- Hubert Walas
Poland's autonomy.
The year is 2030. A harsh winter passes through the north of Europe. Russia Today begins informing the world about the deepening humanitarian crisis in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Food and basic livelihoods are scarce. People are allegedly dying in the streets, a situation which Russian-language television and social media are painstakingly trying to present. As a result, Moscow is demanding the opening of an extraterritorial corridor for humanitarian aid to Kaliningrad through Latvia and Lithuania. Understandably, the Balts are afraid of Russia's actions and thus their sluggishness is presented to World opinion as an inhumane act. Riga and Vilnius are under very strong political pressure which is aggravated by the outbreak of riots by the Russian minority in Latvia. The situation is escalating hour by hour and the Kremlin diplomatically excludes the Baltic states and Poland in negotiations eager to talk with preferably only Germany and France. This is a hypothetical situation in which the agency and subjectivity of the Intermarium region are broken. How should Poland behave in such a situation?
This is a potential simulated scenario, which as part of "Project 2030: The Twentieth War," was prepared by the Warsaw-based think tank, Strategy & Future in cooperation with which this episode was created.
What is War?
The scenario presented in the introduction, for which we will find answers to in this episode, is not sci-fi. Considering the turbulent times we live in, such a situation is not improbable. However, in the beginning it should be noted that analyzing such scenarios of possible events does not assume the intention to implement them. In Russian strategic circles, it is obvious to analyze all possible concepts, even the most unlikely. This is necessary, because when an escalation and sequence of events unfold, the time to make key political decisions is reduced to hours or even minutes. Then it is too late for detailed analyses.
A large part of society, including Polish elites, seem to imagine an apocalyptic scenario for the word "war." However, kinetic exchange is only a small part of war which is, more so, the competition for agency. The most important thing is to play the time of peace out well, show your abilities, and control each level of the ladder of escalation, so that the cost of taking actions by the opponent, namely war, is unprofitable.
The collective security system on which the perception of being protected is based in Poland results from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which assumes a joint NATO response when one of its members is attacked. However, here the question arises - what really is an attack on a state? The Russian doctrine of asymmetric measures assumes a whole host of actions preceding a kinetic military offensive. These measures destabilize the enemy, sometimes even by force, but do not meet the requirements of NATO Article 5. Examples include the activities of private paramilitary organizations such as the Wagner Group; the activity of local militias, which could be observed in Donbas; or the infiltration of Russian special forces, whose operations the Russians do not identify as part of their hostilities. It’s very likely that Poland may have to deal with all of these measures at once. An intensification of those phenomena which are not normatively classified as “offensive warfare” would almost certainly take place in this scenario. And asymmetric actions must also be answered asymmetrically.
Strategic Independence
Starting from the basics - the Polish Command must decide where to deploy its own forces in their own country and not rely on the Americans in this regard. What is more, it is also Poles who should indicate to the Americans any prospective basing location of US troops in Poland. Such independence of decision, in fact, reduces the risk of war because it shows the opponent in the region - Russia - Poland's operational independence and the necessity to take that into account when assessing the local order. In other words, it increases uncertainty on the part of Russia. Conversely, when all decision-making is on the side of the US, Moscow has no interest in negotiating with Warsaw. It is enough to do this with Washington whose interest does not have to coincide with the interest of Poland. Americans can, colloquially speaking, trade deals on the Baltic-Black Sea Bridge in exchange for favorable arrangements with Russia in another part of the world, which they deem to be more crucial to their national interest.
Moreover, Poland should have special requirements with regards to the US armed forces and should clearly declare what external forces are needed at a given location. Let us remember that alliances are not selfless - the United States has a definite interest in being in Central Europe, including Poland, so presenting such requirements is far from inappropriate. This way, the Polish Command can show competence in managing its own space. Unfortunately, current information leaks show that this process is the opposite - it is Polish politicians who often ask Americans where and how to deploy Polish forces.
Each country which wants to independently decide about its own security must have prepared action plans for every eventuality. Like Poland in the face of the simulation mentioned earlier - the humanitarian crisis in Kaliningrad. For example, Poland should be ready to provide immediate assistance with the participation of the Red Cross, in coordination with all countries in the region - the Baltic states, Sweden and/or Germany. Moreover, Poland must have an excellent understanding of the Kaliningrad Oblast, meaning knowing who is influential, who accepts bribes, who are the local decision-makers, etc. A multidimensional infiltration of this area is necessary.
The Polish army must also constantly show its abilities and practice in every direction of military operations. It is essential that these exercises are self-directed. Thus, making it clear that Poland is able to eliminate each axis of any attack on Warsaw on its own.
Belarus is the Key
The next point of action that the Polish state should take before this prospective conflict begins may seem controversial and unreal. However, remember that this is 2030 and a lot can change by then.
It is about a complete revision of the current policy with regards to Belarus. Poland should significantly strengthen its embassy in Minsk, making it even one of its three most important Polish diplomatic missions in the world. The best people should be delegated there and not be stingy with the resources at their disposal. Moreover, a specialist should be appointed in the Polish government, someone with at least the rank of deputy minister, who will be responsible for the entire eastern policy. This must be a person with excellent knowledge of the Russian language, an understanding of the region, and with a network of contacts. All this should be supported by Polish business, which would receive full administrative support from Warsaw. This is how influence should be built.
All this would ultimately lead to the development of an agreement with Belarus on regular battalion-level exercises. Preferably around the Baranowicze area which is the region's transportation and communication junction. Going even one step further: Poland should try to make available to Pres. Aleksandr Lukashenko - or whoever will be in power in 2030 - new possibilities for regional balancing in the form of a secret Polish-Belarusian agreement. Such an agreement would potentially allow the same number of Polish troops to be brought into Belarus as Russia currently brings if, for example, Minsk signals that Russian actions are undesirable.
Currently, 70-80% of Belarusian society is in favor of the geostrategic neutrality of the state, and therefore a certain balancing of Russian and Western influences, without an unequivocal declaration to one of them. Thus, such an agreement, preferably concluded in private or later announced by Minsk, would be one of Belarus's instruments to leverage its position between the East and West, and one over which it would have full control. Such an agreement would, in effect, be in the interest of both Minsk and Warsaw, would support the geostrategic choice of Belarusian society, and would increase the potential cost of Russia violating the Belarusian territory.
The issue of Belarus has been completely forced out of political discourse in Poland for the last 30 years and this is, undoubtedly, one of the greatest failures of Polish foreign policy after the collapse of the communist regime in 1990. Not only is this an area of almost existential geostrategic importance for Poland, but Belarus is also a country that is culturally very close to Poland and one with which Poland has virtually no historical issues, as is the case with Ukraine. Poland has the right people - diplomats, analysts, managers, all with high competencies, however currently, they do not have full freedom of action. This is due to the lack of a long-term geostrategic plan, as a result of which the Polish state pursues an ad hoc policy, meaning in fact it does not pursue any concrete and/or focused policy. The revival of Belarusian policy should be one of the fundamental aspirations of Polish foreign policy. This is also the goal of “The Twentieth War" project by Strategy & Future.
Finally, which also seems obvious, but is absent, Poland should have its own lines of communication with the Russians. Even such prosaic neglect causes the Polish government to give up the role of decision-maker in their own region, giving this function to Washington, Berlin, or Paris. Direct discussions of Polish politicians with their Russian counterparts are another sign that they, and no one else, decide their own space.
The Crisis of the Year 2030
Let's move now to 2030. The conflict continues and decisions need to be made in the here and now. What international military options does Warsaw have during this crisis?
The Polish battalion stationed near Adazi, Latvia must be ready to leave this Latvian base at a time when tensions with Russia are very high. Ideally, it would return to Poland, but this will, in all probability, be impossible. Few people in Poland are aware of the fact that Poland has its own military contingent, as part of NATO's Forward Presence, in Adazi in the Republic of Latvia. However, at a time of crisis, this will be a factor that binds Poland to any resulting conflict. A similar hostage role was performed by American personnel at the base in Ramstein, Germany during the Cold War which included the families of these soldiers. It is no coincidence that the United States does not currently have a similar base in Latvia. It is not about the immediate abandonment of the Latvian people, but rather about maintaining the independence of the decision to escalate or de-escalate Polish participation during a crisis. A potential solution is to authorize the contingent commander in Adazi to authorize a recall himself in the event of an escalating tensions. During the conflict, there will be no time to wait for Warsaw's instructions - these procedures must be clear now. Together with directions and logistics of such a retreat.
We must also be aware of the fact that, at a time of war, it is not possible to defend the Baltic states without making use of the territory of Belarus. The long-term policy goal of the Polish government should be to make such a military use possible with the consent of the Belarusian authorities. However, if this is impossible in a given geopolitical situation, Poland must have an entry scenario prepared without Minsk's authorization, since without extending the theater of operations onto the territory of Belarus, any defense of the Baltic states seems impossible. The aim of the Polish forces would be to secure as many railway junctions as possible, such as - Grodno, Brześć, Wołkowysk, Baranowicze, Łuniniec, or the suburbs of Minsk such as Ratomka and Pomyśliszcze. In addition, the military should have specially trained brigades capable of guerrilla operations and sabotage behind enemy lines.
The topic of Ukraine also remains important, namely the geographical outlet in the north-western part of the country in the form of Shatsk. From there, it is possible to send forces in the direction of Chełm, Lublin, and Dęblin. During the conflict, the Polish army must be prepared to move quickly to the Wołyń Oblast to control any southern attack in the direction of Lublin from Belarusian territory. However, more importantly, it is now necessary to send signals through joint Polish-Ukrainian military exercises in Wołyń, which would send a signal to the Russians that this direction is well recognized and secured. Potentially greater cooperation with Ukraine in the Belarusian direction would tie down the planning of Russian strategists even more.
One can imagine that in the 2030s, cyberspace will continue to gain importance quickly and steadily, so this domain should also be high on the list of investment priorities of the Polish Army. The same applies to the creation of a fleet of unmanned vehicles for exclusive military use - both aerial and land - which would be deployed in the direction of Elbląg-Suwałki-Lublin. During a crisis, their presence can be rapidly increased without risking human losses. They can also be used for intelligence gathering, such as tracking and tracing movements in border regions. This is a very important step on the ladder of escalation and, critically, below the threshold of war, and therefore one of the elements of a direct response to Moscow's asymmetric actions.
The plan for this conflict also includes line troops, the hardware or any armed force. What will be the posture of the Polish army? Reserves should be prepared between Łódź and Warsaw. The heavy, armored reserve must be arranged so that it can use all axes: along the Vistula River north of Warsaw; north and south of Narew river; north and south of the Bug river, and finally north of the Wieprz river. From the point of view of geography, the area near Stryków, a suburb of Łódź, offers this possibility. The logistics of internal operations are also very important. For example, moving around the country could not take place on highways and expressways, because it is very difficult to leave them due to numerous barriers. Therefore another training goal for the Polish Army is the refinement of moving around the country on less-traveled roads. In a word - one has to get one’s hands dirty, especially on the eastern flank.
Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum
The presented scenario is one of many that may unfold in the uncertain years ahead. Seeking answers and taking real action is in the fundamental interest of every country, including Poland. Political simulations of this type are nothing new in the offices of the Kremlin or in the Pentagon. Their purpose is not to "set a ball rolling," that is to try to evoke such a sequence. On the contrary, competent preparation and the performance of a multi-domain mental exercise by the Polish political and military elites actually reduces the likelihood of a conflict. It proves they take responsibility for their own space and forces the Russians to consider Poland in the security architecture on the Baltic-Black Sea Bridge.
The aim of “The Twentieth War" project is to spark a public debate on this subject and make the public aware that the new generation war, or the war which the Kremlin is practicing on many fronts, has little to do with the Apocalypse. Masses of soldiers, nuclear annihilation, and death. This is the top of the escalation ladder. However, below the threshold of war, the definition of which is provided by Article 5 of the NATO Charter - which currently nominally protects Poland - Moscow has plenty of asymmetric actions to which Poland should also find an adequate response.
For more information, please visit the Strategy & Future website and YouTube channel. There you will also find the second joint episode discussing “Project 2030: The Twentieth War,” as well as other talks, analyses, and films, also with guest appearances from Good Times Bad Times.
Source:
The analysis prepared with Strategy & Future experts
