- Hubert Walas
Central Asia Amidst the War and Clash of Powers.
The repercussions of the war in Ukraine are like a shockwave being felt all over the world today. The closer to the epicenter of the outbreak, the harder its impact can be felt. The landlocked, resource-rich, Central Asian region, squeezed between Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and Turkish spheres of influence, is particularly vulnerable to its effects. The geographic isolation of the five post-Soviet republics - Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - and the military imperialism of their northern neighbor is making Central Asian capitals increasingly anxious. Russia's currently distracted attention, meanwhile, is trying to be taken advantage of by other regional actors, namely China, Turkey, and Iran.
In the Kremlin’s Orbit
Russia began its colonial conquest of the Central Asian territories during the imperial reign of Tsar Nicholas I in the first half of the 19th century. To consolidate these areas, the Kremlin sent Russian colonists to change the demographics of the region resulting in the deportation of the peoples living in these areas. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced in this way. Whereas, later in the Soviet era, the area was a resettlement point for Crimean Tatars, Pontic Greeks, Georgians, or Poles. The Kremlin's goal was to break up the population consolidation potential of the area, which could sooner or later threaten Moscow. A similar strategy is also in use today. According to the Ukrainians, since the beginning of the invasion, the Russians have deported thousands of their fellow citizens into Russia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics remained close to Moscow’s orbit. Although the region's capitals attempted their own multilateral policies, they continued to be fundamentally dependent on Russia, and their political agenda tended to be consistent with the Kremlin's.
However, the Russian conquest of Eastern Ukraine has shattered any previous consensus. It has made it abundantly clear that the Russians are determined to recreate Soviet power, perhaps also in territorial terms. And this is causing understandable anxiety in many post-Soviet republics. After the invasion of Ukraine, no post-Soviet country, including the five Central Asian countries, can fully trust Moscow's intentions. On the other hand, the war is consuming the Kremlin's attention, which the region is now trying to exploit. Players pushed out of the region in recent decades or even centuries are now returning to Central Asia.
It is important to remember that the war is affecting the region economically in fundamental ways. The sanctions imposed on Russia, due to its strong regional ties, are being acutely felt in the comparatively poorer countries of Central Asia. Inflation is rising while food and fuel prices are skyrocketing. Let's start with a brief overview of the reactions of individual countries to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Uzbekistan
"Military actions and violence must be halted immediately. The Republic of Uzbekistan recognizes the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We do not recognize the Lugansk and Donetsk republics," said Uzbekistan's Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov in response to a question about the war in Ukraine. While this does not condemn the invasion, it does mark a significant change from previous Uzbek statements.
While Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian country, the authorities have not banned anti-war protests, including subtle displays of support for Ukraine, such as the display of yellow and blue flags in important districts of Tashkent and Samarkand. Similar shows of support were already seen before the war when we could see a large Ukrainian flag on one of Tashkent's main hotels.
Undoubtedly, Tashkent has received the news from Ukraine with concern, but is trying to maintain a multi-vector policy based on good relations with Moscow. That's why on February 25, 2 days after the invasion began, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held talks with Vladimir Putin on continuing economic cooperation.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan has come down harder on critics of the Kremlin's actions. Initially, the country presented a strongly pro-Russian line. Under pressure from Moscow, it banned anti-war protests. This led Kyiv to recall the Ukrainian ambassador from Bishkek. The Kyrgyz attitude is due to the country's extensive dependence on Russia for its economy. A third of Kyrgyzstan's population works in Russia and their money transfers account for 30% of the country's GDP. This gives Moscow considerable leverage over Bishkek. On top of this, Kyrgyzstan's economy is in dire straits and the population is threatened by a rapid rise of poverty levels which in turn has the potential to translate into increased social discontent. Bishkek is also struggling to pay its current obligations and is in the grip of Chinese debt trap diplomacy.
Despite these problems, between the lines, we could hear pro-Ukrainian voices in the country. The Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry stressed the country's commitment to the principle of territorial integrity and the Prime Minister's Cabinet underscored the right of each country to determine its own domestic and foreign policies. In addition, Kyrgyz authorities have begun to impose fines on people who place the symbol of the invasion - the letter "Z" - on their cars.
By all means, Kyrgyzstan tries to remain neutral, but its high dependence on the Russian Federation dictates far-reaching caution in criticizing the Kremlin's actions.
Tajikistan
Like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan depends on Moscow for labor emigration. The authorities in Dushanbe do not prevent Russians from conducting recruitment actions among the republic's residents, which for many of them is the only chance to improve their living conditions. Russia acts as a guarantor of security in the country. Tajikistan hosts the 201st Russian Military Base, with about 8,000 troops stationed there. A reduction in the contingent could destabilize the regime of President Emomali Rahmon and increase the threat from radical Islam. Dushanbe has not officially expressed its position on the war in Ukraine. In practice, however, Tajikistan is subject to Russian dictates.
Turkmenistan
Clinging to its principle of "permanent neutrality," Turkmenistan also declined to make any comment. The country, which has been dubbed the North Korea of Central Asia due to its totalitarian control and lack of respect for human rights, has shown little interest in the war in Ukraine. The maintenance of good relations with Russia is evidenced by the Declaration on Enhanced Partnership signed on June 10. Although it should be remembered that Turkmenistan did not support Russia during the UN vote that condemned the invasion of Ukraine. Overall, none of the 5 Central Asian countries did so. Nor did any of the region's leaders participate in Russia's annual Victory Day Parade on May 9th.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is the most important country in Central Asia - it has the largest territory and an economy larger than all other four countries combined. The authorities in Nursultan, in contrast to the rest of the region, have also presented the most confrontational policy towards Moscow. Therefore, let's devote some more attention to Kazakhstan.
Many expected Kassym-Yomart Tokayev's rule to be subservient to Moscow, especially after Kremlin-led CSTO forces suppressed January protests in Kazakhstan and ensured Tokayev's power. However, the Kazakh President’s rule is more independent than one might think. The recent pro-Ukrainian protests that took place in Kazakh cities, unlike those in January, no longer bothered Tokayev and he gave them the green light. Air Astana, the country's main airline, has halted flights to Russia. Officially, this is due to insurance problems. The government in Nursultan stressed its neutrality towards the war and refused to let Russia send Kazakh soldiers to Ukraine at the start of the invasion. Meanwhile, President Tokayev underscored that Kazakhstan will not recognize the independence of the self-proclaimed republics of Luhansk and Donetsk. He said this in the presence of Vladimir Putin himself on Russian soil during an economic forum in St. Petersburg. Tokayev also refused to accept the Russian order of Alexander Nevsky. For Moscow, this is not the desired image of a regional leader that it considers a vassal.
It is all the more noteworthy that Kazakhstan is no exception in the region in terms of high dependence on its northern neighbor. Kazakhstan buys many cheap commodities, such as wheat, from Russia. The main trade transit route, which carries Kazakh oil, also traverses Russia. What’s more, Moscow has another important lever on Kazakhstan. 20% of Kazakhstan's population is made up of Russians and in the northern oblasts, the Russian minority makes up as much as 30 to 50% of the local population. This is a dangerous situation, and in the case of hostile relations, a perfect casus belli for the Kremlin. All the more so, since the proportion of Russians in the Kazakh population is growing with the country being the best foothold for Russian specialists emigrating from Russia after the invasion.
The invasion of Ukraine undoubtedly caused the Kazakhs great anxiety. Especially since, unlike in Ukraine, it would be virtually impossible to help Kazakhstan. The nearest NATO forces are thousands of kilometers away and the country's ties with NATO forces are practically nonexistent. Therefore, geography forces the Kazakhs to be far more cautious. For the time being, most Russian forces are engaged in the West, but this situation will not last forever. Thus, the threat of annexation, in light of renewed Russian imperialism, cannot today be considered a completely improbable scenario. Especially since the Kremlin has already used similar rhetoric toward Kazakhstan as it did toward Ukraine.
In December 2020, Vyacheslav Nikonov, chairman of the Education Committee in the Russian Duma, said that Kazakhstan's existence was only the result of historical generosity on the part of the Russians. Already after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Communist Party deputy Sergei Savostyanov called for the denazification and demilitarization of Kazakhstan on the model of Ukraine. Tigran Keosayan, the husband of Margarita Simonyan threatened Kazakhstan after a display of Kazakh assertiveness, saying that the country should "look carefully at Ukraine and think seriously about it."
For this reason, the courageous stance of the authorities in Nursultan should be noted. The stance of Central Asia's most important country is a perfect example that Russian hegemony in this post-Soviet area is weakening and that it’s being tested by the most important local actor. The Kazakhs would not be doing this if they did not feel that the balance of power in the region was changing. Of course, Tokayev and co. are doing all of this cautiously, but the Kazakhs' goal is to gradually become independent of Moscow by pursuing a multi-vector policy with other major players in the region.
In addition to the threats, the war is also creating opportunities for Kazakhstan. Many investors withdrawing from Russia are looking for a new regional place for their business. Kazakhstan, as a neutral country with significant natural deposits, is a convenient candidate to replace hostile Russia. Kazakhstan is also a beneficiary of Russia's brain drain. Russian specialists looking for a new place to work after the invasion often choose Kazakhstan. The authorities in Nursultan immediately took steps to retain these people for the long term. Both of these factors combined have the potential to persuade foreign corporations to move their operations from Russia and into Kazakhstan for the longer term.
Moreover, Kazakhstan has the potential to help Europe move away from Russian energy. That was the premise of President Tokayev's statement, saying that his country has enough hydrocarbon potential to help stabilize the European and global energy market. The country has massive resource reserves - the second proven oil reserves in Eurasia and the fourteenth largest gas reserves in the world. Kazakh oil is already being delivered to Europe bypassing Russia. It arrives by tankers across the Caspian Sea to Baku and later it is transported by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. However, the capacity of this route is limited. Still, two-thirds of Kazakh oil exports, or more than 50 million tons, are transported via the CPC oil pipeline from the Tangiz field in Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation to a terminal on the Black Sea.
Not surprisingly, the Russians took advantage of this leverage. Just a day after Tokayev spoke with European Commission President Charles Michel about potential oil supplies, a Russian court in Novorossiysk ruled that the CPC oil pipeline operator had committed "environmental irregularities" and shut down the pipeline for 30 days. This is not the first time Moscow has blackmailed Nursultan in this way.
However, the Kazakhs did not bow. In retaliation, they threatened to halt the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia, which would have hit Russian-Chinese connections hard. As a result, the Novorossiysk court quickly lifted the blockade on the Kazakh oil pipeline.
This situation demonstrates Kazakhstan's vulnerability to Moscow's pressure. That's why the largest land-locked country in the world is looking hard for alternative trade routes. The Kazakhs are pushing for a Trans-Caspian corridor that bypasses Russia.
Russia's defeats have increased Tokayev's boldness and opened up opportunities for Kazakhstan that have not been possible so far. Still, retaliatory measures by the Kremlin are underway.
Open Doors
The weakening of the previously dominant Russian position in the region, in addition to the assertive policies of countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, is also inviting other powerful players to evaluate and engage more strongly in this part of the world.
China
If not Russia, then China. One can come to such a conclusion by looking at economic statistics and the map of Central Asia. Such a conclusion will not likely be proven wrong.
The entire Eurasian heartland area is crucial for Beijing. Primarily because of the now famous Belt and Road project, which is intended to reverse the dominant position of the maritime powers on the globe. The Central Asian region was at the crossroads of the most important trade routes between Europe and East Asia until the Portuguese discovered the sea route to Asia, after which the region's importance gradually degraded. Today, it is essentially a forgotten steppe of low economic value, although with much dormant potential.
Chinese involvement in the region can be well observed in their relations with Kazakhstan. Trade between the two countries has grown at an annual rate of nearly 15 percent for the past 25 years. Meanwhile, the war has caused Chinese carriers to increasingly choose the Kazakh corridor over the Russian route. Kazakhstan's national railroad company reports that it has doubled its freight volumes since the beginning of the year.
However, according to Raffaello Pantucci, a senior fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, China is treated with great suspicion in the region. 3 of the 5 Central Asian countries border China's western province of Xinjiang and are aware of the Uighur minority’s situation there. Moreover, the Central Asian countries are culturally, religiously, and ethnically close to the Uyghurs. And, in fact, ethnic Kazakhs were also victims of Chinese crimes against Uyghurs.
Although Chinese involvement in the region is growing, fundamental questions about the nature of this cooperation remain. Is Beijing intent on being an engine of development for the region, as the leaders of these states had hoped, or an opportunistic guest merely exploiting the region for its own gain? Despite these doubts, China remains the most important partner for the Central Asian states to counterbalance Moscow's still dominant influence.
Turkey
Despite major domestic problems, the country that is showing an increased interest in the region is Turkey. The war is spurring the Turks to make another turn toward Central Asia. Turkey's hard power image, particularly with its Bayraktar drones, has echoed in the region. Turkish drones made a successful showing in both the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the current war in Ukraine. Turkmenistan has been a long-time customer of Turkish armaments with Kyrgyzstan recently joining the ranks by making an order of TB2 drones.
But perhaps Ankara's biggest recent success has been the strengthening of trade cooperation with the region. In March, Recep Erdogan made a 2-day visit to Uzbekistan, where he signed 10 agreements and a pledge to raise annual trade to $10 billion. He held a similar meeting with Kazakh President Tokayev in May, which both Ankara and Nursultan called "an era of new relations." Turkey is whetting its blade to fast become a transit hub for the region's raw materials to Europe as Russia becomes more isolated internationally.
This, however, is compounded by neo-Ottoman inclinations, or the idea of Panturkism, as espoused by the Nationalist Movement, a government coalition partner of Ergodan's AKP party. Its goal is to strengthen cooperation or, in extreme opinions, to push for the unification of the Turkic peoples.
The Turks are far short of China's economic power, but Ankara is attempting to supplant waning Russian influence in the region. The country's leaders welcome Turkey's increased activity because it gives them an additional bargaining chip for talks with Moscow. Turkey is an ideal partner for establishing new trade routes linking Central Asia to Europe and thus bypassing Moscow's globally isolated position.
Iran
Iran is also watching developments in the region, which Tehran historically considers it's legacy. The Iranians believe that much of Central Asia was taken from them as a result of colonial empires' actions and Turkmen uprisings. Tajiks speak almost the same language as Iranian Farsi, and many Uzbek cities are of extremely high value to Iranian culture and have a sizable Iranian minority. Samarkand, Bukhara, and Shahrisabz have produced thousands of poetic, or literary, works of importance to Iranians. If asked about these cities, many Iranians would offer that "they are ours."
Therefore, now we can observe an interesting process. What blocked Tehran from having a broader impact on the Central Asian states was first the Soviet Union and then Russia. The war in Ukraine is weakening Russia's position, which Tehran can use to rebuild its influence. On the other hand, the two capitals have recently had close relations. And today, Russia without allies is like a fish out of water, thus good relations with Iran are important for Moscow while giving Teheran a chance to take advantage of this and re-enter Central Asia by rebuilding its influence. Especially if U.S. sanctions are lifted and Iran revives economically.
USA
Although the United States continues to be the world’s most powerful country, its position in Central Asia is at its weakest in decades. Trust in the Americans and NATO is very fragile. The US lost in Afghanistan and it is tens of thousands of kilometers away from the region.
On the other hand, this makes some decision-makers in Washington view the situation as a new beginning. The more so because the war in Ukraine is a distraction for the Kremlin and provides an opportunity to undermine Russia's existing advantages in the area. The fact that Moscow has strategic interests there makes it a convenient situation for the Americans to undermine the Kremlin's power at little cost.
Donald Lu led the latest U.S. delegation on a five-day tour of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Its purpose, according to Washington, was to strengthen U.S. relations with the region and work on a joint effort to “create a better-connected, prosperous, and secure Central Asian region." Earlier, in late May, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken met with Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister in Washington. In concrete terms, the Americans trained Kazakh border guards in the use of Raven reconnaissance drones. Kazakhstan received the American drones to patrol its thousands of kilometers long borders with Washington's adversaries, Russia and China.
Meanwhile, in Tajikistan, the US announced a $60 million aid transfer as well as a truck transfer worth more than $2 million. These are proverbial "dimes" for the Americans, but this way they undermine the Russo-centric regional order. The potential gains from such cooperation could be incomparably greater than the costs incurred.
Security Vacuum
The assertive posture of countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the increasingly strong bent of neighboring players, mean that the specter of losing its dominant influence in countries that the Kremlin considers subordinate, even vassal, hangs over Moscow.
For this reason, among others, Vladimir Putin's first foreign visit after the start of the war targeted precisely the countries of Central Asia. Putin flew to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In Turkmenistan, he attended a summit of Caspian Sea states, where, in addition to Russia, the participants were Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Kazakhstan.
Temur Umarov, an analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center, says the way countries in the Central Asian region view Russia has changed. Previously seen as a source of stability, Russia is now becoming a threat to regional stability, independence, and even to territorial cohesion. He adds that the authorities of the Central Asian republics will try to minimize dependence on Russia, but this will be very difficult.
The whole situation creates new opportunities, but also threats. Due to unnaturally routed borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region is the arena of many border conflicts. For example, there are many villages in Kyrgyzstan that are exclaves of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Many of these disputes have been mediated by Moscow in the past. Now, this may be made more difficult due to the Kremlin's multitude of other concerns. Another example of unrest was the recent protests in Uzbekistan's Karakalpakstan region after the central government sought to strike the region's autonomous status from the constitution. Following the protests, which were attended by more than 20,000 people, Uzbek authorities reversed the directive. The degradation of the Russian Federation's military power negatively affects regional security, given that it has hitherto been its guarantor, and because the Taliban, now ruling Afghanistan, supports many terrorist groups across Central Asia that pose a threat to local authorities.
All of this does not change the fact that Russia understands what is happening in Central Asia better than any other actor in the region, and this will not change overnight. The Kremlin may allow bold moves by Kazakhstan and other countries in the short term because it does not have the resources right now to manage the region as it sees fit. Geography, however, makes it so that Kazakhstan is not going anywhere and, sooner or later as Moscow gets back on its feet, it will return into the close orbit of the Kremlin.
This scenario is most desired by the Kremlin, but with growing Chinese, Turkish, or Iranian influence, Moscow's perceptions, as in the case of Ukraine, may be slipping away from reality.
