- Hubert Walas
On what does Russian success or failure rest?
"When the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will fall short" - Sun Tzu, “The Art Of War”
In aviation, we can come across the “Swiss cheese model” which helps in visualising the causes of a particular disaster. Each mechanical malfunction, human or system error is a hole that covers up another hole, another slice of Swiss cheese. Theoretically, if just one of these holes had been patched, the accident might never have happened. Just as a plane crash is never caused by a single error or a single element, there are many causes, or many holes in the cheese, that led to the war in Ukraine.
There are societal factors - the desire of Ukrainians to change the system and structure of their country to a more “Western” model. There are geographical factors - Moscow’s everlasting “anxiety” if Ukrainian territory were to be controlled by an entity considered hostile by Moscow. Military factors - the lack of NATO’s effective deterrence policy. Some would say - raw material factors - as we mentioned the other day, Ukrainian land hides natural treasures. And last but not least, purely personal factors, often rejected by determinists. It’s impossible to know how the history of the last 25 years would have turned out if Putin had not come to power in Russia. The war might have happened sooner, or not happen at all. Contrary to appearances, the role of chance has a colossal significance in the entire historical process.
But Putin was at the right place at the right time, and in late 2021 and early 2022 after months of moving troops to the Ukrainian border, and NATO rejecting his ultimatum, he decided to attack Ukraine.
What Vladimir Vladimirovich’s strategic calculations looked like is something we will probably never know. Was it hundreds of hours with his general staff, or was it a spur-of-the-moment decision based on thousands of scraps of information that reached him during the last 25 years of his presidency, and which contributed to the perception of the world he had built for himself? Through the process of reduction, one could even say that whether the war would happen or not, depended on the image of the world that Vladimir Putin formed in his own mind.
In this image, consciously or not, Putin regarded the Russian Federation as strong enough, and the opposition as weak enough, that the calculation of going to war seemed attractive and worth the risk.
Every civil engineer knows how crucial the foundation is to the construction of a building. Regardless of the architect’s fantasy, a given vision must be built on solid ground. Putin the Architect’s fantasy was that Russia would regain their former position in Europe and in the world, and the foundation for this vision was to be the six pillars. After almost two years of war, we can try to visualise these pillars.
In good times, they are the source of the resources that Sun Tzu talks about, or the lack of those, in the bad times.
It’s not an exaggeration to say that on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation was in its strongest position since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union. This was also clear to its leader, Vladimir Putin.
But on the same day, the verification of this position began. Moscow held a stack of strong cards, but the Ukrainians, backed against the wall in a poker game, said “check”, and after a while other Western nations joined the checking process. In the days and months that followed, Russia's cards were revealed to the world. It quickly became clear that the Russians were bluffing, but not all of their cards were weak.
Moscow raised the stakes before the war on the basis of at least six key pillars - a subjective choice, of course. They influenced Putin's decision then and still determine Russia's future today. Some of them have been thoroughly tested, others have survived the clash with reality and turned out to be exactly as Putin perceived them. Let's look at what the 'pillars of Russia' were at the outbreak of the war and then consider their condition today.
Pillar one - Military power
One of the most important parameters determining the perception of Russia's strength internally and internationally before the war. The Russians began modernising their armed forces with Serdykov's reforms, which were later largely torpedoed by his successor, Sergei Shoigu. Despite the reforms, the Russian military remained a hotbed of corruption and sloppiness, led by persistent organisational problems, exemplified by the lack of effective reporting process.
The invasion of Ukraine exposed the structural weaknesses of the Russian Federation's armed forces, these often caricature in nature, spread around the world thanks to the instant access to the mass media. They spurred Ukraine and the West into action - as it became clearer with each passing day that the Russian military was weaker than it appeared.
The Russian army entered Ukraine making strategic, operational and tactical mistakes, generally guided by the Soviet model of thinking, which was and is characterised by pervasive messiness. All this was painfully tested in a clash with a mobilised, better adapted to the modern battlefield, and supported by Western warfare techniques opponent.
The Russians lost thousands of their best professional soldiers, lost thousands of pieces of military equipment, used thousands of missiles, and yet, after a month of fighting, they were in retreat for another year and a half. The first pillar was badly damaged and in danger of sudden collapse.
Pillar two - Hydrocarbons and Reserves
The share of hydrocarbons in the Russian economy is difficult to estimate. Rosstat says that the gas and oil sectors account for about 17% of Russia's GDP. The Russian Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, reports that the share of the oil and gas sectors in the federal budget have fluctuated between 20% and as much as 50% over the past two decades.
Still, this is not the whole picture. Mikhail Krutikhin, an independent Russian analyst of the Russian natural resources sector, writes in the Conference on Russia report: "the Russian Ministry of Finance is disregarding such levies as oil and gas producers’ corporate income tax, dividends due to the state, personnel income tax, and other levies. Independent estimates may raise the share of oil and gas in the federal budget’s revenues to over 60 percent. “
One thing is certain - Moscow was and is inextricably dependent on hydrocarbons. The lion's share of revenues from selling hydrocarbons, up to 50 per cent, was generated by Western Europe. It was these revenues that helped Kremlin to accumulate a huge amount of capital in foreign exchange reserves and gold before the war - the value of these assets exceeded $600 billion on the day the war broke out. This was intended as a hedge against international turbulence after the outbreak of war.
Again, as with the military pillar, Putin's perception turned out to be quite different from reality.
While military strength was verified by the Ukrainians themselves, the economy, especially hydrocarbons and reserves, was the pillar hit the hardest by the West. With much pain, Europe nevertheless began to cut itself off from Russian oil and gas. At the same time, more than $300 billion of Russian assets were frozen. Russian banks were cut off from SWIFT. Extensive sanctions were imposed on Russia.
The economic pillar was also shaking hard.
Pillar three - The weakness of the West
The West’s weakness was visible on many levels. The pre-war years were a festival of fragmentation, indecision and weakness in the collective West. The regional security architecture was dominated by the particular interests of individual states - for example, Germany did not look at Ukraine when building Nord Stream 1 and 2, in the process of which in a way Berlin threw Kyiv under the Russian steamroller.
The West did not react decisively to Russia's open violation of international law and attack on the Donbas and Crimea, which later became de facto a part of the Russian Federation. Finally, there was the absence of any policy of deterrence - NATO remained passive in the face of the accumulated Russia’s capabilities on Russia's western border in mid and late 2021.
This weakness strongly shaped and influenced Vladimir Putin's perception and inevitably pushed him towards war. It can be argued that he was mistaken here, too. The Western countries, more or less decisively, sided with Kyiv. 2022 was the period in which the collective West displayed the greatest solidarity, perhaps even since the Second World War. Weapons, equipment and money began to flow into Ukraine. Another pillar on which Vladimir Putin based his decision to attack was different than imagined.
And, if the outcome of the war had been determined by these three pillars alone, the structure would probably have collapsed long ago. However, three other pillars, which withstood the blows, took the strain and held the Russian structure together.
Pillar four - Society
When the war in Ukraine began, millions of people around the world watched it in disbelief. The natural reaction of many people at the time was to ask a fundamental question to the Russians themselves - how can you tolerate this? These questions rang even louder in the light of the discovery of Russian mass crimes in Bucha or Irpin, not much different from the mass exterminations of the Nazis or Soviets during the Second World War.
But the louder was the call for a response, the louder was the silence from the other side. Over time, it became clear that the Russians would do nothing with a stinking egg in the middle of their room. What's more, they would walk around it and explain that they are not interested in eggs, meaning - politics, with all due respect for the few who stood up to this on the streets.
So later, when it turned out that Russia had fallen into a terrible geopolitical swamp, it was clear that ordinary citizens will have to bear the cost of the Kremlin's miscalculation. And the more this egg stinks, the more Russians will have to contribute to its maitanance. What's more, a faction of admirers of the stinking egg has emerged in the process - young neo-fascists, Generation Z, intoxicated by its smell.
Regardless how we define the social engineering that has been going on in former Tsarist Russia territory for more than a century, today we can say that the model is working. Putin did not miscalculate, Russian society has rallied behind him and bought into the narrative to justify the invasion.
A mixture of attitudes of passivity, apathy, a pathological prayer for peace for Russia and Ukraine, or a belief in competing with the West which want to bring wokeness to Russia. Anyone could choose the right motive to explain the killing of hundreds of thousands of people and the ruining of the lives of millions.
Russian society is one of the main pillars that has withstood all the blows of the past two years. And many Russians are proud of it.
But without the next two pillars, not even an indifferent, Orwellian, dystopian society could have sustained the Russian Federation in its present form.
Pillar five - China
China was in a similar situation to Russian society. The Kremlin had also laid a rotten egg on the Chinese, but while the Russians themselves largely pretended the egg was not there, Beijing had to take action to minimise the damage.
The Chinese essentially had two options - cut the Russians off or help them clean up the mess they had made and then charge them heavily for it. Beijing chose the second option, keeping the Kremlin afloat. China was the key.
It was China that ensured that Russia was not left completely alone on the international stage. In the early months of the war, the world watched with anticipation to see how the great powers would respond to the Russian invasion. The Americans and the West gradually consolidated and began to support Ukraine, but China remained a question mark. Nevertheless, Beijing's pro-Russian stance became clearer with each passing month. Even its reluctance to react, meant in practice, siding with the Russians.
If mighty China, the leader of the Multipolar Word Order enthusiasts, supports a tottering Russia, then we should do the same - this seems to be the thinking process in many world capitals, especially in the Global South. The most vocal advocates, apart from China, were to be Iran and North Korea, which, in addition to narrative support, are providing extensive military support - we talked more about this recently. But indirectly on the side of Russia, and perhaps more precisely, on the side of China and against the West, are many smaller states. Even if they have not done so openly in the UN (United Nations), their policies have shown this.
China, on the other hand, provided Russia with everything it needed to survive economically. They filled its import gaps, provided some of the missing revenues from hydrocarbon sales. It's not a one-to-one economic substitution; it doesn't happen that fast, but Beijing was Moscow's lifeline at its most difficult moment. Of course, it didn't do this out of sympathy for the Kremlin's former Communist regime, but because it has a vested interest in doing so.
The Chinese pillar turned out to be as strong as Vladimir Putin thought it would be. But even then, still, the whole thing might have collapsed like a house of cards anyway had it not been for the sixth and final pillar.
Pillar six - Nuclear weapons
Somebody could say, wait a minute It is a part of pillar number one - military strength. Firstly, it is a subjective list, so blame the author. However, being serious - the atomic bomb is such an important factor that for this material It's worth excluding It from the umbrella of pure military force.
We can imagine that with strong social and Chinese pillars, but without a nuclear one the whole "building" could still collapse. i.e. Ukraine today would be rebuilding the country, while at Kremlin, at best, there would be a change of power, or at worse, the country would be in chaos and in danger of breaking up into smaller parts.
Nuclear weapons even though never used in this war, were and are the main factor defining its course. However, this is not because of the threat of its use by the Kremlin.
We would probably not be close to such a scenario even if NATO conventional forces entered Ukraine and participated in the war with a defensive position, without entering the territory of the Russian Federation. Even in that case, we would probably still operate below the boundary for the use of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons seem to play a crucial role for other reasons. They are the most logical justification for why aid to the Ukrainians has been precisely rationed by the Americans since the beginning of the war. To keep Kyiv in the fight, but at the same time not to defeat the Russians too quickly and not throw the baby out with the bathwater.
The baby in the eyes of Americans, was to be the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons in a period of internal chaos in the Russian Federation. These weapons could come to Afghanistan, Iran, or other countries where America to put It mildly is not seen in glowing terms. So looking a few steps ahead - America still having in mind years of unsuccessful fight against terrorism by breaking Russia could contribute to an uncontrolled nuclear proliferation, and later to a surprise attack on its own or allied territory by hostile international or non-state actors. Or at least that was the calculation.
It was the weapons of mass destruction that may have proved to be the last, Russian safety valve for which the Americans decided to 'keep Russia at war'.
There is no point in fooling yourself. If the White House had decided so we would observe hundreds of Abrams, F-16 fighting jets, or ATACAMS missiles in Ukraine at least one and a half year ago. With such potential, the Ukrainians would have quickly pushed out the disorganized, bleeding Russian army. But the whole thing would have caused massive perturbations in Russia itself - something the Americans wanted to avoid.
Washington made the strategic decision not to humiliate Russia. Was it right from its point of view? That will be debated by historians, but even in 50 or 100 years, it will not be entirely clear, because we will never know the alternative history.
Shaping reality
Those are the six pillars on which Russia was embedded when it entered the war and remains embedded on them today.
It can not be said how many of these pillars need to collapse or be seriously damaged to make Russia lose the war with Ukraine or to break Russia down completely. Even Americans with their ability to shape reality, wielding many crucial tools in their hands, have no control over the ultimate course of events. 23rd of July 2023 can serve as an example.
It is debatable what the condition of the Russian pillars was when the Prigozhin revolt began - certainly, the first three were badly damaged. They were also, indirectly, the catalyst for his rebellion. Prigozhin was furious with the Russian military command - the weakness of pillar number one, in this case, we are talking about corrupt structures and preposterous governance. Certainly the deteriorating economic condition - pillar number two - did not help either. It can be understood as the hesitation of the state elites during the revolt itself to stand firmly on Putin's side. For the most part, mafia elites and oligarchs of sorts remained passive to the coup, because they watched the country slide down the slope for a over year. And this threatened their private estates. In the end, Prigozhin directly was confronting the pillar number three, i.e. the alleged Weakness of the West. It was his people who experienced the consequences of this calculation, through death at the hands of M777, the Krabs, or the Caesars.
From the total collapse that day Kremlin was saved by the world's perception of another individual - Yevgeny Prigozhin. He decided that the greater good was the fate of Mother Russia, and he paid the ultimate price for this mindset two months later. Staying at the level of analogy, one could say that Russia then was sustained by the pillar number four - society; in this case understood as the processes that have been shaping Russian minds for decades, including that of Prigozhin.
Pillars in 2024
Having identified the main components that determine the success or failure of the Russian Federation, it is possible to return to the question - what do they look like today and what can the West do in early 2024 to get the war in Ukraine back on track - because today the direction is certainly not what was intended.
Of course, It is hard to find one definition of the preferred end of war among countries standing on the Ukrainian side. The definition will be different in Kyiv, Brussels, Berlin and Washington. This is also the reason for the weak decision-making of the West. Collectively, however, it can be regarded as a matter of retaking the initiative not only in the war in Ukraine but in the broader, global power play for which Ukraine is a verification field.
Coming back to our poker game from the beginning. Just as the Russians revealed their cards in the first days of the war and were heavily verified, so over the next two years the West's actions to show the Kremlin's strategic error in practice also started being reviewed.
It must be said that the West correctly identified Russia's weaknesses at the start of the war, and hit hard on the first pillar - military strength - and the second - the economy, and these combined hit the third - the alleged weakness of Ukraine's allies. The other three were not much affected - society remained in its bubble, except for those who chose to leave it. Nor did the West have any influence on China's decision. Could the West have done anything to change Beijing's position? Doubtful. In fact, for advocates of a bipolar or multipolar world, this in itself may serve as an explaination why we no longer live in the unipolar world of the United States. The West, or the Americans, have not been able to force the Chinese to change their attitude, even in the face of criminal Russian crimes. It could not do so without going to war. Nor has it been able to take the nuclear card away from the Russians.
So the weaknesses of Russia's pillars have been well tracked and the tools of leverage have grown - sending more and more sophisticated weapons to Ukraine, more and more sanctions, SWIFT, oil and gas - the list goes on. These have all been good decisions, and their impact on the Russian government's growing problems is increasing with each passing month. But over time, all pressure tools rust if they are not properly maintained.
Just give them weapons
Starting with the most important point and also the first pillar. Ukrainians were simply not sufficiently supported materially. Washington decided that from a long-term perspective, it was not good for its interests. This gave the Russians the chance to remobilize its military base - human and industrial - in the face of a massive threat. Moscow established supply lines from Pyongyang and Tehran. Internally, it is also on a war footing - the arms industry is now the center of gravity of the Russian state.
The hesitation of the Americans has consequences. It is now much harder to force Russia to back down than it would have been a year or a year and a half ago. This policy has also led to the closing of the ties between Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. If Washington were to throw the Russians down the roof in 2022, it would preemptively stop the formation of this bloc and restore power and agility to the Pax Americana system.
Of course, there would be a risk of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation, as it was the case with the Soviets, but even this aspect could be alleviated in a moment of chaos, even with the help of the Chinese, who would also care for this not to happen. The old Putin elites would be blamed for all the evil, and the new ones would be given international legitimacy and control over weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps it would be possible to impose some restrictions or forms of control on the new authorities based on the fact, that they have lost the war.
Yet, this at the same time, does not mean naively believing in a sudden change of the mindset of the new Russian authorities - this needs to be made clear. The Russians would not suddenly become the chosen people. Nevertheless, for a moment the fire would be extinguished, the war would end, and people would stop dying. The role of the Americans in the last 80 years in fact can be reduced to occasional fire-fighting. The Ukraine fire is one of the biggest in modern history. But let us not forget that this firefighter role the US is highly paid by the whole world, it's not an act of mercy - a fact often overlooked by the Americans themselves. And yes, some of the fires the US made on its own.
But the milk has been spilled. Today USA doesn't deliberate on how not to beat Russia too badly, but how to keep Ukraine at war. Ukraine’s collapse will be a disastrous blow to the US's credibility on the international stage. The hegemon would lose the most important war in Europe since the Second World War, perhaps just before the war with China. It is in the interests of the Americans and the Europeans to renew their own military production capabilities as soon as possible, for their own needs and those of the Ukrainians - which are also their needs, only more conveniently exploited, because through proxies. It is also in the US interest to significantly strengthen the physical capabilities of the Ukrainian army so that it has a chance of going on the offensive again this year. Whether decision-makers in Washington decide to take this step depends on several factors, many of them internal. Regardless, if they do not, it will hurt the long-term prospects for American dominance in the world.
Oil - Russian blood
While, crushing Russia's first, military pillar again is fairly one-dimensional, a similar action towards pillar number two - the reserves and the hydrocarbons requires more finesse.
When talking about the broad concept of sanctions, public opinion tends to split into two extreme sides. The first side shouts - sanctions don't work, or what’s more - they are more harmful for the West than for Russia! The other side replies - that's not true! Russia is only now feeling the effects of sanctions. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Yes, the blow to the Russian economy was massive - probably the biggest sanctions blow in the history of the world. But how Russia has taken and is taking that hit is a product of several factors and a function of time.
Firstly we need to remember that Russia entered the war from a position of power, also economically. Even though already in the first year of war Europe had decided to cut itself off from Russian oil and gas, because of the price crisis and long-standing dependency, the resource pillar in 2022 was more profitable for Russia than it had been before the war! It fueled Russia with $166 billion dollars in 2022. So, yes, it took some time for this blow to hit the Russian economy. Nevertheless, this time buffer gave the Russians space to look for alternative markets. The whole thing can be seen in the 2023 oil and gas sales report.
In 2023 the Russian budget recorded a 24% decline from a very good 2022, at the same time as it was the weakest result in three years. Meanwhile, revenues of leading oil and gas producers fell by 41% in the first nine months of 2023.
How should we read this information? A drop of ¼ in a sector on which, as we said before, up to 60% of the country depends is a colossal blow. But first, the 24% drop is a drop from the absolute peak in 2022, when Russia earned $166 billion from oil and gas sales. So it helps to take a broader time perspective.
Russia earned 60 billion less than in 2022, but "only" 23 billion less than in 2021, while still earning more than in 2016 or 2020, when the oil price was much lower, averaging around $40 per barrel.
There are several conclusions. 2023 is the first year in which Russia has had to face the consequences of the attack on its hydrocarbon pillar. The trend is negative for the Russians, but so far not fatal. Moscow is working very hard to sell its oil elsewhere, and there are plenty of opportunistic buyers. Of course, Russia is selling this oil and gas from a position of weakness, at lower prices, but it is selling.
And the fact that it can sell this oil is due to two major gaps. The G7 price cap on oil is too high, and the means of transporting Russian oil have not been neutralised.
Starting with the price cap - even using this chart as an example, you can see that in 2016 and 2020, when global demand for oil was falling, or supply was rising, or both at the same time, the price of oil fell sharply. It was even 20 dollars below the price cap set by the G7. In a word, it is still too high. Robin Brooks, who follows the Russian oil exports, says that when the price cap was being negotiated, there were proposals for a price as low as $30 a barrel, but the lobby with a vested interest in selling it prevailed and set the cap at $60, a level the Russians could live with.
If its price were to be attacked again and reduced to $50 or even $40 a barrel, combined with other pressure tools, we could expect Russian revenues to fall to 2016 and 2020 levels or lower in the coming years. And that means $100 billion less for the Russian war machine than in 2022! Basically a third of all Russian budget.
However, first Russian oil has to be able to get to its destination at all, as most of the countries to which Russia is connected by pipeline have stopped buying it.
This process is enabled by Greek shipowners with a huge fleet of oil tankers. Robin Brooks from IIF reports that they are the ones who continue helping coordinate oil sales, thus sustaining the Russian war economy. Looking at this chart, one might say that their share has declined in recent months, but this is an illusion. Fearing that the Eldorado is coming to an end and that the sanctions will eventually catch up with them, the Greeks have started to sell their tankers to the Russians, who are thus building their 'shadow fleet' operating in the world's oceans. The West - the Americans and the Union - have the means to hit the Greek shipping magnates hard, but as Brooks puts it, "the Union continues to put the interests of a few magnates ahead of the collective interests of millions of its citizens". Patching this hole, along with lowering the price cap on oil, should be the West's premiere target in 2024.
Further patching of potholes
Unfortunately, there are many more holes. As the indispensable Brooks once again notes - the whole of Europe has resumed exports to Russia, only using third countries - mostly from Central Asia and the Caucasus. When this variable is taken into account, exports to Russia have not fallen as drastically as the raw statistics on exports to Russia suggest.
Moreover, part of these exports is critical technology that later finds its way into Russian lethal weapons or the machinery needed to produce them. This is an issue that Rhodus Intelligence, founded by Kamil Galaev, constantly writes about. The fact alone of how much advanced Western equipment ends up in Russian missiles, which may later fall on the cities from which these parts and tools were exported, deserves its own episode. A targeted hit on all the hi-tech exports could cripple Russia's defense industry and make it even more primitive.
Finally, there is the issue of Russia's $300 billion in frozen reserves in the West - this is not an easy one. Transferring these funds to Ukraine would be an unprecedented event, and lawyers warn that it would severely strain the West's credibility, which again is founded on rule-based order. It would certainly be an interesting idea to transfer the interest these assets generate to Ukraine. Overall, the matter is being examined from the point of view of international law, and these resources may finally go to Kyiv. However, experts in the field warn that this alone will not be a panacea. Caution is advised while the West has the resources to keep Ukraine financially afloat until the matter is resolved.
So, can we say that the pillars of Russia resisted the attack of the West? Before the 5D Russian chess enthusiasts gather to cheer Putin’s masterplan , we should remember that...
... the costs of this war for Russia and the Russians remain enormous and continue (!) to mount up. The situation is improving, but only in isolated spots - such as military, while the state as a collective is still very weak and can be weakened more and more every year. Even a rescue by China means further weakening from the point of view of Russian geopolitical interest, as it only increases dependence on another power. Paradoxically, the current political leadership in the Kremlin has no positive way out of this situation, apart from pushing on Ukraine, while praying for the West to break. This is the only way Putin can catch his breath and present Russia as a victorious power. That is why the Kremlin is playing va banque, proceeds with the war effort, and with him, the Russian society.
Russia is getting stronger with the weakness of the West - pillar number three is getting stronger with any slippage, indecision, or internal problems of the Americans and Europeans. All the pillars that have been damaged remain fragile, but the Russians have taken it upon themselves to repair them, and without the West's reaction, they will make progress in this area. They are also strengthening other pillars, such as the Chinese one.
2024 should be the year of the West's renewed military and institutional offensive. More military and financial aid for Ukraine. Lowering the price cap on Russian oil, plugging sanctions and export holes - all these things can be done, and the West can afford them. They are all in the long-term interests of the countries that make it up.
In the end, coming back to Sun Tzu's words from the beginning of the film - Russia is not a nation that possesses unlimited resources in this protracted campaign, but it remains the West’s duty to expose this truth.
