- Hubert Walas
Brotherly help.
In early January 2022, protests of an unprecedented scale erupted in Almaty, Kazakhstan - the country’s former capital. The riots, whose official reason was said to be the increase in gas prices, quickly spread to the rest of the country. Pictures of the toppling of a statue of another autocrat, former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, circulated around the world seemingly at lightspeed. In the background, two major regional actors - Russia and China - had to move quickly to preserve their interests. As a result, a potentially groundbreaking event took place in Central Asia which we will examine here. Welcome to the 20s Report.
Balancing Autocrat
President Kassym-Yomart Tokayev called the January protests a "black period" in the history of the country and the organizers of the protests were labeled as terrorists who were "financially motivated.” Russian and Belarusian media quickly began to promote the thesis that it was a Ukrainian-American tandem that stood behind the riots in order to divert the Kremlin's attention from the situation in Ukraine by striking at Russia's "soft underbelly.”
But before we look at the current events, let us answer the question: why is Kazakhstan an important place on the world’s map and, in particular, for Moscow? There are many reasons. The vast Kazakh lands - Kazakhstan is territorially the 9th largest country in the world - hold resources worth billions of dollars. Kazakhstan has at least a fifth of the world's uranium deposits, is the second largest producer of chromium, and has the largest proven oil reserves in the Caspian Basin. Kazakhstan's territory is crucial for any project aimed at improving the connectivity of the Eurasian supercontinent, which is of particular interest to the Chinese. However, from the perspective of the Kremlin, two other aspects are also extremely important. First, the social aspect. About 20% of the population of Kazakhstan are Russian citizens. Second, geostrategic. The weakness of Russia's geography is a 400km narrowing, between the western border of Kazakhstan and the eastern end of Ukraine. In the event that both political centers: Kyiv and Nursultan are hostile to the Kremlin, this creates a potential geostrategic problem for Moscow resulting with a potential cut-off from its Southern Military District, a strategically and economically key area of the Russian Federation. Hence the aforementioned "soft underbelly." Moreover, the country is home to an important space and military center, the Baikonur Cosmodrome, where, in addition to space operations, the Russians also test ballistic missiles.
Therefore, it is not surprising that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has greatly cared about good relations with Kazakhstan. Vladimir Putin managed to establish and then maintain such relations with the "father of the Kazakh nation," Nursultan Nazarbayev. So much so that even when Nazarbayev stepped down and the current leader, Kassym-Yomart Tokayev, took over as president, Putin continued to direct most of his attention towards Nazarbayev. Further recognizing him as the de facto most important person in the state - this did not necessarily sit well with Tokayev. More about this important caveat later.
Although there can be no doubt that Nazarbayev ruled in an autocratic manner, in international politics he tried not to put everything in one basket. Kazakhstan tried to pursue a policy that avoided creating enemies both among "Western" countries and among its powerful neighbors, namely China and Russia. Even when relations between Russia and the West began to deteriorate, Kazakhstan tried not to get tied up in conflict and for a good reason. While geography makes Kazakhstan reckon primarily with Russia, economic relations dictate a strategy towards the West as most of the country's oil is exported in joint ventures with Western companies.
Power Struggle
And here, we turn to current events. Why did the protests erupt? Kazakhstan was considered to be the most stable country in all of Central Asia with a relatively good economy. According to World Bank calculations in 2020, Kazakhstan's GDP per capita in purchasing power parity was higher than that of Bulgaria, a member of the European Union. Nonetheless, the official reason for the outbreak of riots was the increase in gas prices and general public dissatisfaction with the authorities. In only a short time, the initial political demands of the protesters reached the media: first, that Kazakhstan leave all alliances with Russia; second, the immediate resignation of both President Tokayev and his government. A closer look at the recent events reveals some more details though.
Let's start from the fact that we Europeans, Americans and all people from the wider West tend to look at the events in Kazakhstan through a prism which is natural for us and which is related to the dissatisfaction of society resulting from poverty or from the lack of reforms in the authoritarian Kazakh state. The increase in gas prices was the final straw. Dmitry Oreshkin, a Russian political scientist, proposes to look at Kazakh affairs through a different prism. Oreshkin notes that in Kazakhstan, as in other Central Asian countries, clan and family relations are more important than political arrangements. Until now, the bulk of power has gone to families belonging to the so-called "Senior Zhuz." The clans of the former and current president, the Nazarbayevs and Tokayevs, belong to this “tribe.” However, the west of the country, where the protests were strongest, is the "center of influence" of the families from the so-called "Junior Zhuz." Their leaders were said to be dissatisfied with the fact that despite their provinces being the most profitable, thanks to oil and gas production, their share in the distribution of wealth is ignored. Therefore, according to Oreshkin, Tokayev's words about "reforming the country," which he mentioned in his speeches after the outbreak, should not be read as an announcement of the democratization of the country, but as a necessity for a new agreement between the Senior and Junior Zhuz clans. The sacrifice that was made on the altar of reform was Nursultan Nazarbayev who was a symbol of the previous regime.
Tokayev used the current events as an opportunity to break away from his long-time protector, Nazarbayev. Tokayev dismissed the government which, according to Russian analysts, was loyal to Nazarbayev. In turn, Karim Masimov, the head of the country's main security service and a close Nazarbayev associate, was removed from his post and charged with treason. Masimov was Nazarbayev's eyes and ears on Tokayev's team. The removal of Masimov and other Nazarbayev allies looks to free Tokayev from the tutelage of the former president, his family, and associates. In effect, the current president has assumed full power. An unwelcome development from Moscow's perspective as the Kremlin already had a strong, established relationship with the Nazarbayev regime. Moscow has been saying for some time that while Russia is playing its "big game" with NATO and the United States, there is a growing risk of destabilizing the Central Asian area, a key area that the Kremlin considers its sphere of influence.
Tokayev, who took full power over the Kazakh state, could also interpret the Kremlin's perspective in this way. As Tokayev did not want to spoil relations with Moscow, a gesture of goodwill was needed, and this was emphasizing that Kazakhstan's strategic direction towards Russia would be preserved and even strengthened. Tokayev's gift was generous and unprecedented: the invitation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - aka "Russian NATO" - and its troops to quell the unrest.
International Police Force
The CSTO sent to Kazakhstan a detachment of 2,500 soldiers and officers who are part of the CSTO’s so-called "peacekeeping forces." On a side note, these troops are not formally peacekeepers as they do not have a relevant UN mandate. The CSTO forces were composed of troops from Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and, of course, Russia which constituted 85%, and so we can basically speak of the force as being Russian troops. The Russians sent part of the 45th Independent Airborne Brigade which is operationally subordinate to GRU, Russia’s military intelligence. This is an elite unit previously involved in the Chechen Wars, the conflict with Georgia, and the annexation of Crimea. At this point however, it should be noted that strategically this was a small intervention for the Russian Federation. It didn’t change Moscow's capabilities in its key direction which is currently Ukraine, and such theses appeared in both Russian-speaking and Western media.
However, this seemingly small strategic dislocation has sparked heated debate and potentially can have significant consequences. First, everyone began to ask whether the Russian troops will really leave Kazakhstan when the situation in the country calms down as announced by Tokayev. Leonid Kalashnikov, the head of the State Duma's Committee on the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Vladimir Putin's close friend Sergei Mironov, the leader of the Just Russia party, commented on the necessity of permanent deployment of troops.
One of the most respected Russian analysts, Fyodor Lukianov, editor-in-chief of the journal Rossiya v Globalny Politikie and an expert of the Valdai Club, analyzed this eventuality from the Kremlin's perspective in greater detail. In his text, Lukianov calls the CSTO intervention a breakthrough event and a milestone in the development of the entire post-Soviet space. Why? First, the main mission of the pact has been blurred. Before, it was clear that it’s aim was to counter an external threat. But now, the CSTO has been given legitimacy for internal interventions, essentially turning into a policing entity. This was not the case during the recent unrest in Kyrgyzstan or earlier in Armenia. Lukianov calls the agreement of the CSTO countries' authorities to intervene a "collectivization of security" in the post-Soviet space. This effectively means that Moscow has been given a mandate authorizing it to intervene militarily in other CSTO republics should they occur in the future.
The Russians believe that ultimately control over a country is given to the Kremlin only by a permanent military presence on its territory. This should not be confused with occupation, but the possession of military bases is to be regarded as the ultimate guarantee that, in the event of a breakdown in the internal order in a given country, Russia is able to react militarily and play out Moscow's desired scenario. It is not necessarily about interfering in elections or supporting particular parties. The Kremlin is supposed to be indifferent to who holds power because it knows that any CSTO member government will have to deal with Russia anyway. That is why the Russians did not react to the recent revolution in Kyrgyzstan; having a permanent military base there, Russia was calm about its interests remaining intact.
The real danger for Russia are spontaneous, and hard to control, protests that could spread throughout Central Asia and eventually even reach Russia. This is the darkest scenario for the Kremlin. The CSTO’s “police force” and permanent military presence in the region are an ideal tool to control precisely this kind of situation.
Despite this, the CSTO forces have left Kazakhstan. It is unclear whether this was Vladimir Putin's plan all along, due to some votes from the State Duma, or whether he was prompted to this by the actions of Kazakhstan's other powerful neighbor, China. In principle, Beijing recognizes the Russian-Chinese division of influence in Central Asia with the Russians in charge of security while the Chinese dictate the economic sphere. China is interested in maintaining the stability of the region, an aspect crucial to China's actions in the region. This, among others, is why the Chinese media immediately picked up the narrative of a "color revolution" that is being brought about for "U.S. dollars."
However, the deployment of CSTO troops seems to have influenced China's calculations. After Tokayev's conversation with Wang Yi, the head of Chinese diplomacy, Beijing issued an interesting statement saying that "China is ready to expand cooperation with Kazakhstan's law enforcement and security services," which could be interpreted as an offer of "brotherly military assistance" should Kazakhstan need it. The U.S. agency Dow Jones, in turn, suggested that China had explicitly offered to send its forces to help its neighbor, but this was denied by Beijing. Nevertheless, it is likely that the entry of CSTO troops was seen by China as a move too far and as a result, China offered Tokayev helpful leverage with Moscow. This Chinese diplomatic counter may have contributed to the more restrained stance by the Russian Federation, at least for now. The precedent that Lukyanov spoke of has already happened and the dice have been cast.
The losers of the unrest in Kazakhstan can be traced primarily to two places. First, in the United States. American mining companies have invested billions of dollars in the local mining market over the past years. There was even talk of an American base in Kazakhstan. Now, the possibility of Washington's direct influence on the situation in Kazakhstan is very limited while American companies operating there will be dependent on the new authorities.
An even bigger setback was for Turkey. Ankara has invested heavily in relations with Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan was supposed to be one of the key states in the concept of the union of Turkic-speaking nations. Yet, Tokayev has not asked Turkey for help, which is considered by the Turkish opposition as a weakening of Turkey’s influence in Kazakhstan. There are many indications that Erdogan has bet on the wrong horse in his plan to build "Greater Turan" and expand Turkey's influence in Central Asia.
One can suspect that the protests were not entirely spontaneous and resulted from internal friction over the distribution of power in Kazakhstan. Which is not to say that the largest protests in Kazakhstan's history were not a social movement opposing authoritarianism and nepotism. In fact, the events in Kazakhstan can most simply be described as a national coup fueled by a wave of social protest. It seems that Kassym-Yomart Tokayev skillfully used the whole situation to remove the influence of his main political rival - the Nazarbayev family. In turn, the intervention of the Russian military sends a strong signal to Washington, Beijing, and Ankara that Moscow continues to treat Kazakhstan, and Central Asia in general, as its exclusive zone of influence. However, the Kremlin cannot overreact, because unlike in Soviet times, a now more powerful player than Russia, China, also has vital interests in the region.
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