- Paweł Paszak
Annex by 2049.
The unipolar era is over. We are now in the opening phase of a new order where players dissatisfied with their place in the global system are testing the hitherto reigning power. This is taking place both on the periphery, which from an American perspective is Ukraine, and in the center of gravity of the modern world. That in turn is Taiwan, whose status is crucial to the world-critical Sino-American rivalry. It is no secret that mainland China wants to incorporate Taiwan by 2049. The problem is that the Taiwanese are not thrilled with this idea. Why does China want to absorb Taiwan? What assets do the Taiwanese hold? What scenarios are the most likely?
Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier
The origins of the conflict between China and Taiwan can be traced back to 1949 when Nationalist forces led by Chiang Kai Shek fled to the island of Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War. This gave de facto birth to a new, independent Chinese state supported by the United States and its Allies. In 1955, the Republic of China and the US signed a Mutual Defense Treaty committing the U.S. military to protect the island (with the exception of Kinmen and Matsu islands) from any potential invasion. Thanks to close cooperation with the US, by 1971, it was the Republic of China that sat on the UN Security Council as China's official representative. The relaxation of Beijing-Washington relations during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter led to the development of the "One China Policy," which culminated in the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 1979 with the People’s Republic of China.
Despite the changing nature of relations with the PRC and Taiwan, US authorities were not about to give up a valuable ally in the region, much less allow the island to be captured by a communist power. In place of the former treaty, the United States made other commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. These were reaffirmed during Donald Trump's term in office with the Taiwan Reinforcement Act, which was intended to represent US readiness for ROC independence. Under these, the US is obligated to provide Taiwan with the defensive resources necessary to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities. The lack of obligations to come to Taiwan's defense leaves the US president and Congress with a wider field of action. At the same time, the authorities in Taipei have no formal basis to require support which provides a disincentive against a unilateral attempt to change Taiwan's status by declaring independence. "The 'politics of strategic ambiguity' has so far been one of the policy pillars in the U.S.-Taiwan-China triangle of relations."
From Beijing's perspective, Taiwan remains a rogue province to be peacefully or forcibly incorporated. This process is a priority for PRC authorities for three primary reasons.
First, the existence of an alternative democratic model for China's development undermines the CCP's legitimacy and narratives of the uniqueness of "socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The primary threat to the CCP is any movement that could lead to the decentralization or weakening of Party power. Among these potential threats, so-called "separatist movements" involving Xinjiang, Taiwan and Tibet are of paramount importance to the CCP.
In the 1990s, after four decades of military junta rule, the Taiwanese authorities initiated a process of democratization of the political system. Since then, the Republic of China has achieved a high level of economic development while guaranteeing a wide range of freedoms to its citizens. The success of the Taiwanese model provides an attractive alternative for the growing Chinese middle class which is treated as a threat by the CCP.
In the symbolic dimension, nationalism is of great importance, being in fact the leading ideology of the state and the party. One of the key concepts of Xi Jinping's administration is the "Great Revival of the Chinese Nation," which is to be accomplished by 2049. This concept also includes the unification of all territories to which China has, or claims, "sovereign rights." And this includes Taiwan.
Secondly, Taiwan is one of the leaders in the electronics sector and plays an important role within regional and global supply chains. This is particularly true in the microprocessor and semiconductor industry in which Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is a true powerhouse. This is an area where the PRC has serious deficiencies in technology, knowledge, and world-class expertise despite massive investments. Microprocessors top the list of goods imported by the PRC with the value exceeding 300 billion annually as of 2019. The disruption of supply chains caused by the pandemic has highlighted the vulnerability of the global industry to deficits in this commodity. Gaining control of Taiwan and its developed high-tech sector would give the PRC a very strong asset in its rivalry with the US. So far, the US has been the undisputed leader which has made it possible, among other things, to cut off Huawei from goods using American technologies. With the incorporation of Taiwan, China would have a chance to become truly "self-sufficient" in this area and gain new resistance to US pressure.
And third, since the end of World War II, Taiwan has been seen as a key point on the strategic map of Asia, keeping mainland China ‘in check’. It is no coincidence that General Douglas McArthur in 1950 referred to Formosa as "the unsinkable aircraft carrier" and Secretary Dean Acheson included it in the so-called "defense perimeter." For Beijing, the incorporation of Taiwan is equally important. It would mean gaining real control over the "first island chain" and with it developing strategic depth. Not only would it increase the distance for a potential adversary, but also the power projection and ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance) capabilities. The mountainous terrain would also allow for the installation of anti-aircraft batteries and missile launchers. Moreover, the loss of Taiwan would be a serious blow to the functioning system of U.S. alliances in Asia and the world. The United States is not formally obligated to defend Taiwan, but failure to respond decisively and effectively would increase doubts about Washington's ability to meet its alliance obligations. Such a scenario could set off a chain reaction in the region, culminating in the collapse of the regional order. The collapse of Taiwan would also be significant for the security architecture in Europe, particularly on NATO's eastern flank, which relies heavily on the credibility of US deterrence policy.
Arms Race
Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has initiated a comprehensive and ambitious fleet expansion program. Already, the Chinese navy is the largest of its kind in the world with more than 360 vessels. The PLA remains the world leader in terms of the rate of fleet tonnage expansion. Between 2014 and 2018, it grew by around 678,000 tons, or more than the combined tonnage of the British and Spanish navies. The scale of the quantitative change is also evidenced by the fact that between 2015 and 2017, the tonnage of vessels launched in Chinese shipyards was almost double that of the US Navy. There is a high probability that this dynamic will continue into the future. A 2021 US Congressional report predicts that the Chinese Navy could have up to 425 vessels by 2030. The naval infantry and landing ships that are necessary for a successful invasion are also being actively expanded. However, modernization is by no means limited to the navy. China is also actively modernizing and expanding its air force, missile forces, as well as extending its capabilities in the informational sphere and cyberspace. A US Department of Defense report indicates that China has the most numerous air force in the Indo-Pacific region. Out of a total of 2,500 aircraft, 2,000 are for combat use, 1,500 are fighters of which about 800 are classified as fourth generation and above (J-20, J-16, J-10, J-11, Su-30 and Su-35). In the coming years, the priority will be to replace aircraft introduced into service during the Cold War (Q-5, J-8) with generation 4 and 4.5 machines, to launch serial production of the J-20 model, and to complete development work on the Xian H-20 strategic bomber.
The pursuit of C4ISR superiority, that is Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, will also require the introduction of more Airborne Early Warning (AEW), Airborne Reconnaissance and Surveillance (AWACS) units. China's missile program has made tremendous progress over the past two decades in terms of the number of advanced missiles and platforms capable of carrying them. Among these, short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles have attracted particular attention in U.S. military circles: DF-21, DF-26 and DF-17. They represent one of the main assets of China's missile forces and threats to US troops stationed in the region. The DF-26 have a range of up to 4,000 km, allowing them to strike aircraft carrier battle groups, the Guam base, and Okinawa located in the so-called "second island chain." The DF-21 and DF-26 began entering service in the 2010 decade, making them one of the most modern types of weaponry in the PLA inventory. Added to this is the program to develop DF-17 supersonic missiles (HGV) with a range of 1.8-2.5 thousand km and capable of carrying both conventional and thermonuclear payloads. Unlike classical ballistic missiles, the DF-17 is more difficult to intercept by enemy radar and defense systems due to its low trajectory and higher velocity.
The PRC is not only increasing the strength of its military, but is undertaking regular exercises to prepare it for an invasion into Taiwan. This is a key activity from a military as well as psychological point of view. Since the beginning of Donald Trump's presidency, China has increased its air activity in the Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone in leaps and bounds. This has been accompanied by landing and live fire exercises in the South China Sea. These actions taken have often been in response to actions by the US administration that Beijing felt violated its interests. The increase in activity is intended to put pressure on Taiwanese authorities and society and to let the US and its allies know that any moves toward ROC independence will be met with an escalation from across the Strait.
Barriers
The most serious obstacle to the PRC's plans to seize Taiwan is the US military presence in the region. The United States simply has the world's most powerful military and can count on the support of regional allies and partners such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India. The administrations of Donald Trump and Joe Biden have initiated the Quad and AUKUS formats which aim to create a networked security architecture in the region and balance the growing influence of the PRC. Together with its allies, the US has the capacity to disrupt the flow of critical goods and raw materials to China by imposing a maritime blockade on shipments across the Indian Ocean. A symbol of Chinese vulnerability to such a blockade is the Strait of Malacca through which about 70% of all energy commodities enter China.
Another problem faced by the Chinese army is the geography that increases the defensive capabilities of the Taiwanese. The landing of troops across the strait itself requires the use of a massive landing force including both naval infantry and PLA units such as Type 071 and 075 ships. Taiwan's mountainous terrain favors defensive operations and leaves only a few potential points for invasion. For 70 years, Taiwan's armed forces have been preparing the country's defense system to inflict maximum damage on an advancing adversary based on technology and equipment supplied largely by the United States. The PRC would have to mobilize at least several hundred thousand troops along with air, missile, and naval forces to ensure a chance of success. Victory would potentially come at a very high cost and also depends on the level of US and other actors' commitment. The Chinese side must also take into account the risk of escalation of the conflict and the possibility of tactical use of nuclear weapons. The short distance separating China's eastern coast from Taiwan generates a serious threat to the area where the largest urban and economic centers of the PRC are located. It is also speculated that Taiwan's armed forces' medium-range ballistic missiles are targeted at China's Three Gorges Dam. The consequences of its destruction would be catastrophic for China and, in fact, comparable to a nuclear strike.
A full-scale invasion is a very risky undertaking for Beijing politically as well. Beijing is building the Party's legitimacy on the basis of nationalist rhetoric emphasizing China's economic and political successes. In a scenario of a failed invasion with heavy losses, the nationalism that has strengthened the Party so far could turn against it or at least lead to a change of leadership.
Last, but not least, initiating a regional conflict with worldwide consequences is simply bad for business and not in the interest of most economic sectors. Globalization has made countries highly interdependent in international supply chains and capital markets. In turn, the pandemic has demonstrated how severe the consequences of these disruptions can be, including energy, transportation, and inflation crises. Conflict would very likely slow down China's already slowing economic momentum. The CCP's authority, built on China's economic success, would then be threatened which would, in turn, generate opportunities for political transformation and the removal of the CCP from power - a scenario that the Party seeks to avoid at all costs.
Possible Scenarios
The most likely scenario is the imposition of a blockade or an attempt to gain control of the archipelago of Matsu, Kinmen, or Dongsha islands which are closer to PRC territory than Taiwan. This type of action would not involve high casualties as it would provide an easy target for the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Occupying the area would be an image booster for Xi Jinping and the Party and would also contribute to undermining US credibility if Washington chose not to intervene. This option is less risky than a full-scale invasion, but it does not mean it is without risks. China's high dependence on maritime transport, including and in particular, the Strait of Malacca, exposes it to symmetrical retaliation by the US in, for example, the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean. Moreover, there is a high probability that the US and its allies will impose economic sanctions that would hit the PRC's economy. A decision to impose a blockade or attack on one of the smaller islands would accelerate the increase in military spending among the remaining countries in the region, military aid to Taiwan, and potentially also the proliferation of nuclear weapons among U.S. allies in the region: Australia, Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan itself. Therefore, it could ultimately contribute to weakening the PRC's relative military power in the region.
Also paramount to maintaining Taiwan's ability to defend itself will be the psychological willingness of the island's population to suffer losses and maintain resistance. This factor will be crucial, hence the information front is one of the primary areas of potential conflict. The PRC's internal allies may include supporters of the Kuomintang (KMT), a party that, despite declining in support among Taiwan's young citizens, remains a proponent of peaceful unification between Taiwan and the PRC. On the part of the US and allies, a necessary element is to develop a political consensus now on how to respond to an escalation or conflict. This will allow for shorter decision-making times and the selection of measures appropriate to the situation. Taiwan is potentially the most important flashpoint on Earth today. But will the Chinese decide to light the fuse?
