- Andrzej Krajewski
Future or Utopia?
"The European Treaties are not carved in stone" announced in August 2022 Olaf Scholz in Prague. Five years before that, at the Sorbonne in Paris, Emmanuel Macron had declared: "We cannot talk about a Europe of Nations all the time". Historically, the Franco-German convergence of interests towards a single European state was not so apparent; on the contrary, it was the product of a constantly shifting balance of power. But the current architecture of the global and European systems means that for the first time in history, Berlin and Paris, Europe's two most powerful centres of power, are speaking with one voice: Europe should move towards a superstate. To examine the concept of the European federal state and to understand the full dynamics of relations within the European Union, we need to take a longer journey in the past.
At the plenary session of the European Parliament on 22 November 2023, Parliament’s members voted in favour of a draft prepared by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. It provides for a fundamental revision of the EU Treaties. The result would be an extension of Brussels' competencies in dozens of areas and, above all, the abolition of the right of veto in the Council of the European Union. 291 MEPs voted for the resolution, 274 against and 44 abstained. This was only the first of many steps required throughout the process. Nevertheless, it should come as no surprise that the project initiated by Christian Democrat, Socialist and Green MEPs, among others, to transform the Union into a de facto federal state, will be supported in the Council of the European Union by the German Chancellor and the French President.
In order to understand the whole process of European integration and to try to assess the chances of transforming the old continent into a single state, it is necessary to take a little trip back in time. Step by step into the past and then back to the present.
The Evolution of European Integration
"The European Treaties are not carved in stone," announced 29 August 2022 Olaf Scholz in Prague. Although the German Chancellor addressed these words to students and academics at Charles University, his speech could hardly be considered a standard lecture. The leader of the largest country in the European Union declared, "If we jointly come to the conclusion that the Treaties have to be changed in order for Europe to move forward, then we should do so".
But Scholz was not the first leader of a key EU country to make such a declaration. French President Emmanuel Macron has been pushing a similar vision of change for years. It is worth noting that he also unveiled his proposals during a university lecture, though not in Prague, but at the Sorbonne in Paris.
"We cannot talk about a Europe of Nations all the time," he argued to the audience on 26 September 2017. Instead of cultivating the existence of nation states, he called for a reform of the treaties so that they tighten federal ties in the Old Continent. Interestingly, his call for the European Commission to be transformed into something resembling an EU government, with only 15 commissioners, was already made at that time.
However, Chancellor Angela Merkel was very sceptical of the French President's vision. Particularly since it was apparent that he dreamt of restoring to the Fifth Republic the role it played in the Community more than thirty years ago, when Jacques Delors was President of the European Commission for a decade.
This position of Berlin changed when the parties that subsequently formed the 'Ampelkoalition' (traffic light coalition) won the 2021 elections in Germany. In the coalition agreement, presented to the public on 24 November 2021, the SPD, the Greens and the FDP jointly declared that the goal of Chancellor Olaf Scholz's government was to reform the Union to become: "a European federal state, organised according to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the Charter of Fundamental Rights". We talked more about this in our material from that time.
Three months later, Russia invaded Ukraine and the German economy, along with the economies of other EU states, was faced with an energy crisis. At the same time, a political crisis was underway, for this is what one might call the complete collapse of the eastern policy that Berlin had been pursuing towards Moscow since the reign of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. The Russian campaign of conquest of Ukraine, instigated by Vladimir Putin, forced Scholz to attempt an ‘escape forward'. This would involve tightening ties within the Union and streamlining the Community's decision-making process. The Chancellor, therefore, did what President Macron had long advocated.
"When, if not now, will we create a sovereign Europe that can survive in a multipolar world?" - rhetorically asked Olaf Scholz at the end of his lecture at Charles University. Having previously presented the audience with a vision of a new Union, bringing together as many as 36 states (including Ukraine), in which decisions would be taken by majority vote. Such a Europe would be able to conduct a unified foreign policy and have its own armed forces. It would also become an equal partner to the United States and China in the power game.
If one believes in idealism in politics, one could argue that Chancellor Scholz would like to finally realise the vision outlined by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman more than 70 years ago. The former claimed that: "The peoples of Europe have no other future than union". The more conservative Schuman understood the resistance it would provoke in the nation states, but believed it could be overcome.
During a speech in May 1960, Schuman stressed that "the term supranational power arouses suspicion. But it is nothing more than the application of the majority principle to international relations, which at the national level is regarded as the primary means of exercising freedom". And he made this speech on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the announcement of his plan to coordinate steel production and coal mining and so the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by 6 Western European countries. The implementation of the Schuman Plan is considered the pivotal moment that eventually led to the establishment of the modern European Union.
Behind Schuman's idealism, however, was the hard pragmatism of the leaders of France and the Federal Republic of Germany at the time, who recognised that, through the vision of a common Europe, they would be able to rebuild both countries' position in the world. Here it is necessary to go back even further in time in order to discern certain regularities.
The Old Continent has twice in recent centuries come under the control of a single centre of power. The first time was in the early 19th century, when France, ruled by Napoleon Bonaparte, subjugated almost all of Europe. In the following century, Germany under Adolf Hitler accomplished the same feat. Each time, the domination of the Old Continent by one force was short-lived and accompanied by a series of military clashes that were the bloodiest of their era. And the cost of the venture proved crushing for the states that were to be its beneficiaries. As a result of the Napoleonic Wars, France ceased to be the most potent power on the Old Continent and never regained this position. The Second World War had a similarly disastrous effect on Germany, which was further divided into two states by the victorious Allies.
Interestingly, both projects of unifying Europe by force through a single nation failed due to the naval powers who consistently tried to prevent this. The UK held Napoleon back, while Germany was held back by Britain along with the US. However, the defeat of France and Germany was sealed by losing wars with Tsarist Russia at the eastern end of the continent and its heir - the Soviet Union.
The failures and the accompanying loss of power were painful lessons. France first began to draw the conclusions that a different path should be taken. It was compelled to do so by seeing its own decline in importance compared to Napoleonic times in military, economic and even demographic fields.
At the beginning of the 19th century. France was the most populous power on the continent, with 28 million inhabitants. But by 1914, its population had only increased to 39 million. During this time, the British and Germans had tripled, while the Russians had quadrupled. All these countries had established themselves as powers more significant than the Third Republic within a century. Then, during the First World War, more than 6 million young Frenchmen died or were permanently injured. From then on, nothing was feared in Paris more than a bleeding war. Therefore, the construction of the Maginot Line began. At the same time, in September 1929, the French Foreign Ministry prepared an offer addressed to 27 European countries. Aristide Briand proposed to them the creation of common 'federal ties'. He put the concrete plan in a special memorandum, which was announced eight months later.
The European Confederation was to have a supranational parliament and committees with quasi-governmental roles. This was to guarantee perpetual peace on the Old Continent, while ensuring that Paris retained its leading role. The Briand plan had a chance of success, only with the approval of Berlin. There, Adolf Hitler seized power and brought with him the bloodiest war in history.
France emerged from the Second World War severely weakened. However, Paris was still in a better position than defeated Germany, which lost 24 per cent of its territory and was then not only divided into two states, but one of them, the German Democratic Republic, came under the boot of Moscow. The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, had to respect the demands of victorious Americans.
This state of affairs proved to be a good start to revisit the ideas of Aristide Briand. All the more so, as the integration of the countries of the western part of the Old Continent began to be fostered by a number of other factors as well. Losing Italy abandoned Mussolini's dreams of rebuilding the Roman empire. The Netherlands no longer had the strength to hold sway even over the remnants of its colonial empire. Belgium and Luxembourg realised that alone they did not have even a shadow of a chance of defending their independence.
At the same time, Britain's foreign policy was changing dramatically. Faced with internal troubles and the threat of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom stopped blocking the integration of the western part of the Old Continent. All the more so as the United States was very interested in supporting this process.
Intended to help European countries recover from the devastation of war, the Marshall Plan was formulated in 1947 in such a way as to force participating countries to cooperate ever more closely in the economic fields. President Truman's administration, faced with the threat of war with the Soviet Union, needed a strong Western Europe as its ally. Strong economically, militarily and able to act as a collective. Already during his speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall called on European countries to create a 'system of permanent ties'. From that point on, Washington exerted discreet but powerful pressure on allied governments in Europe to begin the integration process as soon as possible. Giving it continued support over the following years.
It was no coincidence that the idea of European unification was first formulated publicly by the Americans' closest friend Winston Churchill. The former British Prime Minister invited more than 800 influential people from across Western Europe to The Hague in early May 1948, including the leader of the West German Christian Democratic Union, Konrad Adenauer. "We want a united Europe with free movement of people, ideas and goods throughout," Churchill said at the time. French Prime Minister Robert Schuman, who was present, agreed with this vision but did not entirely agree. Namely, in a Europe united under the aegis of the UK, with the support of the US, France might not play a decisive role. The Hague Conference brought about the creation of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. However, these bodies were never given real power and their influence on the continent was limited to exerting moral pressure on states to respect democratic principles and human rights.
Meanwhile, Robert Schuman, already in his role as head of the French Foreign Ministry, modified Churchill's plan to better serve French interests, with some help of the economist Jean Monnet. German industry, still relying on the power of the Ruhr region - the then hegemon of steel and coal production - was doomed to revival. So Schuman announced his famous plan on 9th May 1950.
"The French government proposes to place all Franco-German coal and steel production under the management of a common High Authority in an organisation open to the participation of other European countries," proclaimed its key point.
Thus the Coal and Steel Community was born. The joint supervision of coal and steel production was intended to prevent Germany's military and industrial growth from posing a threat to France. At the same time, it limited the influence of the British, and placed Germany in the position of France's junior partner, as Paris gained partial control over Germany's most important region. The day before the "Schuman Plan" was announced, its contents were made known to Washington. At the White House, the initiative was seen as a very good idea, in tune with American strategic objectives. At the same time, the Americans were completely unconcerned about the interests of Great Britain, whose colonial empire they wished to see quickly become a thing of the past. For this reason, London was not informed of the Schuman Plan.
"The Quai d'Orsay (the French Foreign Office - author's note) took an undying pleasure in this: it was the first of many small acts of revenge for the 'Anglo-Americans' taking decisions without consulting Paris", says Tony Judt in his monograph 'Postwar'.
But Schuman's statement pleased the most German Chancellor - Konrad Adenauer. "This is our breakthrough," he reportedly shouted to his colleagues. Defeated Germany was invited to join the international organisation on an equal footing with the victorious countries. Paris, on the other hand, went to great lengths to ensure that London would not have access to it.
The European Coal and Steel Community brought together six countries, but all important decisions were made in Paris, after consultation with Bonn. Adenauer accepted French domination because the memory of German crimes was still fresh in Europe, which made it very difficult for him to conduct an independent foreign policy. He saw the rebuilding of the German economy as a more important goal. This, thanks to the American Marshall Plan, was succeeding brilliantly. At the same time, he advocated deeper economic integration on the assumption that, in time, Germany's economic strength would offset Paris' political advantage. Thus, he was not keen on building the European Defence Community pushed by France, which was to become an alternative to NATO. Instead, he staunchly supported the Treaties of Rome, under which the European Atomic Energy Community was established in March 1957 and the European Economic Community (EEC) was born on 1 January 1958.
And indeed, Germany was thriving. It was recovering its economic and diplomatic strength, posing a threat to France's dominant position. Therefore, when the legendary World War II leader General Charles de Gaulle took leadership in France again in 1958, he was strongly dissatisfied with the unfolding events. De Gaulle's response was a project called the 'Fouchet Plan.'
Christian Fouchet, was an experienced diplomat commissioned by President de Gaulle. He chaired a committee of representatives from the six EEC states tasked with drafting guidelines to transform the organisation into a federation with a common defense and foreign policy. The Community’s Parliamentary Assembly, existing under the Treaties of Rome, would be transformed into the European Parliament. However, it would only have the right to deliver an opinion on the Council’s decisions.
Despite de Gaulle's efforts, the "Fouchet Plan" was rejected by the Community countries, even in its watered-down form, presented again in 1962. Although its existence was not formalized at the time, the leaders of all EEC countries began to meet regularly to discuss specific issues.
The French President felt that since integration according to the Paris formula was not possible, he had to replace it with another solution that would guarantee that France remained a 'leading force' in the EEC. Thus was born the idea of the Elysée Treaty. Konrad Adenauer accepted it, believing that it would become a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation. Prepared for signature on 22 January 1963 at the Élysée Palace, the treaty envisaged close coordination between the German and French governments in the process of making key decisions. According to the terms of the treaty, the heads of government of both countries were to meet at least twice a year to agree on the most important issues. Foreign ministers had to meet at least every three months, while the chiefs of staff of the armed forces had to meet every two months.
The Elysée Treaty was intended by de Gaulle to mark the beginning of a closer union between the two largest EEC states, forming the core of a confederation with weaker European countries. In this 'marriage of convenience,' the French president had set himself the role of head. Meanwhile, disappointment awaited him. Adenauer had compliantly accepted an increasingly close friendship with France, as long as it did not threaten German interests. Therefore, in May 1963, the Bundestag ratified the Elysée Treaty. But it added an introduction to it that angered de Gaulle. In it, the Germans emphasized the role of the partnership of a unifying Europe with the United States and NATO. And what's more, they announced the pursuit of integration of the whole community: "with the participation of the United Kingdom."
"This is not what the French president expected." - Jerzy Krasuski emphasizes in his monograph 'Western Europe after World War II.' Disappointed with Germany's attitude, blocking both federalization and pushing US power out from Europe, de Gaulle focused on building up France's superpower status. This political turn was accompanied by the promotion of the slogan of a 'Europe of homelands,' which justified the general's volition.
In 1966, he decided that the Fifth Republic should leave the military structures of NATO and saw to an intensive expansion of the armed forces. By the end of his reign, France already had its own nuclear weapons prepared for use - following the example of the USA and USSR - according to the principles of the nuclear triad. This consisted of Dassault Mirage IV bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs, S-2 missiles carrying nuclear warheads with a range of 3,000 km, and submarines capable of transporting and launching ballistic missiles.
Within the EEC, Paris gave up pushing for rapid integration, taking care only to keep the British out of the Community, even though Harold Macmillan's government had indicated a desire to join the Community. President de Gaulle remained unyielding even when London's efforts were supported by US President John F. Kennedy.
"He wanted France to play the role of Germany's big sister, rather than the poor cousin of the three Germanic industrial powers: West Germany, Britain and the USA" - emphasizes Krasuski in his book. Here, it should be mentioned that it was of significance to the general that, according to the censuses conducted in the USA at the time, approximately 29 per cent of the population of that country was of German origin, while only 22 per cent had their roots in England.
In one thing Charles de Gaulle was not wrong - allowing the UK into the Community meant that integration processes were to be frozen. When the next French president, Georges Pompidou, allowed the United Kingdom to join the EEC in 1973, together with Ireland and Denmark, the implementation of the plans for building an economic and political community, which were still in the making, slowed dramatically. Only the creation of the European Monetary System succeeded and in 1979 the virtual money 'ecu' was created as a prelude to Monetary Union. This in turn was blocked by the veto of Bonn. Chancellor Helmut Kohl had no intention of getting rid of the German mark, as its stability was one of the pillars of Germany's economic success. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, on the other hand, made sure that the creation of a federal state was not possible.
The widespread lack of enthusiasm for the vision once floated by Schuman and Monet was due to deeper reasons. The creation of the Common Market and close cooperation with the United States had resulted in the economic rebirth of Western Europe. This in turn translated into an increase in the importance in the world of the individual countries that made up the EEC. In 1985, the Community economies collectively accounted for more than 24% of world GDP, while the United States accounted for 22%. At the time, no other region in the world could match the EEC in terms of wealth. Whereas the motive for deeper defense integration, i.e. the real threat previously posed by the Soviet Union, had disappeared by the end of the 1980s.
This state of affairs meant that the largest countries of the Community: West Germany, France, the UK and even Italy could enjoy the status due to the superpowers. Federalization was proving unnecessary and therefore the enthusiasm for it had died out. Only France tried to keep its flame burning for the sake of Germany, fearing that it might eventually lose its position as 'big sister' due to Berlin’s growing economic importance. This is why President Francois Mitterrand and his finance minister Jacques Delors began in the mid-1980s to push for deeper integration, so that Germany would not suddenly become a completely independent political entity.
Towards a European Union
But although Delors, as President of the European Commission, set up a Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, his efforts were in vain. Until an unexpected breakthrough came. Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the reunification of the German states became possible. The finalization of this process was to mark the end of France's dominant position in Europe. On the other hand, Paris did not have enough power to block the process of German unification indefinitely, since the Soviet Union and the United States had withdrawn their opposition. Mitterrand therefore agreed to West Germany's absorption of the East, but in return demanded from Germans a rapid monetary union and the construction of a political one.
Although most people in Germany could not imagine giving up their own currency, Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed. But in return, his finance minister, Theo Waigel, demanded that Paris formulate tough conditions for the countries aspiring to join the future Monetary Union. These were later included in the Stability and Growth Pact. Having received guarantees that the annual budget deficit of the countries using the single currency would not exceed 3 per cent of GDP and that public debt would not exceed 60 per cent of GDP, Kohl began to push for Monetary Union. "In one case - the euro - I was like a dictator," he admitted in an interview 10 years later with journalist Jens Peter Paul, which waited another decade for its publication. "We would have lost the referendum on the introduction of the euro. It's quite clear. I would have lost it seven to three." - Kohl recounted.
Political necessities meant that integration finally got off the ground and its direction was officially defined at the Community summit in Maastricht in February 1992. Interestingly, it was not until the Treaty signed there that the key decision-making body, the European Council, was incorporated into the Community structure. At Maastricht, the leaders of the EEC countries agreed on the foundations of the European Union. But then their present shape began to be forged by political necessity. And it was mainly French and German politicians who pushed it forward. The latter were increasingly given the final say.
To begin with, the admission to the EU of the countries of Central Europe was preceded by a new treaty, signed in Nice on 26 February 2001. Quite an important one. It reformed the structures of the Community so that its enlargement would not affect its daily functioning. In doing so, it decided to introduce the first elements of democracy at a central level, giving the European Parliament its first legislative and supervisory powers over the European Commission. At this point, it might have seemed that the transformation of the European Union into a federal state was only a matter of time. A Monetary Union was coming into effect, which all EU countries were expected to join over the years. What’s more, the plans included the adoption of a common European constitution.
On 30 April 2001, the weekly magazine 'Der Spiegel' published a piece entitled "Verantwortung für Europa" (Responsibility for Europe). It was a manifesto of the ruling SPD prepared by the party leadership under the guidance of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In it, the authors proclaimed that: "there is no alternative to continuing integration". Schröder believed that the European Union needed to progress toward political unification, incorporating federal solutions (along the lines of the German system) and placing a premium on the subsidiarity principle. This principle states that each level of government should only perform those tasks that a lower level of government or civil society itself cannot perform effectively.
A European political union was put on its agenda by the SPD in the second half of November 2001, at the party congress in Nuremberg. The German leadership at the time assumed that in the new Union, the European Commission would assume the role of the government. Thus, the Council of the European Union, comprising the heads of government of the Member States and the most important ministers, was to become something like the Senate, i.e., the upper house of the European Parliament. The competences of the latter were to be broadened, but not to the extent that it could dominate decisions of the Council of the European Union. The idea of a President of the Union was also proposed. He or she was to be appointed jointly by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament in multi-level elections.
Less than a year after Nice, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jacques Chirac issued a joint statement in December 2001 recognizing the need for a European Union Constitution. Almost immediately, this proposal was endorsed by the European Council. Its rapid implementation would have meant that the new Central European members would have become part of a large federation from the outset.
Both Berlin and Paris found common interests again at this point, and on many levels. In the case of world politics, the USA, after the collapse of the USSR, continued to consolidate its dominant position, taking advantage of the gains then offered by the globalization of the economy. In 2000, for the first time, it was not the Community countries but the US economy that recorded the largest share of world GDP. At the same time, European companies missed almost all the opportunities of being the initiator and leader in successive technological revolutions. It was the United States, Japan, South Korea, and other Far Eastern 'tigers' who could boast of greater economic success. And this was thanks to the entry into widespread use of personal computers, with their innovative software, the Internet, microprocessors, mobile phones, etc. The European Union was falling further and further behind in the race for the most modern economic sectors. The leaders of the time were aware of this. That is why the European Council of March 2000 adopted the so-called Lisbon Strategy. Its objective was as follows: "The European Union should become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion," reads the European Parliament's communication.
Integration was intended to facilitate the implementation of the strategy and to challenge the political and economic dominance of the United States. At the same time, Berlin and Paris saw it as a way of curbing the individual ambitions of each country of the Community. Especially to keep the new Central European members in check. Meanwhile, the system of counting votes in the Council of the European Union adopted in Nice offered the exact opposite. Germany, being the country with the largest population and the most powerful economically, had only 29 weighted votes, exactly the same as the UK, France, and Italy (no wonder, then, that these countries supported the Treaty of Nice). Moreover, the Nice system of vote counting offered Spain and Poland 27 votes each. This meant that a wide range of the largest countries in the Union could counterbalance each other's influence. Nice opened the way for deeper integration of the Community and its enlargement to the east of the continent. Both measures were necessary to enable the Union to stand up to US domination, but at the same time they seriously diminished the importance of Berlin and Paris in the Community. So, as the next step, Nice had to be replaced by a treaty, restoring the status quo.
Federal Europe dropped once again
This is how the main motives of Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac can be read. In contrast, the project for the rapid construction of a joint federal state, outlined by Schröder, this time was not taken into account by Paris. Instead of this a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was presented. The only significant change from previous treaties, however, was that this constitution profoundly reformed the system of counting votes in the EU Council. The new system, called the double majority system, stipulated that for a decision to be taken, the consent of at least 55% of the states of the Union (no less than 15 states) representing at least 65% of the Union's population was needed. And to block a decision, more than 45 per cent of states or 35 per cent of the population living in at least four states.
In addition, the constitution brought together in one document all the previous treaties, organized the functioning of the EU institutions, and extended the guarantees of EU citizens' rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which had already been adopted at the Nice summit. Making voting weights dependent on the number of inhabitants restored the pre-Nice Treaty balance of power in the Community, limiting the role of smaller countries, which de facto could not push anything through without the approval of the largest ones. Introducing to the EU 10 new members from Central Europe was scheduled for the 1 May 2004. That meant that there was no possibility of opposing the changes that had already been prepared. The draft Constitution was brought to a conclusion very quickly and, on Friday 29 October 2004, the heads of state of the Union put their signatures to the Constitutional Treaty during a ceremony on Capitol Hill in Rome.
Yet, the debate on the preparation of the text of the Constitutional Treaty was claimed as not entirely free, as ordinary people did not participate in it.
This is why the President of the European Convention, which drafted and edited the Constitutional Treaty, Válery Giscard d'Estaing, announced that he would insist on a ratification referendum in all EU Member States. However, only 10 countries recognized his words as binding. In France, according to current law, the ratification of the constitution could be carried out by parliament. Meanwhile, President Chirac opted for a referendum. In February 2005, the first one took place in Spain and seemed to confirm that everything would go ahead as planned. With a low turnout, as many as 77 per cent of voters voted in favour of the constitution. Then, in May, the French and immediately afterwards the Dutch said a hard 'no'. In France, as many as 55 per cent of votes were cast against ratification. This result dismayed other EU countries. Some of them postponed or suspended the ratification process, even though it had already been completed in Germany and Italy, among others. Jacques Chirac, who was losing popularity, did not intend to go against the opinion of the electorate and declared the referendum result binding. The state of limbo lasted more than two years. The leaders of the EU countries agreed to extend the deadline for ratification of the Constitution, but when this did not help either, in June 2006 at the Brussels European Council, it was decided that, by the second half of 2008 at the latest, a decision would be taken on the extent to which the Constitution should be amended so that it could still be adopted.
For Berlin and Paris were not about to give up on pushing through a change in the counting of votes in the Council of the EU. The task of modifying the Constitutional Treaty fell to Germany, which, in the first half of 2007, took over the presidency of the Union after the Austrians and the Finns, later known as the heavyweight presidency. Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that the issue of ratifying the Constitutional Treaty would be a priority for her government. She then approached the issue with the pragmatism that has become her trademark over time. The flashy and controversial name – the Constitution – was therefore dropped back to the neutral – treaty. Merkel also gave up pushing things that were controversial in terms of worldview.
The UK and Polish governments, therefore, did not have to sign the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The provisions on the obligatory presence in public spaces of EU symbols, such as the flag and the anthem ('Ode to Joy' by Beethoven), were dropped so as not to suggest to the people of Europe that the EU was turning into a federal state. Although, at the same time, the position of the President of the European Council was being created. In the media, he is referred to as the "president" of the EU in exaggerated terms. In practice, this function gives negligible powers regarding the organization of European Council meetings. Apart from these, the President of the European Council mainly has a representative function. In reality, a more important role is played by the EU's High Representative for Foreign Policy, to whom the several thousand-strong corps of the EU's diplomatic service (the so-called European External Action Service) reports. This post was created with a view to the Union pursuing a unified foreign policy over time.
However, how votes would be counted in the Council of the EU was still the key issue. During the German presidency, Angela Merkel's skilful diplomacy succeeded in preserving the mechanism from the Constitutional Treaty while drastically reducing the right of veto. It was abolished in about 45 areas and, due to the resistance of smaller states, was retained only in the most strategic issues, i.e. those relating to foreign policy, defense, social security, taxation, and cultural affairs. Interestingly, the CDU Chancellor piloted the changes according to the roadmap set out by Gerhard Schröder in "Verantwortung für Europa". But in a much softer form. In many places - such as the position of President of the European Council - it was a façade. The Treaty prepared under her watch was approved at the meeting of the Heads of State in Lisbon on 18-19 October 2007, and ceremonially signed on 13 December 2007.
Then, the troubles started again. In June 2008, the Irish people rejected the Lisbon Treaty in a national referendum, and the great reform of the functioning of the Union was again in question. But small Ireland is not France with its potential and importance in the Union. Dublin, therefore, found itself under enormous pressure. At the same time, in exchange for a change of mind, the Irish government was offered, among other things, legal guarantees that the document would not violate the country's neutrality or Ireland's national competence in tax policy and on abortion. As a result, after a massive 'yes' campaign in the Irish media, supported by the major political parties, as many as 67.1 per cent of voters supported the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in the second referendum on 2 October 2009.
To everyone's surprise, Czech President Vaclav Klaus resisted for the longest time. He refused to sign the ratification act, explaining this by fear of possible claims from the descendants of the 3 million Sudeten Germans displaced from Czechoslovakia by the Beneš Decrees of 1945. In the end, the European Council resolved that the Czech Republic would be excluded from the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, along with the UK and Poland. This convinced Vaclav Klaus to change his mind. Poland, in turn, was appeased by the fact that the voting rules in the EU Council were, until 2014, based on the weighted voting method of the Nice Treaty.
In this way, the process of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty came to a happy conclusion, and it was Angela Merkel in particular who could congratulate herself on this success. The key to the success was the weight of votes in the Council of the European Union because it is here that all the threads of power that bind the Union together are concentrated. Whatever is proposed by the European Parliament or the European Commission ends up in the Council of the European Union. It is not a single entity but an umbrella body which meets in ten different configurations, depending on the area of EU policy being discussed. And individual countries send to the meeting the minister responsible for the policy area in question. The most important decisions are taken by the leaders of the Member States at European Council meetings. As under the Lisbon Treaty only a limited range of issues can be vetoed, the decisions then taken become binding on all EU members. The only remaining avenue is then to appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union, which decides whether a specific decision is in line with EU law.
In order to grasp the significance of Angela Merkel's success, it is necessary to visualise the change in power in the weighting system. Under the Nice system, Germany's vote weight was 8.4 per cent of the total vote, whereas under the Lisbon system, it was 16.5 per cent. Twice as much.
In the case of France, there was an increase from 8.4 to 12.9 per cent, the UK from 8.4 to 12.4 per cent. Italy’s and Spain’s share also increased. Each of the large countries gained in terms of influence, which encouraged them to support Angela Merkel's actions. It was the smallest countries that lost the most, with their voting weights dropping by up to several times - an example being Estonia, whose vote now weighed four times less.
In practice, this meant that EU policy began to be decided by the big countries, and the role of playmaker was secured by Berlin because it is very difficult to play against the biggest decision-maker. By entering into an alliance with Germany, there is a great chance that something will be pushed through in the Council of the European Union. The British quickly realized this, insisting that their former Prime Minister Tony Blair should become the first President of the European Council. Angela Merkel decided that a person of this standing and political experience would be too uncomfortable for her in Brussels. So she promoted former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy to the presidency.
From this point onwards, the process of tightening the integration of the Union ceased to be an attractive thing for Chancellor Merkel. All the more so as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty coincided with the outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008. It radically accelerated the process of the economic weakening of the southern EU countries and of France vis-à-vis the German economy.
Germany, benefiting from affordable energy resources from Russia, started to solidify its position as the sole economic powerhouse within the Union. This change was further accelerated by 'Brexit'. While the UK was part of the EU, it served not only as a check, slowing down integration, but also as a country ensuring the possibility of establishing precedent-setting exceptions for individual states in the treaties. The UK also guaranteed a counterweight in the Council of the European Union to both Germany and the German-French tandem. The Eurosceptic stance that London usually took had to be taken into account. The UK's exit from the Community finally upset the previous political balance, further elevating Berlin's already strong position.
From then on, Chancellor Merkel assumed the role of arbiter with skill and moderation, ensuring the balance within the Union. Governments in the north, where the electorate can hardly bear the awareness of subsidizing countries in the south and east of the continent (even though these are profitable markets) were given a 'rule of law mechanism'. Thanks to it: The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, or Finland have gained the feeling that, if they break EU law, they will be able to cut off an overly burdensome southern or eastern European country from Community funds.
In turn, weakened in the aftermath of the financial crisis in the Eurozone, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal received financial support from Berlin. However, this was in exchange for painful fiscal belt-tightening under the supervision of a 'troika' created on the spot and made up of experts from the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In practice, it was headed by German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. It was Schäuble who "cracked the whip on the Greeks", as the daily Die Tageszeitung put it, forcing them to take drastic austerity measures in order to stay in the eurozone.
Lying at the center of the Old Continent, Germany became the sole axis on which the cohesion of the entire Union rested between 2009 and 2021. As befits a good peacemaker, it defended the North against the financial greed of the South. And at the same time, they looked after the south, defending it against the cheeseparing of the north. And they offered guarantees to the countries of Central Europe that cohesion funds would not be cut, by the financially troubled states of the old Union. Otto von Bismarck once called such political tactics the role of an "honest broker”. Whereas the Romans called such an approach "divide et impera". All this happened preferably through Brussels, ensuring the mediator had clean hands.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that when on September 26, 2017, which brings us back to the beginning of our story, President Macron presented his vision for deepening European integration during his lecture at the Sorbonne, the Chancellor completely ignored it. In that situation, any change in Berlin could only be for the worse. However, as has often happened in European history, just a few years passed, and new circumstances overturned the previous balance, while political necessities forced Chancellor Scholz to seek ways to forge something new.
European Federal State - the future or utopia?
The official motto of the European Union is the Latin maxim "In varietate concordia" – "United in diversity." But history, shows that the motives for creating the Union, and later its evolution, arose from the direct interests of its largest members – France and Germany. Only they have enough potential to dictate the direction of the Union's development from the top and then implement it. The situation is no different now.
This is not inherently bad - that’s just reality. Every country has the right to pursue its vital interests, especially when those interests often overlap, as seen in the example of a common trade union. It was a great achievement for Europe, providing tremendous growth stimulus for each member.
The current motive for another step toward a European Federal State stems from the continuous and rapid decline in the importance of the large EU states – Germany and France – relative to two other dominant centers of power, the United States and China. After decades of mutual testing, both Paris and Berlin finally agree that it is the time to consolidate power and face Washington and Beijing, armed with comparable tools of governance.
So, every nation has the right to define its own national interest, and today Paris and Berlin identify it with the creation of a European superstate in which, naturally – due to demographic and economic reasons – they would have the greatest decision-making power. Nevertheless, the definition of national interest varies among Union members, and for most of them, global competition with America and China is not a priority. For countries like Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or Poland, the more significant concern is the threat of war from Russia. In the new Union format, all these countries, by abandoning the right to veto, would surrender the decision-making power over their own security policies to Brussels. And let's remember, Brussels' actions would depend on states that misjudged Kremlin actions before the invasion of Ukraine. Competition with Beijing and Washington may not be a priority for Greece, Italy, or Spain – countries constantly exposed to waves of migration from the south and enduring persistent economic problems. In other words, the nations of the Union still, in many respects, do not trust each other, as demonstrated, among other things, by the war in Ukraine. And this distrust cannot be solely blamed on nationalist movements. A "leap forward" would be a leap into a deeply divided and internally conflicted body. The question is whether such an evolution would be a real opportunity for the Union's development or a path leading to chaos.
The past history of the Union suggests that the next phase of integration will be achieved through attempts to reach compromises. Yet, it will always be conditioned by the pragmatic national interests of Germany and France – which should not be surprising. They will also determine whether true federalization of Europe is possible.
In the past, whenever the political, economic, or even prestigious interests of the two most important Union countries diverged, projects for deeper integration naturally died. Today, the diminishing importance of Germany and the Fifth Republic is pushing them towards transforming the European Union into a federal state. However, do Paris and Berlin have enough agency, even within Europe today, to convince the rest of the Old Continent of this idea?
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