- Michał Nowak
The fall of Bashar al-Assad and the simultaneous victory of Abu Muhammad al-Julani or actually using his real name, Ahmed al-Shaara, is a fact to which not only millions of Syrians, but also the leaders of countries in the region or powers wishing to wield influence in the Middle East have had to adjust. Syrians harbored hopes for change in the country after the overthrow of the previous regime, but with them also came fears about the future under the rule of structures derived from Sunni extremism. It has been more than a month since the rebels seized Damascus and secured their position by their main force in the form of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. It is therefore possible to try to make a first summary and draw some preliminary conclusions.
The state built by the Assad dynasty has crumbled like a house of cards. After December 8, apart from the tattered portraits of the recent president still hanging in large numbers from the facades of buildings, virtually nothing remained of it. The army, including even by Syrian standards elite military units melted away leading to a smooth takeover of central and western Syria by al-Shaara, who until then had ruled only in Idlib. This one, despite having the most serious military force in the form of the HTS, was not and still is not the only claimant to the Syrian throne. However, he took it by the method of accomplished facts, and then directed offers of lucrative positions to rival factions. The war in Syria is not over, but it has moved into another, for the moment calmer, phase, and its development will depend on many factors.
Collapse and escape
Let's start with the loser. Bashar al-Assad has abandoned Syria and gone into exile in Russia. Aside from a laconic communiqué published a few weeks ago, indicating that he had actually relinquished power, there is not much information about the former Syrian president. Rumors continue to circulate that he left Syria as a result of Russian pressure, and that his downfall was the result of betrayal among the officer corps. The latter was indirectly confirmed by the leader of the Ahrar al-Sham organization in an interview with the Majalla portal, in which he explicitly stated that before and during Operation Counter-Aggression, contact was maintained with some officers of the former Syrian army. Along with Assad, between 1,000 and 1,500 people with close ties to Russia, including officers or local armed militia leaders, were evacuated to Russia. The effective evacuation of such a large number of people at a time when the state was rapidly disintegrating is evidence of Russian preparedness for such an eventuality.
The recent loyalists do not actually put up any resistance. Sporadic clashes occur primarily during attempts to arrest those accused of crimes committed during the war. There is also a lack of reliable information confirming greater guerrilla activity and the building of an underground resistance targeting the new government. The vast majority of former soldiers and officers in the Syrian army have benefited from the amnesty announced. Every day, men who served in the past in the army or security forces line up in long lines at so-called reconciliation centers, where they can formally change their status and receive the appropriate certificates. However, this does not mean that the new government is all sunshine and rainbows. Over the past month, the new state's security forces have carried out a series of security operations in major cities in western Syria targeting declaratively the "regime's survivors." In the course of these, up to several hundred people were detained, some of whom were later released.
The new authorities, headed by al-Shaara, are trying to avoid at all costs a situation in which Syria experiences a renewed period of chaos and bloodshed. In his speech, al-Shaara himself explicitly stated that the revolutionary period is over, and now it is time for reconstruction and state-building. However, this does not mean that the victors do not crave blood. Almost every day there are reports, some of which cannot be confirmed, pointing to kidnappings, murders and looting aimed primarily at the Alawites, the sect from which Bashar al-Assad himself originated. The persecutions appear to be unorganized, and are often the responsibility of neighbors or the most radical element of the rebel factions that won more than a month ago. Alawites openly admit that they fear discrimination and persecution under the new government. They point to numerous incidents in recent weeks: executions, kidnappings, looting or destruction of places of worship .
Security forces emanating from the HTS are too few in number to control such a vast area, but harassment has also sometimes occurred on their part, according to some Syrians. Similar incidents, although for the time being on a smaller scale, are also taking place toward Christians.
Alawite-dominated localities are experiencing increasing incidents and protests by civilians demanding security. Central or local authorities, even if they do not remain completely deaf to them, may not have the resources to meet these demands and fulfill their responsibilities to their citizens.
What should be noted is that in al-Shaara's public message, the emphasis on implementing Sharia law has disappeared, replaced by declarations of tolerance, minority rights and building a state representing all Syrians. As recently as five years ago, HTS ideologues such as Abd al-Rahim 'Atun openly declared that the goal of jihad and revolution was sharia rule and the rejection of democracy and secularism . Meanwhile, after the victory, in a December 19 interview with the BBC, al-Shaara himself admitted that "the people have the right to choose who leads them. The people have the right to choose those who represent them in the People's Assembly". Declaratively, this signifies a willingness to give the Syrian people the right to elect the legislative and executive branches of government. However, it was admitted shortly thereafter that the earliest elections could be held in four years. So a lot can change during that time, and the current declarations may just be an attempt to pander to Syrians and the West during a difficult transition.
There has also been a gradual change in the approach to adherence to Sharia norms over the past few years. As Jerome Drevon wrote for CNN, al-Shaara's change in approach to rule based on Sharia law was noticeable in recent years when he was in power in Idlib province. He gradually backed away from the strict application of Islamic law, turning a blind eye to smoking or drunken people although the sale of alcohol was still banned. Structures responsible for policing morality were curtailed or disbanded, but women were further encouraged to cover their hair. Even after gaining power in Damascus in a December 16 interview, when asked if he would ban alcohol and pork, al-Sharaa replied: "We will not interfere in a profound way with personal freedom." A short time later, however, he stated that he would leave these and other issues to be decided by a committee of experts.
A country of many tribes
Al-Shaara and the HTS, which he controls, seized power by entering undefended Damascus on December 8. The organization was able to secure the capital, as well as several other key Syrian cities, and set up an interim government by actually transferring the existing salvage government that ran Idlib province to Damascus. Presumably in order to satisfy the rival factions, he appointed the leaders of the largest of them to manage specific provinces, or they were assigned roles in the new army. However, this does not mean that the power of al-Shaara, who is essentially Syria's interim president, is secure and indivisible. In fact, HTS only controls the western part of Syria from Damascus, through Homs, Hama, Aleppo to Idlib and the coast with the cities of Tartus and Lattakia. Its authority over southern and eastern Syria is illusory or nonexistent. Despite repeated calls to disarm and submit to the new authority, numerous rebel factions in southern Syria have refused to do so. Daraa province, in part, is controlled by a number of organizations that have come a long way from rebel forces fighting Assad, to partners of Russia and Assad himself, to renewed revolutionaries. The leaders of these groups are making further demands, and al-Shaara wants to avoid bloodshed, because that would shatter the myth he has created that he has captured Syria almost bloodlessly. He omits here, of course, his involvement in the bloody conflict that lasted for years before the offensive late last year.
One of the leaders of the southern factions that refuse to submit to the new authorities in Damascus is Ahmed al-Awdeh, who may have up to 15,000 fighters under arms, who according to unconfirmed information are being financed with the help of the United Arab Emirates, which has no interest in bringing the jihadist group close to Turkey under control in Syria.
The neighboring province of Suwayda, on the other hand, is governed virtually autonomously by the Druze. These gained this peculiar autonomy more than a decade ago, taking advantage of Assad's weakening, and are now unwilling to submit to the authority associated with the jihadist camp, fearing for their rights and security. Druze factions have also refused to disarm, and talks between the community's leaders and Damascus continue without much of a breakthrough.
The areas of Deir ez-Zour province lying on the west bank of the Euphrates River, on the other hand, constitute an area over which no one has full control. The HTS does not have sufficient forces and resources to establish itself there, and the factions affiliated with Turkey are more committed to fighting the Kurds and the SDF than wanting to manage the conquered areas. This fact may be exploited by the still-existing Islamic State, which will try to grow in strength during the period of chaos. The real threat from this organization is evidenced by the recent attempt to attack a Shiite mosque in Damascus foiled by HTS security forces. Earlier in the day, IS-linked jihadis killed at least several people in Homs province.
Meanwhile, fighting between the Turkish-controlled SNA and the Kurdish-dominated SDF continues unabated in northern Syria. The Kurds lost the city of Manbidj, but recently have been gradually regaining the initiative by reoccupying a small area on the west bank of the Euphrates River toward that city. The pro-Turkish groups are proving far too weak to win these battles. The ongoing clashes try to exploit al-Shaara in their own way. After consolidating his power, there has been at least one meeting between him and SDF representatives. The new Syrian leader refuses to recognize Kurdish autonomy or the federalization of the state, demanding that SDF structures be incorporated into the new Syrian army. The decision of the Kurds will depend, on the one hand, on the development of the situation in the country, and therefore on whether the declarations made by the authorities will be reflected in reality, and on the other hand, on the maintenance of the American presence in the areas controlled by the SDF. Without American protection, the Kurds will be forced to make concessions.
The new authorities in Damascus will seek to resolve the conflict with the Kurds by diplomatic means. Similar measures are and will be pursued with regard to the groups that make up the pro-Turkish SNA. Success in this regard depends both on the positions and benefits their leaders will receive from the new authorities in Damascus and, on the other hand, on Ankara's position. It is possible that agreements between al-Shaara and Erdogan will be the decisive factor that will determine whether he consolidates and stabilizes his power.
Also an important piece of the internal puzzle in Syria are the many radical Sunni groups affiliated with, for example, the Islamic State or the Muslim Brotherhood, while being hostile or distanced from HTS and al-Shaara. His deradicalization, combating the most extremist elements in his ranks, his lack of open revanchist policy, his broad amnesties and at least his rhetorical lack of desire to build a state based entirely on the principles of Sunni fundamentalism may alienate further radicals hitherto close to him. Especially if one considers that his public statements contradict what he has previously advocated. One of the more prominent critics of this shift is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian scholar whose teachings were crucial to the formation of jihadist ideology. Today, al-Maqdisi accuses al-Shaara of treason.
This new approach of al-Shaara, especially after occupying areas with populations far removed from Sunni fundamentalism, was attempted to explain by another HTS ideologue, Abdallah al-Muhaysini, whose premise is "so that we don't raise a hypocritical generation that refrains from prohibitions out of fear of us and not of God. All this without watering down religion, while explaining what is forbidden and giving advice about it." In response, the aforementioned Maqdisi published a lengthy rebuttal commentary based on the premise that this approach amounts to a betrayal of religion, and that the ruler should enforce proper Shariah-compliant behavior, including prayer, and that HTS wants to "please the infidel West”. From the perspective of Western audiences, including our listeners, these types of legal and religious disputes may be meaningless, but in the current Syrian circumstances, it is not only the fate of millions of Syrians in terms of daily life that depends on which of these concepts prevails, but also whether another bloody conflict erupts in the country.
For the time being, there is no record of top-down enforcement of norms under Sharia laws. The problem, however, is the activity of numerous extremist groups such as Huras al-Din, which, along with HTS, have entered captured towns and villages. There are attacks on bars and stores, extortion of Islamic dress and separation of women from men, and some stores or bars have been closed out of fear. Security forces subordinate to the new government are responding in certain situations, but these are too few in number. It seems that al-Sharaa may have chosen a more gradual approach to the Islamization of the Syrian state and society. More extremist structures and individuals are unlikely to accept this, and hundreds of thousands of Syrians accustomed to the secular state model may ultimately reject his authority anyway if he gradually but consistently restricts their personal freedoms. Ultimately, therefore, such an approach may end up with him being rejected by almost everyone, with a narrow group of supporters remaining on his side. With such a highly divided society, it will be difficult for him, especially without the use of violence as strong as in his predecessor's time, to satisfy everyone and maintain social cohesiveness while maintaining his power.
Admittedly, Al-Shaara has a wealth of experience weakening and combating groups more radical than HTS, as it has destroyed or absorbed numerous factions over the years, but a progressive change in message could eventually be considered a betrayal and end in open rebellion. Al-Shaara, therefore, must balance the desire to appease millions of ordinary Syrians, especially minorities, and the need to gain acceptance by the countries of the region and the West, with the need to satisfy the expectations of its own partisans. This task will be extremely difficult, and its success will depend in part on how quickly it can gain outside support. If funds begin to flow into Syria, allowing the country to rebuild and recover from economic collapse, the risk of radicalization in the streets may not be as serious.
All eyes on Syria
Therefore, despite such a complicated internal situation, Syria still depends on the actions and policies of external powers. These are keenly observing the Syrian internal dynamics and are slowly beginning to adapt to the new reality.
After gaining power and rapidly establishing an interim government, al-Shaara’s foreign minister began an ongoing series of meetings with leaders and representatives of countries in the region. At the same time, representatives of both Middle Eastern and European countries met with al-Shaara in Damascus. Even a US delegation appeared in Damascus. The diplomatic efforts of the new administration for its normalization and recognition, and consequently for the removal or at least reduction of sanctions imposed on Syria back in Assad's time, are legible and to some extent effective. A wide stream of humanitarian aid is flowing to Syria from some of the countries in the region, primarily from Qatar or Saudi Arabia. The United States has agreed to ease some restrictions in its sanctions policy on energy, but there is no talk of fully lifting them. The country's leaders explicitly point out that decisions will depend on the governing practices of the new Syrian administration and whether minorities can count on security and full rights, including the right to religion. The meetings themselves with al-Shaara, a man who, after all, remains the leader of an organization considered to be a terrorist, and who in the past has been linked to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda and directly responsible for crimes, is already a clear signal of openness toward the new government. Syria's potential partners, however, are concerned that the country could in the future become a breeding ground for radicalism and jihadism, which could threaten the stability of the region and potentially jeopardize power structures in countries such as Egypt, Iraq and Jordan.
In recent years, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have invested a great deal of diplomatic effort in strengthening Assad. Arab states have been moving toward Assad's rehabilitation, as exemplified by the reinstatement of Syria under his rule to the Arab League in May 2023. Now these same states must find themselves in a new reality. Their leaders fear that various Islamist and jihadist groups will be emboldened by the HTS's rise to power in Syria and may launch operations against their governments.
These countries remain aloof from the new government, unwilling to bolster its legitimacy through cooperation and any form of support. Besides, in many cases, this is out of the question due to the U.S. sanctions still in place under the Caesar Act. Western countries, on the other hand, are not interested in supporting a regime formed by jihadists hostile to Western values without confidence that the form of governance will be acceptable.
Therefore, the situation is extremely difficult. Support for a new Syria under al-Shaara will strengthen his power, and his future policies may be far from conciliatory declarations. The West wants to avoid a situation where it will allow someone to gain power who in the future may give refuge to terrorists or be directly responsible for bloody sectarian persecution. Failure to do so, on the other hand, could quickly shake this new fragile system and lead to an uproar that would elevate someone even more radical and, from the West's perspective, worse to the throne. Either option could be bad, and for the moment it seems that Western capitals have simply decided to wait, perhaps until Donald Trump takes office to see what the next American president's Syria policy will be. So far, statements by Western representatives, including those unofficially relayed through the media, suggest that the lifting or reduction of sanctions depends on the absence of radicalization and persecution toward minorities.
It will depend primarily on the decisions of the incoming U.S. administration as to whether the new authorities will be able to sustain themselves, gain legitimacy and secure any future for the Syrian people. Many of the goals of several previous US administrations have been achieved. Iran has lost its influence in Syria and its land connection to Lebanon, and the Axis of Resistance project hangs on the brink of collapse. Russia is likely to lose its military bases in the country, and Bashar al-Assad's power has ended. The American ground intervention launched back in Barack Obama's second term was necessitated by the successes of the Islamic State, but as a result of the actions of various state and non-state armed forces, its influence in Syria has been severely curtailed. However, the Americans remained in eastern Syria as a security guarantor for the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces project. It will be up to Donald Trump to decide whether the east of the country should return to Damascus' control or whether the country will remain divided and controlled in part by outside actors. However, it is difficult to judge whether the issues now coming to the forefront of ensuring the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Syria will also be of such importance to Trump. He has the right pressure points on the new authorities in Damascus to force a move away from the radical message and guarantee security for all groups living in Syria if only in the form of an offer to reduce sanctions on selected sectors of the Syrian economy. An infusion of funds will enable the country's reconstruction process to begin. Above all, the fate of the Syrian Kurds is at stake in future negotiations, while other minorities can hope to receive adequate guarantees and a kind of patronage.
Following the HTS victory, Trump issued a brief message on social media stating that "the United States should have nothing to do with Syria. This is not our fight," which seems to suggest a readiness to withdraw the US contingent from the country. It should be remembered, however, that Trump tried to withdraw from Syria as early as 2020, but eventually changed his mind, probably due to resistance from the Pentagon.
The possible withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria will mean that eastern Syria will be incorporated into areas under al-Shaara's rule. Thus, he will gain control of the oil fields there, which can guarantee the resources necessary to maintain power. However, Trump must keep in mind that the possible abandonment of the Kurds could shake global confidence in the Americans' fulfillment of their commitments. The lack of American troops on the ground, especially if the new authority's security forces prove too weak, could also encourage groups such as the Islamic State to take more active steps to regain their position. The Americans must also be mindful of possible Turkish actions against the Syrian Kurds. Currently, it is the presence of U.S. troops on the Syrian-Turkish border that blocks possible Turkish military action against the SDF. Ongoing negotiations in Damascus between al-Shaara and the Kurdish and SDF leaders may lead to a situation in which Turkish expectations are indirectly met which will preclude the need for armed intervention, and the area, with American consent, will come under Damascus' control in some form.
In Europe, on the other hand, growing pressure on refugees and migrants from Syria in terms of their expectation to return to their country of origin can already be seen. Some European Union countries have stopped accepting asylum applications from Syrian citizens. Such measures have been introduced by Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Italy, Denmark and Croatia, among others. However, regime change in Syria alone may not be enough to make hundreds of thousands of Syrians residing in EU countries decide to return to their country. Many of them may have nothing to return to. Their homes are either destroyed or occupied by new owners. Syria lacks the basic means to rebuild their lives. The country is struggling to access water, electricity or food, and the possibility of obtaining stable employment is close to none. This means that the prospects for Syrians to return are extremely low at the moment. Especially at a time when the specter of reduced sanctions does not loom on the horizon, and it is difficult to speak of a satisfactory level of security in the country.
A new liberator?
Ahmed al-Shaara probably achieved his success on his own, meaning based on his own resources and without direct external support. He now wants to present himself as the natural leader of the country, who bloodlessly "liberated the Syrian people." His first month in power has given no basis for making judgments about his possible dependence on anyone. He gives the impression of a politician, as he is no longer a fighter, assertive and pragmatic. The first test for his influence and capabilities was Israel's actions. A campaign of air strikes and a ground operation met with virtually no response from the new authorities in Damascus. In what was probably the largest airstrike campaign in recent years, the Israeli air force destroyed almost all of the assets left by the outgoing Syrian army that would have come under al-Shaara's control. Authorities in Tel-Aviv feared that they could be used in the future, either by the new government and its armed forces or by other numerous armed groups, against Israel. Al-Sharaa and its forces could in no way counter these strikes. The occupation of parts of southwestern Syria by Israeli troops who crossed over from the occupied Golan Heights was similarly passive. They remain on Syrian soil to this day and, it seems, Israel does not assume the prospect of their withdrawal.
The new authorities in Damascus therefore face a whole range of challenges that will be difficult to respond to adequately. The honeymoon period of the revolution will slowly pass, and the problems of the Syrian people, which, after all, have not disappeared, will begin to come to the surface. Syria is virtually a failed state, the country's economy is scrubbing at the bottom. More than 70 percent of Syrians live below the poverty line, and the cost of reconstruction of the country is estimated to be at least $400 billion. The protests, limited for the moment, over the desire to improve their livelihoods will begin to gain momentum, which is, after all, how the Syrian civil war began in 2011. None of the problems Assad has left behind can be solved without serious involvement of third countries, including the West. But will these be willing to support someone who could threaten their own security in the future?
The foundations of al-Shaara's power are fragile and based mainly on the strength of armed formations. Failure to address security concerns, let alone broader persecution targeting minorities, will inevitably lead to open rebellion. Tensions of the greatest magnitude can be observed on the Syrian coast, particularly in Lattakia province. A series of killings, protests and even armed clashes occurred there in late December and early January. The security crisis was sparked by the seizure of one of the former Syrian army bases near the town of Jabla by foreign jihadists - Uighurs, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. These began carrying out operations targeting Alawites living in the area. On January 8, three Alawite civilians were murdered. Their funeral, which took place the next day, turned into a huge demonstration against their presence. The agitated crowd was led by Saleh Mansour. However, the protests were not in the nature of speeches against the new government. The key was the expectation of security. On January 10, an Alawite pharmacist was assassinated. In late December, meanwhile, the bodies of three judges who were also Alawites were found. There have been many more such cases, and each time the perpetrators remain undetected.
Former Syrian army soldiers remain passive, but there are minor armed resistance operations. One of these groups was led by Bassam Nasser al-Din, in the past an officer in the elite Tiger Forces. On January 14, his group carried out an ambush on HTS security forces, in which two of its members were killed and seven taken prisoner. On the same day, the security forces took control of the situation, the prisoners were released, and the leader of the guerrilla group committed suicide. This is just one example of armed resistance against the new government by representatives of the old camp. To date, the scale of similar activities has not been large, but the eventual continuation, and even more so the increase in the scale of persecution targeting minorities, may lead to more frequent armed actions against the new power. It should be noted, however, that the aforementioned Mansour's calls for open rebellion and even French intervention were not only met with little enthusiasm by the Alawites, but rather were rejected by them as a manifestation of rebellion against the state and its sovereignty. On January 14, a large procession of Sunnis shouting slogans against the Alawite community passed through the streets of Lattakia. Such phenomena in the form of grassroots or armed group-organized protests against minorities are on the rise and are not limited to Alawites. Actions targeting Christian areas are also occurring. On January 14 in Damascus, jihadists from an unknown group in one of the Christian neighborhoods, carried out actions in the form of calls for women to cover their bodies, close down bars and distribute extremist leaflets. Local citizen patrols, which are being set up en masse in minority neighborhoods, arrested the provocateurs and handed them over to HTS security forces. A day later, a large demonstration was held in the so-called Valley of Christians in Homs province by Sunni extremists who provoked Christians by shouting Islamic calls.
Minorities and Sunnis far from the fundamentalism represented by clerics associated with the victors of the war may fear the future and change. The new government is not acting as suddenly and radically as the Islamic State did years ago, and is not introducing guidelines related to Sharia law overnight. There have, however, already been changes in the curriculum, from which, for example, records of the ancient Queen of Palmyra Zenobia have been removed, and references to sacrifice for the homeland have been replaced by martyrdom for God. In many cities, women are being encouraged or forced to cover their hair or entire bodies, and gender segregation has been introduced on some buses, but these are grassroots measures rather than being introduced top-down by the new authorities. The victors are also creating a new army to replace the disbanded structures of the previous armed forces. One component of military training is to include a Shariah course. This automatically excludes the possibility of Christians, Alawites, Druze or other religious minorities serving in the army, and signifies a desire to build armies composed exclusively of Sunnis, which may also be intended to preclude a military coup organized by minorities in the future.
There are increasing calls for rebellion by the Alawites, but at the moment they do not seem to be gaining high support. Syrians continue to await developments and what the future will bring, hoping that any turmoil will pass right by them. However, further arrests, kidnappings or murders will result in armed resistance, and in the future perhaps an open rebellion with outside support.
Among the countries that may be interested in possibly supporting the factions that have launched armed resistance to Ahmed al-Shaara's rule, attention should be paid to Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The former may be interested in financial, organizational and armed support not only for the Shiites, but also for the Alawites. The formation of armed resistance groups on the coast with organizational help from Lebanon's Hezbollah could provide a strong center of resistance in this part of the country. The United Arab Emirates, in turn, may be interested in creating a second “Haftar of Libya”. At this point, someone like that for Abu Dhabi may be the aforementioned Ahmed al-Awdeh, who, with financial assistance, will seek to consolidate his position in the south and, perhaps in concert with the Druze, prevent the new power in Damascus from taking full control of the western part of Syria through HTS.
The fall of Assad represents a geopolitical earthquake in the Middle East. Given the sectarian and ethnic divisions that exist in Syria and have only strengthened over the past decade, Arab states will want to avoid a rise in extremism and chaos that could ricochet off them.
Millions of Syrians are entering a new, completely unfamiliar stage of their lives where a secular but brutal government has been swapped for Islamist rule, whose level of brutality may not be any less in the future. Meanwhile all the problems remain the same or are even bigger: poverty, hunger, and lack of housing will remain a constant in the lives of this nation.
Sources:
- القائد العسكري أحمد الدالاتي لـ"المجلة": اختراق أمني دشن معركة حلب... وسقوط نظام الأسد كان أسرع مما توقعنا (2 من 2) | مجلة المجلة
- https://x.com/QUSAY_NOOR_/status/1878493174550712827
- Syryjscy alawici, sekta Assadów, boją się o swoją przyszłość - WSJ
- A Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham Perspective on Democracy :: Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
- أحمد الشرع من قصر الأسد يتحدث عن خططه من أجل مستقبل سوريا وارتباطه السابق بتنظيم القاعدة - YouTube
- https://www.jihadica.com/from-jihadi-to-islamist/
- Can Syria’s Islamist rebels govern the country? Their rule in Idlib offers clues | CNN
- Syria’s New Leader Calls on Countries to Drop Terror Designation and Lift Sanctions - The New York Times
- https://x.com/clashreport/status/1873308125576507730
- https://www.jihadica.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/maqdisi-tweet-1.png
- https://x.com/dr_abdullah44/status/1868294095795281967
- https://www.jihadica.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/al-tanbih-ala-kalima-fasida-1.pdf
- https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1879255468780179725
- https://x.com/joshua_landis/status/1879227956419342537
- Syryjscy alawici, sekta Assadów, boją się o swoją przyszłość - WSJ
- https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1879257672639492519
- https://x.com/CdricLabrousse/status/1879464067129123122
- https://x.com/Wolveri07681751/status/1879250810489684405
- https://x.com/Ostensiblay/status/1879269016130457994
- https://x.com/Ostensiblay/status/1879566301854912682
- https://x.com/joshua_landis/status/1876759979283390628
