territorial integrity of this country. India, however, did not make this move solely out of concern for its neighbor. To the south of Doklam is the Jamphri Range which overlooks India’s Siliguri Corridor - otherwise known as the "chicken neck," which is a key link to the Northeast regions of the country. The defense of Doklam was therefore the strategic interest of Delhi. After more than 2 months, the Chinese withdrew taking equipment and tents with them. Since then, the media has occasionally reported the presence of Chinese in the Doklam area. However, both Delhi and Beijing do not confirm any change in the status quo.
Ladakh
Another major escalation took place more recently during the pandemic. The Chinese, taking advantage of the lethargy caused by the coronavirus, surprised the Indians on July 15, 2020, by transferring their troops from military exercises directly to the disputed area of Ladakh in the western part of the LAC. Twenty Indians and an unknown number of Chinese were killed in the confrontation. However, not a single shot was fired, because the troops fought with sticks and stones. It was the first fatal encounter on the disputed frontier in at least 45 years. As a result however, China took control of an additional area of more than 1,500 square kilometers. Even though several talks took place, the Chinese do not want to go back to the status quo before the match.
Delhi, seeing Beijing's great military advantage, decided to react by economic sanctions - banning some Chinese applications and the participation of Chinese entities in government purchases. However, these moves failed. India is militarily and economically several times weaker than China. China's defense budget is 4 times larger and its economy 6 times larger. This was further exacerbated by the 2020 pandemic, which saw the Indian economy perform its worst metrics in the entire Southeast Asia region.
Almost 60% of India's military budget is absorbed by the 1,350,000 soldiers’ army. Increasing the presence of Indian troops in the Himalayas would hit the budget even harder. And remember that Delhi has its plans and commitments within the QUAD group which includes India, Australia, Japan, and the United States. The strategic goal of the initiative is to contain China's expansion in the region. Economic problems have reduced the planned 200-ship Indian fleet to 175 and plans to build a third aircraft carrier are in great doubt.
From this perspective, it can be seen that India cannot afford a long, costly rivalry with China in the Himalayas. Even the current dislocations are very expensive. The maintenance of such forces under extreme conditions leaves a heavy toll on supply chains, equipment, and especially people. Thus, India's stance is primarily aimed at stopping any further Chinese offensive in the area, with no real chance of penalizing Beijing for the recent violations. Both armies are blocked with the prospect of a long stalemate in the highest mountain range in the world. The harsh conditions drain resources, but China’s deep pockets put the country in a privileged position. A certain advantage of the Indians is the experience of operating in such conditions, which they gained during their conflict with the Pakistanis. The last time the Chinese fought in such an area during the Korean War in the 1950s.
Chinese Impudence
China's latest offensive on the line of actual control in Ladakh has its roots in the events leading up to the pandemic. China's concerns have arguably increased since India's August 2019 decision to transform Ladakh, which was previously part of the autonomous state of Jammu and Kashmir, into a union territory directly ruled by New Delhi.
Senior Indian policymakers have repeatedly emphasized that their August decision only concerned the issues of political relations between Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India. This action was in no way intended to affect the territorial issues related to the border with China. However, Beijing interpreted it differently and remained unmoved by these assurances. China, in agreement with Islamabad, tried to rally international opposition to New Delhi. These efforts failed in part because the United States supported India in key international fora such as the UN Security Council.
It is also important to know that the swift modernization of Chinese infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau allowed for the bold expansion of Chinese patrols in these frontiers which India could not match given its failure to encourage local people to settle permanently. India is now desperately trying to catch up and its efforts to modernize its road and air networks along the Himalayan borders have caught Chinese attention. Beijing is asymmetrically trying to thwart these efforts and maintain its advantage. By occupying new segments of Indian territory, it aims to increase its bargaining position in future negotiations. Or it simply wants to annex spaces it craves for political or military reasons thereby forcing India to cease its ongoing infrastructure modernization. This can prove beneficial in any future conflict.
The recent Chinese incursions into the Ladakh region leave India with only difficult choices. The predominance of China's first move has put India in an awkward position trying to negotiate China's withdrawal from these new occupations which is unlikely, especially in areas such as Pangong Tso where China is aggressively ending the road by car and in the Galwan Valley where it is rumored the Chinese are building bunkers and barracks. Even if China pulled out as a result of successful negotiations with India, the new infrastructure it has created would likely survive as a ready-made asset for future use.
China, taking advantage of its initiative to take over part of Indian territory, can now keep its new acquisitions forever unless India decides to force Chinese troops out which for the reasons mentioned above seems very unlikely.
Arunachal Pradesh
At the beginning of 2021, the media again reported about the Indian-Chinese clashes, this time at the Naku border crossing in northern Sikkim. This is an area much more to the east than Ladakh where the most recent confrontations took place. This may suggest that the conflict is beginning to move towards the eastern section of the line of effective control. This is a significant difference. In the west, Beijing and Delhi fought over uninhabited desert areas. In the east, the competition is in inhabited areas of great cultural and political diversity, and ones rich in natural resources; in other words, Arunachal Pradesh.
This region, slightly larger than the Czech Republic, has a population of nearly 1.5 million and is home to Christians, Hindus, animists, and Tibetan Buddhists. The largest Buddhist monastery outside of Tibet is located in the city of Tawang. It is also the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama.
In recent years, the eastern regions - including Aksai Chin, have been more important to Beijing. China needed them to connect the turbulent regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. This is now changing. Aksai Chin is not a sparsely settled area with few natural resources. Unlike the Eastern Himalayas, including Arunachal Pradesh, it is a strategically important region, relatively densely populated and rich in natural resources - mainly water. Both giants fight for access to the mighty rivers of the eastern Himalayas which provide both access to life-giving water and cheap energy through dams. Besides, favor and power over Himalayan communities are also very important. Their loyalty can prove crucial in the event of a conflict and at the same time cannot be taken for granted.
What is the Number to Washington?
The landscape that emerges in this situation is not favorable for India. The Hindus are already lagging in many domains. Also, Delhi's economic problems, coupled with Beijing's fairly smooth transition through the pandemic crisis, will make this imbalance only grow wider. Some analysts indicate that this may be the right time to engage in closer cooperation with the United States.
Indian-American relations have not always been good. The Cold War period was a time of chilled relations on the Delhi-Washington line. The Hindus did not want to fit into the black and white bipolar world of the second half of the 20th century. During this time, the Americans collaborated more closely with China and Pakistan while India cemented its relations with the Soviet Union by seeking access to advanced military platforms. Currently, these arrangements are no longer valid.
Washington's elites sometimes question Delhi's agency as a major regional force. Global conflicts which are important in the eyes of Americans, such as the Russian destabilization of Europe, the Middle East boiler, or China's superpower ambitions in the South China Sea, did not receive a decisive response from India. Even though they are directly affected by the latter two. Which does not mean that the Indians do not make any efforts to establish order in the region, but rather choose carefully the directions of action, measuring them against their strength and national interest. Certainly such a direction is the disputed area in the Himalayas. Although the region is not recognized by the Pentagon as crucial as the South and East China Seas or the Straits of Malacca and Taiwan, the smoldering conflict there makes it constantly gaining in importance.
Close cooperation with Delhi may not be paid back to Washington with help in solving global problems, but it is certainly in the US interest to oppose Chinese offensives in every frontier, of which the Himalayas are one. The fact that India is nuclear power is also important. The convergence of interests may bring the two countries closer, but it will require compromises on both sides. India would have to modify its strategic autonomy agenda, and the US would have to trust Delhi more as a provider of security in this part of the world.
The current crisis on the Sino-Indian border has shown that China has little respect for long-term efforts to freeze the status quo along the disputed borders of both countries. Beijing has expanded control of new parts of the Himalayan border through ruthless actions that confront India with the difficult choice of either eliminating losses or escalating by force, which is unlikely. On the other hand, China's actions are pushing India towards an Asian anti-Chinese coalition. In this way, Beijing alone can push Delhi into the arms of Washington. Close US-Indian cooperation would certainly not be of use to the Chinese.
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Sources:
Why China Is Winning Against India
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/01/india-china-himalayas-ladakh-standoff/
China and India just had their worst clash in forty-five years. What do we know?
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-and-india-just-had-their-worst-clash-in-forty-five-years-what-do-we-know/
A Frozen Line in the Himalayas
https://www.csis.org/analysis/frozen-line-himalayas
India Can’t Say It Wants U.S. Help Against China
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/25/india-china-himalayas-conflict-indo-pacific-strategy-united-states
Is the China-India Border Dispute Shifting East?
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/is-the-china-india-border-dispute-shifting-east/
Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/04/hustling-in-himalayas-sino-indian-border-confrontation-pub-81979
Battle in the Himalayas
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/18/world/asia/china-india-border-conflict.html
