- Hubert Walas
Hybrid warfare.
In recent days, Poland has witnessed an unprecedented event in it’s modern history. The migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border is the first clear example for Polish society of a change in the structure of the global order. Polish political elites, so far preoccupied mainly with internal power struggles, were mercilessly awakened from their geostrategic sleep. Why did Lukashenka cause a crisis on his own border, what scenarios are possible, and what does the new Polish army have to do with all this?
Border crisis
War is a tool for achieving political goals. In this sense, a traditional kinetic war, such as World War II, is no different than a hybrid war fought locally and with relatively few resources. Hybrid war, or to be more precise, hybrid conflict - for this is how all actions below the official threshold of war are defined - includes, among others, social activities, weaponization of migrants, information warfare, activities of special forces and/or paramilitary groups. The world has observed such actions since at least 2014, the year of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The next iteration of this form of political pressure is taking place now, through the invocation of a migration crisis by the Republic of Belarus.
In mid-2021, the Belarusian regime headed by Alexander Lukashenkothe launched a new migration channel. First, the target was Lithuania, but after some time the Belarusian authorities redirected the inflow to the Polish border. On 8 November 2021, the events escalated with several thousand (and possibly more) migrants being transported to the Bruzgi-Kuznica border crossing.
Interestingly, a few days earlier on November 5 - at the meeting of the Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus - the two countries signed a package of integration agreements. It assumes, among other things, the adoption by Russia and Belarus of a common migration policy and military doctrine. This fact, together with statements made by high-ranking Russian politicians, confirmed Alexander Lukashenko's belief that his actions have the full support of Moscow.
One might ask, why does Lukashenko need a conflict on the border? The answer may seem simple. It is clear that Minsk's actions are a form of Lukashenka's revenge against Poland, Lithuania, and the European Union in general for supporting the Belarusian opposition after the 2020 elections, as well as for the sanctions imposed on the regime. It is almost certain however, that Belarus’s hybrid actions are, above all, part of the internal Belarusian-Russian game with Belarus acting as Moscow's political bumper while it pursues its goals of destabilising the EU's and NATO's eastern flank as well as Ukraine. In fact, the recent number of coinciding events is puzzling.
On November 8, the day the crisis escalated, Belenergo, a Belarusian energy company, announced that it was immediately breaking its contract to supply electricity to Ukraine at a time when the country is currently experiencing an acute energy crisis. Perhaps there would be nothing surprising about this were it not for the fact that deliveries had begun 7 days earlier. What’s more, Moscow has recently stopped deliveries of gas through the Yamal pipeline which runs through Belarus and Poland and on to Germany and the EU. Although Lukashenka boasts that Belarus will buy gas from Russia at prices several times lower than those paid by European countries, blocking Yamal will effectively cut off Belarus from revenues generated by gas transit, which gives the Kremlin another tool to pressure Lukashenka. There is also speculation in the press about the dislocation of nuclear weapons to Belarus and about extending the lease of two military facilities for another 25 years.
On the other hand, Belarus still does not formally recognize the annexation of Crimea, which Russia considers a slap in the face. Although Lukashenka makes it clear that informally this has already happened, the Kremlin expects a formal stance from him. Despite the seemingly friendly relations between Minsk and Moscow, we are in fact dealing with a constant game lined with smiles and declarations while in the background a merciless struggle for efficiency and political maneuvering is taking place. It is likely that destabilization of the Polish border is an additional tool for Lukashenka to use in his maneuvers with Moscow. For example, unleashing a crisis and allowing Moscow to be the final arbiter may be traded for resumption of Russian gas transportation through Yamal.
The escalation of the border crisis is in the interest of the Russian Federation, which treats it as part of its "bullying strategy" and a form of pressure on Western states while formally not bearing responsibility for it. The migration crisis fuels social and political discord in Poland and tests the resilience of Poland's security system, its armed forces, and NATO as a whole.
Information Warfare
One of the most important domains of any modern conflict, including the current border crisis, is the infosphere. It is not important what happens on the ground, what matters is the message that goes out into the world. Whoever wins the narrative war is the de facto winner of the entire game. The Russian and Belarusian authorities report that the West is responsible for causing the migration because it supported American moves in the Middle East. The Belarusian side and the Russian-language media accuse the Polish side of inhumane actions and violating human rights. These include the forcible detention of migrants forcing their way across the border and the use of tear gas to repel the assault. All this is most often fuelled by images of children and women appearing online. This description is being joined by some political circles in Poland, who are calling for the admission of those camping at the border, which is in line with the goals of Belarusian narration.
The question that needs to be asked at this point is: are we dealing with a humanitarian disaster? According to the European Court of Human Rights, Poland must provide food, clothing, medical care and, if possible, temporary shelter to migrants camped at the border. However, Belarus refuses to allow Poland to send a convoy into its territory with humanitarian aid for migrants, thus refusing to provide assistance. Besides, it is clear that all people who received a visa to Belarus first had to prove that they had sufficient funds for accommodation and normal life functions in Belarus. The price migrants had to pay to smugglers approved by the Lukashenko regime, according to various media leaks, ranges from $2500 to even $15,000. The Lukashenko regime seized this money in order to use these people instrumentally for its own game. When the first people realized that they were victims of fraud, they tried to return to the airport, but the Belarusian police turned back cabs with migrants. This culminated in transporting the migrants to the border and then cutting off their way back. In a word, Middle Eastern migrants are now prisoners and hostages of Lukashenka, who plays with human lives to achieve his own political goals. If the Polish, Lithuanian or broader EU side considers negotiations with Belarus and admits some migrants, it may be a signal for the Lukashenko regime that pursuing such a policy is effective, which may result in further hybrid actions in the future, including further waves of migrants.
Belarus used to operate several dozens of flights a week from Dubai, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and, importantly, from Istanbul and Antalya. It would not have been possible without the silent approval of Turkey, Poland's ally within NATO. Whereas Poland and Turkey recently signed an agreement for the delivery of Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles Bayraktar TB2, worth over a quarter billion dollars. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs denies that it supports Lukashenka's smuggling activities, but it is likely that Polish-Turkish relations will be damaged as a result.
As expected, EU and NATO countries reacted very differently to the crisis on their eastern border. Although Lukashenka's actions have been condemned at the declaratory level, and a fifth package of sanctions has been announced, their impact is likely to be reduced relative to the initial intentions. One of the sanctions is to exclude Belavia, the state-controlled Belarusian air carrier, from the market in aircraft leasing contracts, which would effectively ground the aircraft because it would force Minsk to buy them back, for which it has no money. However Ireland, where most of the providers of such services are located, opposed this scenario, proposing that sanctions be imposed only on new leasing contracts. Another idea was to exclude Belarus from the global agreement on aviation data sharing, but here too the Lukashenka regime is preparing to get around that by creating a common aviation space with Russia and a joint administration to manage it.
It is not difficult to guess that declarative support comes mainly from Berlin. One should remember that Poland is only another stop on the way to Germany, so the Polish buffer for the Germans is very useful in this case. Already now the German media report that single groups of migrants from the Belarusian direction have found their way to Germany.
Also important, the current game can be costly for Belarus and Russia. A sudden influx of thousands of migrants destabilizes the situation in the country. If Lukashenka does not bring the situation under control, his legitimacy in the eyes of the most influential people in his own regime’s departments, who in practice ensure his power, may decrease.
The sanctions package imposed on Belarus has not resulted in a freeze of trade. On the contrary, as Belsat reports, in the first 9 months of this year, trade with EU countries has increased by more than 40 percent and is back to pre-pandemic levels. While the main partners of the Republic of Belarus remain Germany and… Poland. Therefore, a complete closure of the border with Poland would be a real blow to Minsk. It would be equally costly for Moscow, since the main land trade route connecting Russia with the European Union runs through Belarus. Added to that, there is a dry cargo port, Małaszewicze, on the border with Belarus. This is the largest dry dock in Europe. Hundreds of trains from East and Central Asia are bound for it as part of the Chinese Belt and Road initiative. Małaszewicze handles 90 percent of the goods brought from China to Europe by rail. If Belarus climbs up the escalation ladder, Warsaw may take steps to close this artery. This would certainly be met with a reaction from Moscow and potentially even China. It should also be remembered that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is crucial for the Kremlin, remains inoperable. Although it is very close to completion, it is still a potential disciplinary tool in the hands of the West.
Poland effectively guards the border, so further escalation of the escalation ladder by the Republic of Belarus is likely. Including provocations with weapons. Interestingly, in the Russian city of Kazan, the forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or "Russian NATO," are practicing protecting a refugee camp and exporting convoys with humanitarian cargo. It is therefore possible that after a series of escalations, Vladimir Putin will suddenly enter the game, introduce Russian guards to the border, and present himself to the world as a stabilizer of the situation which will be welcomed with relief and even gratitude by Western countries. Such a reaction in Moscow will be taken as a success and confirmation that this type of policy brings the intended results. The media reports that Angela Merkel has already made the first call to Putin asking for help in solving the crisis on the border.
The End of Strategic Sleep
The November crisis on the border was preceded by another very important event in Poland. Perhaps even a breakthrough, ending the period of strategic sleep in which Polish policymakers have been stuck since the 1990s. The leader of the Law and Justice party, deputy prime minister Jaroslaw Kaczyński and, in practice, now the most influential politician in the country, held a press conference about the fracturing of the world order, hybrid war, and Russia's offensive posture. He also pointed out the limited ability of NATO to help Poland in a new generation war, which may last only a few days or weeks. So, by the time NATO troops, or the Americans to be precise, come to help, it already could be over. Thus, he stressed the need for Poland's military autonomy, which has not manifested itself in the views of the ruling party so far.
In response to these challenges, Kaczyński announced that Poland must be able to defend itself and for this purpose it needs a large army. Perhaps several times larger than the current army of about 100,000 active troops, as well as roughly 50,000 in reserve. Expert and strategic environments, although they welcomed Kaczyński's assessment of the situation, immediately raised the question: how much will a majorly beefed up Polish military cost?
A well-equipped army of 250-300 thousand, such estimates are given in the media, would be a huge burden on the budget. It is all the more doubtful, since Poland, despite currently quite large allocations for defense (its budget is comparable to the Israeli or Turkish forces) has an army with much smaller capabilities. Increasing the number of personnel, which due to demographics is already difficult, will only further dilute these capabilities.
Grass-roots Polish think tanks are pushing for a debate on this issue and demand a very conscious reform process, so as not to throw big money down the drain. Although the outlook on the reform of the armed forces is not uniform, all experts agree that a modern army should, first of all, have a high saturation of capabilities. It is not the quantity, but the quality, of units that is most important. According to the Swedish military think tank, FOI, despite the fact that the Polish army presents a certain value on NATO's eastern flank, it suffers from low personnel and poor quality of the equipment used. According to FOI, up to 75% is obsolete. Therefore, declarations of a 250,000-strong army are simply unrealistic at the moment. However, a correct assessment of the situation is the first step towards useful change.
An unexpected side effect of the Belarusian-induced migration crisis, which is at least declaratively supported by Russia, may be an increase in public support for the idea of reforming the Polish Army. The conflict on the border is a reminder of the ruthlessness of the relationship between states. For the last 30 years, living under the American and EU umbrella in a unipolar world, Polish elites, as well as society, have forgotten about this principle. Nothing is a given forever and military power will always be the ultimate tool to enforce national will. A modern military, capable of protecting the state's interests, is the foundation of the nation’s functions and its relations.
Sources:
https://pism.pl/publikacje/Unijne_sankcje_przeciw_Bialorusi
https://nowakonfederacja.pl/jak-mozemy-sklonic-minsk-do-ustepstw-w-sprawie-kryzysu-granicznego/
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