Russia-Ukraine: Pre-War Chronicles?

Dragged into world.

For at least the last three months, the prospect of war has loomed over Europe, one whose scale the continent has not seen for nearly 80 years. Only several years ago, the prospect of a large conventional armed conflict on the European peninsula seemed to be a total abstraction. However, with more Russian troops moving close to the Ukrainian border and threats from Russian diplomats that Russia is ready to invade, no one doubts the new reality anymore. Is it time to write pre-war chronicles?

Pre-War Chronicles?

It's been two months since our last report on the Ukrainian-Russian crisis, in which we presented the issue of military mobilization and Moscow's logic behind it. In the meantime, the situation keeps escalating and the prospect of war is no longer an abstract notion and has now become a tangible threat. In recent weeks, countless diplomatic meetings, strategic debates, and behind-the-scenes activities have taken place that could cover almost the entire previous decade. This is how the breakdown of the international order looks like in practice as we have been saying since the beginning of this channel. Now, let’s begin by looking at key meetings between the West and Russia that have occurred in recent weeks.

10/01/2022 - Geneva, Switzerland - US-Russia Meeting.

Top Diplomats:
Russia - Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov
US - Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman

The 8-hour meeting was mainly dictated by the Russian Federation’s demands to NATO and, more specifically, to the United States. These were made before the meeting and are as follows:

• Russia is demanding formal assurances of an end to NATO's further eastward expansion. This is primarily where Ukraine and Georgia are concerned. Representing the Russian delegation, Ryabkov said: "for us, it is absolutely necessary to make sure that Ukraine will never, ever become a NATO member." But more than that, such a provision would also include Sweden and Finland.
• Russia expects NATO not to conduct exercises, establish military facilities, and to withdraw joint troops from the alliance member states that joined after 1997. In practice, this refers to the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania.
• Also in those countries, Russia requests no deployments of military equipment that Russia considers to be strike weapons.

In a nutshell, Russia is demanding a return to the security architecture of more than 20 years ago. The U.S. and NATO allies considered these claims absurd and that they are "non-starters." Accession to NATO depends only on a country's willingness to join the alliance and that member states accept such accession. Regarding Ukraine, Washington said it claims the right to bilateral talks with Kyiv and does not want to talk about Ukraine without Ukraine. In a word, both sides held on to their pre-meeting positions.

12/01/2022 - Brussels, Belgium - NATO Council-Russia Meeting.

Top Diplomats:
NATO - Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Russia - Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko
USA - Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman

During the meeting Jens Stoltenberg noted that "we can discuss many issues, but not the foundations of the alliance." And further: “There is a real risk of a new armed conflict in Europe. We are clear-eyed. So we also conveyed a message to Russia that if they use military force there will be severe consequences; economic sanctions; political sanctions.” All NATO members unanimously rejected the Russian demands.

Representing the Russian Federation, Grushko reiterated the Kremlin's line from recent talks with the U.S., while again negating the presence of Russian troops in Donbas and Luhansk. Grushko portrayed NATO countries as aggressors and Russia as a peacemaker, "if NATO wants to cooperate with us, it must take into account Russia's role as a guarantor of peace.”

It is not hard to see that NATO is struggling to maintain a coherent view. The alliance's coherence is being broken by the policies of the Germans and French.

13/01/2022 - Vienna, Austria - Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council.

Top diplomats:
OSCE - Chairman of the Council in 2022, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland -Zbigniew Rau
Ukraine - Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine - Dmytro Kuleba
Russia - Permanent Representative of Russia to the OSCE - Aleksandr Lukashevich
USA - Ambassador to the OSCE - Michael R. Carpenter

"It seems that the risk of war in the OSCE area is greater now than at any time in the last 30 years," said Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau as he began Poland's one-year chairmanship of the 57-member security organization.

Russia, through the mouth of Lukashevich, further escalated tensions. "If we do not hear a constructive response to our proposals within a reasonable period of time and the aggressive line of conduct against Russia continues, we will be forced to draw appropriate conclusions and take all necessary measures to ensure strategic balance and eliminate unacceptable threats to our national security." To this, he added that Russia loves peace, but not at any cost. The guarantees demanded by the Kremlin are an unconditional necessity.

This is the only format of this level, which was also attended by Ukrainians. Kyiv’s representative, Dmytro Kuleba was satisfied with its course, saying "I believe that the only way to prevent Russia from solving problems by force is to continue discussions in established formats, especially in the OSCE."

The American delegation again rejected the Russian ultimatum. The recurring theme of successive meetings is beginning to resemble Cold War rhetoric.

14/01/2022 - Brest, France - Informal meeting of EU foreign ministers.

Top diplomats:
EU High Representative for International Affairs and Security, Josep Borrell.
Other EU Foreign Affairs ministers

Relatively, this was the least important of all four meetings due to the European Union's lack of real agency in international affairs as a coherent block. Josep Borrell, in response to the earlier cyber-attack, announced aid to Ukraine and expressed regret that it had occurred. This was followed by confirmations about the continuation of close cooperation with the U.S. and the desire to resolve the crisis through diplomacy.

After all these meetings, the following question still hangs in the air: is the Kremlin seeking genuine give-and-take negotiations or will it use the rejection of its demands as a pretext for military action against Ukraine? Unfortunately, it’s looking more and more like the latter.

However, Moscow's policy is not costless. The claims of the Russian Federation have struck directly at the strategic freedom of two Nordic countries - Sweden and Finland. Although both already cooperate closely with NATO and could join the alliance almost "overnight," both Stockholm and Helsinki value strategic neutrality. Yet Moscow's actions have sparked heated debate in both states. "Joining NATO is up to us," firmly declared Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde. A survey last year indicated that 46% of Swedes were in favor of joining NATO. This is a 17% increase compared to 2012. After Russia's actions, the sentiment may have shifted even more toward NATO application.

The same attitude prevails in Sweden's eastern neighbor, Finland. One Finnish minister said that Finland is "closer to NATO than ever before." This is a big change from the Cold War years when Helsinki first consulted Moscow on every strategic decision. It is likely that if Sweden joined the alliance, Finland would follow, so as not to be left in a security vacuum between NATO and Russia. However, even if Helsinki and Stockholm do not join NATO in the near future, the debate in both capitals has signaled a new era in their relations with Moscow.

This new era in relations with Moscow, despite its extremely aggressive stance in recent months, is consistently not wanted by Germany, or more specifically, by the new German government. By its recent actions, Berlin has shown a closer adherence to a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation than with NATO. Although this may be controversial, Germany provides many arguments that this is in fact the case. The goal of German policy is to maintain its status as a distributor of imported hydrocarbons from Russia on the European peninsula. At the core of this strategy are the Nord Stream pipelines, which we have mentioned many times in our reports. Maintaining the status quo is so important for Germany that Berlin indirectly supports Moscow in this conflict - at Kyiv’s expense.

Not only did Germany block the sale to Ukraine of defense systems inside NATO that Kyiv paid for, but it also decided to block a third country from their will to transfer weapons made in Germany to Ukraine. This is what Estonia was planning to do with some of its German-made weapons. The United States, despite having similar contractual provisions when selling arms, did not cause problems for the Baltic States on this issue. Berlin is defending itself with the argument of preserving the doctrine of a solely diplomatic solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and eschewing military means. Furthermore, Germany cites its own guidelines, which do not allow the issuance of export licenses to third countries that are "embroiled" in armed conflicts.

Firstly, however, Article 51 of this law speaks of the right to self-defense in the case of an armed attack, so Berlin could make an exception for Kyiv in the case of political will. And secondly, the principled approach did not prevent Berlin from executing a massive €4.3 billion contract for the sale of arms to Egypt that’s currently "embroiled" in the Yemen War on the side of the Saudi Arabian Coalition.

As if that wasn't enough, just a few days ago, the German Naval Commander, Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach, added fuel to the fire. [Video] Berlin dissociated itself from the admiral's words and he himself apologized for them and then resigned under pressure. However, statements that Crimea is already lost and calls to show respect to Putin show the behind-the-scenes opinions of parts of the German elite.

There are increasingly strong protests against this conduct of international affairs within Germany itself. A big group of German experts in the field of international relations have expressed their indignation with Berlin's policy. 73 of these signed a letter that was then published in Die Zeit and in which they called for a change in Germany's strategic course. They write "The crimes of Nazi Germany on the territory of present-day Russia between 1941 and 1944 are not suitable to justify Germany’s reluctance to respond to the Kremlin’s revanchism and nihilism under international law. Especially not when, as in the case of Ukraine, it involves a Russian invasion of the internationally recognized territory of another nation that itself was the victim of past German expansionist actions."

Germany is also learning, by its own doing, a hard lesson about Russia's credibility as a gas supplier. There is a wide debate in the German media about whether Moscow will interrupt its deliveries and what to do when this uncomfortable scenario materializes..

However, for the time being and apart from appealing to diplomatic solutions which in practice are empty words, Berlin is full of hot air hoping that the situation will resolve itself and that Germany will eat its cake and have it too.

Provoked To War

The Western perspective is generally well known. Russia uses its military superiority to push through favorable political solutions and by taking advantage of the beneficial international situation with the reorientation of the Americans to the Pacific, the military weakness of Europe, and the breakdown of NATO cohesion. But how does Russian society look at the current crisis? It is, after all, a very important factor, as the burden of Russian aggression in the end falls, as always, on the average Russian. This is what Denis Volkov, director of the Levada Center, the largest and most independent analytical center in Russia, presents in his article. Levada's autonomy is evidenced by the fact that the Kremlin at one time recognized it as a center of foreign influence after it published negative poll results for the Kremlin government. So let's take a look at what Russian society thinks about a potential war through the prism of Levada's polls.

50% of Russians believe that tensions in Russia's west are not escalating into war. The opposite view is held by 39%. This is a big increase from 2019 when 14% of the population held this opinion. On the other hand, when asked whether "Do you fear war?" as many as 62% of Russians answered in the affirmative. This is a record for the entire history of the survey.

In terms of responsibility for current events - the answer is clear. 50% blame the US and NATO, while 4% see the Kremlin as the culprit. Russians unanimously share the view that "Russia is being deliberately dragged into war" and when "provoked, it can do nothing but respond." Volkov cites some of the statements: "They want to attack Russia as they did in the past. They are seeking pressure through Ukraine and Belarus, among others. 'The situation with refugees on the Belarusian-Polish border... almost turned into a war... We would have had to intervene. And that would have been it: we would have been dragged into a war!" or another quote "They are provoking us deliberately to impose sanctions, to make the economy worse again, to make the currency weaker. Russia will have to respond. From all sides they are pinching us, biting us. What should we do? Surrender?" Provocation is a recurring theme in the poll’s answers.

Many Russians consider NATO's eastward expansion after the collapse of the USSR and the presence of NATO troops on Ukrainian territory as an imperial project that threatens Russia. "NATO is expanding eastward. You have to agree that American planes and ships are in the Black Sea, they are gathering and there is an expansion eastwards, into Ukraine. Ukraine is letting everything in, getting closer to our borders. We have to protect our borders." The problem with this argument is that all of these actions are expressions of the will of the people of NATO countries or countries that cooperate with NATO. The North Atlantic pact is by definition a defensive alliance. None of the member states has any intention to conduct any aggressive actions against the Russian Federation. And even if this were to happen, it would remain alone in these actions, because in such a situation the activation of Article 5 of NATO would be impossible.

On the other hand, Russian society seems to be indifferent to the constant struggle with the West, and in a way bored with the constant oscillating escalation and de-escalation. While the annexation of Crimea was enthusiastically welcomed by Russians, as shown by Putin's and the government's popularity polls, the current crisis is not winning the Kremlin any sympathy. Support for the president, prime minister, and government is gradually falling. According to some experts, Russian foreign policy is an extension of the struggle for domestic legitimacy. This would mean that since the polls are falling, it is not worth escalating. Moreover, and this is very important, as many as 80% of Russians declare the desire to improve relations with the USA and the West. Unfortunately, however, it would be naive to extrapolate the logic of the whole society to the group of people ruling Russia.

Raising The Price

Although no country is offering direct military assistance to Ukraine to repel a potential offensive by the Russian Federation, there are a number of countries that provide Kyiv with diplomatic support, military training, and most importantly, arms transfers.

This is done, among others, by the aforementioned Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - which provided Stinger anti-aircraft and Javelin anti-tank systems or the Czech Republic which donated anti-tank ammunition. Some of the aid may be coming through clandestine channels. Media leaks suggest that this may be the case for example with Poland. However, Ukraine is supported militarily primarily by the UK and the US, in accordance with the doctrine of "offshore balancing." The British have donated a large number of NLAW anti-tank weapons to the Ukrainians while the Americans are transferring Javelins, Stingers, and Mi-17 helicopters, among others, to Ukraine as part of their $200 million in military aid. It should be noted that this information is part of ongoing events and may soon change.

Unfortunately, there should be no illusions that such support will be enough to raise the cost of war on Russia's side to the point where it ceases to be calculable to the Kremlin. The nature of the military buildup along the Ukrainian border suggests that Russia will have the ability to conduct large-scale, combined offensive operations against Ukraine. Tens of thousands of troops, thousands of combat vehicles, hundreds of fighter aircraft. The invasion would in all likelihood begin with devastating missile attacks from land, air, and sea that would strike Ukrainian command centers, airfields, and logistical points. The Ukrainian military would be surrounded on almost every side from the outset, and Russian troops attacking from the north from Belarus would have to travel as little as 100km to capture Kyiv.

The Ukrainians have mainly post-Soviet equipment that the Russians know very well and know how to neutralize. The light anti-tank systems that Ukraine has now received work well in a relatively static conflict such as in Donbas, but a massive artillery and rocket attack is a different story. The only weapons systems that could plausibly incur costs that could change Russia's calculations are surface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft. However, the delivery of these systems to the Ukrainians by the United States is highly unlikely. And even if there were such a will, it would take months to train the pilots and crews.

But this does not change the fact that the fighting spirit and morale of the Ukrainian military is very high. Kyiv declares that it will fight to the end.

Yet, the West’s arsenal retains still another powerful weapon, somewhat dusty in recent years - sanctions. In recent years, these seem to us to have been an ineffective weapon with regard to Russia. This is because the U.S. and EU have used them on a very limited scale. Russia has spent the last 30 years on economic integration with the United States and Europe. The argument that helping Russia modernize will bring a friendlier ruling class has been debunked. Russia has used the gains from this strategy to fund a highly successful military modernization program. But Russia needs Western products and technology far more than the West needs Russian goods. This gives the United States powerful levers it has not yet used. To have the intended effect this time, they must be more decisive and well-planned, as Edward Fishman and Chris Miller argue in their recent article for Politico.

First, the West would have to move away from a strategy of "smart and targeted" sanctions that would hit only the “bad guys.” Unfortunately, this is not feasible. For sanctions to really hurt Moscow, the U.S. and EU must also bear some of the cost. Second, the US and the EU need to quit the graduation of sanctions as the conflict escalates as this doesn't work either. From the outset, the Biden administration must signal the imposition of maximum severe sanctions on the entire Russian economy, not just "specific targets." Third, they must be well planned and thought out. What do Fishman and Miller propose? In addition to sanctioning the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and cutting Moscow off from SWIFT, as we discussed in our previous material, several new proposals were put on the table. These include the threat to cut off Russia's largest banks, such as Sberbank, VTB, and Gazprombank from the U.S. financial system. Which would make it difficult, if not completely impossible, for anyone in the world to transact with these institutions. Going further, Washington, as in the case of Iran, could sanction the export of Russian hydrocarbons - oil and gas. Here, European resistance would certainly be considerable. Moreover, sanctions could also be extended to Russian imports, such as consumer electronics, car parts, and precision machinery.

If such steps were communicated quickly enough, they would raise the cost of invading Ukraine to a degree that no military aid can provide at this point. But is Washington ready for such a step?

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