- Hubert Walas
Russia's Collapse. Part 1.
Will Russia disintegrate or become a failed state by 2033? In response to this question posed to 167 international policy experts by the Atlantic Council think-tank, as many as 77 of them answered, “yes.” That’s almost 50%.
Russia's full-scale in vasion of Ukraine has failed to achieve any of the Kremlin's goals and accelerated the process of state disintegration. Jamestown Foundation analyst Janusz Bugajski believes that Russia is nearing the end of its imperial cycle and that its current formula is running out of steam.
There has not been a time since the collapse of the Soviet Union when the Russian Federation has experienced so many simultaneous crises, which now include the inability of the central government to ensure sustainable economic development, growing disparities between Moscow and the provinces, an impending military defeat, or at least an indefinite impasse in Ukraine resulting in increasingly severe sanctions.
The arguments that the collapse of the Russian Federation is not simply an abstract scenario are multiplying. It is by no means an inevitable event, but the size of the Russian giant, its human, military, and raw material resources make this a very serious prospect. The implications of the chaos to follow the colossus collapsing show that the scenario of Russian state failure shouldn’t be avoided, but in fact monitored and subjected to constant analysis.
Why is this a plausible scenario? And what might it suggest about Russia's potential fall?
Birth of the Future Colossus
We cannot begin an analysis of such a complex issue without first looking at the past. Indeed, with a broader view into history, we are able to discern certain recurring patterns.
Russia under various names and forms has existed for 800 years. The Grand Duchy of Moscow, the forerunner of today's Russian Federation, was first a distinct entity in the 13th century. For its first 200 years, it was a vassal state of the Mongolian Golden Horde. During this period, the Muscovite leaders, from a group of several subordinate centres of the Horde, won the rivalry in the region of today's north-western Russia. This resulted in the incorporation of further territories adjacent to Moscow's borders, including the previously superior principality of Vladimir. Eventually, Moscow became powerful enough to break free from the rule of the Golden Horde in the war of 1480.
Successive rulers of the Rurik dynasty subjugated further new territories to Moscow, in the early days pushing, above all, into the sparsely populated east.
Territorial expansion was halted by the death of the last of the Rurik dynasty, Ivan the Terrible, in 1584, and the state descended into chaos - today known as Smuta or The Time of Troubles. The Kremlin was occupied by the Poles for two years, and the liberation of Moscow from Polish occupation in 1612 is today celebrated in Russia as National Unity Day.
However, the country reunited under the Romanov dynasty, and managed to recover from its internal problems. It annexed further territories, this time successfully biting into Europe. In the 17th and 18th centuries, it subjugated the territories of present-day Ukraine, and in the 19th century it reached the height of its territorial power, culminating in the annexation of Manchuria in 1900.
After centuries of wars, expansion, and colonisation, the Russian Empire stretched from Poland's Kalisz to Lushunkou in China's Manchuria and from Finland's Rovaniemi to the Persian city of Rasht in the southern Caspian Sea. It was a colossus of 22 million square kilometres. This territorial power translated into a massive population for the time, 125 million people. It was nearly twice as big as the United States, which at that time had a population of 76 million people. This potential was recognised by Western industrialists, who invested mightily in Russian industry. The convergence of territorial, human, and industrial potential was to make Russia the world's greatest economic power. This was the prediction made in 1914 by the eminent French economist Edmond Thery in his book 'La transformation economique de la Russie." In 1948, Russia would overtake all Western economies, and with a population of 344 million, would be second only to China.
Collapse Instead of Growth
In theory, everything heralded that the 20th century would be the century of Russia and the Russians. However, what testified to Moscow's power was at the same time the herald of its twilight.
Why? Let's start with geography.
Looking at Russia's history, it is difficult not to see a recurring motif of state action. The Moscow-centred state's modus operandi has been constant territorial expansion. However, the Russians did not do this through some unique gene that made them more eager for control than, say, the Swiss. Throughout their centuries of existence, the actions of one and the other were influenced by the space that surrounded them.
Located around Moscow in the north-western part of today's Russian Federation, the Moscovites were surrounded by almost no major natural barriers, neither mountains, nor seas almost no great rivers. This translated into a chronic sense of anxiety for Moscow's rulers, which included incursions and invasions. So, having consolidated the state and emerged from under the yoke of the Golden Horde in the 15th century, the Muscovites did not stop and pushed on in search of natural barriers that would reduce this looming threat. Expansion to the east was relatively easy given that they were, and still are very sparsely populated areas. The Russians reached as far as the Pacific Ocean even crossing the Bering Strait and settling present-day Alaska. From the south and from China, Russia was separated by the Gobi Desert, as well as the Altai, Karakorum, and Tien Shan mountains. From India and Pakistan, the Karakorum and Hindu Kush mountains. From Persia, the Alborz Mountains and the Caspian Sea. From the Turks, by the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea.
Still, the biggest problem, was the western border. The Central European plain which begins in France, passes through the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland. It widens in Eastern Europe and fully fans out going into Russia. The problem was all the greater because in the last 800 years Europe represented a much more developed and economically concentrated area than the vast, and backward Russian steppes. But this problem, too, was to be solved.
There was a sequence of events that was favourable to the Kremlin. The rebellion of Bohdan Khmelnytsky which developed into a regular Cossack uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, followed by the Swedish Deluge, and the Polish-Russian War opened the gates for Moscow to enter Ukraine and then Poland. The whole process began with the conclusion of the 1654 Pereiaslav Agreement between the Khmelnytsky Hetmanate and Tsarist Russia. There was also the failure of the 1658 Treaty of Hadiach which was to add Ruthenia as a third subject to the Commonwealth, which Poland, Lithuania, and Ruthenia would now form as equals. Yet it all ended with the partitions of Poland in conjunction with Austria and Prussia at the end of the 18th century. The solution to Moscow's greatest geographical challenge in the West was becoming a reality.
After centuries of unrest, the Russians had the largest buffer zone in the world. For any potential invader to reach the core - Moscow - would need to pass thousands of kilometres.
Nevertheless, if Tsar Nicholas had actually stopped at what Moscow had managed to absorb by the end of the 19th century and had concentrated on improving the internal situation, Russia would have had a chance to fulfil Edmond Thery's prediction. What the Frenchman did not foresee, however, was that for the Kremlin, no matter who was in office, there was no finish line, no end point, at which the Russian rulers would consider to be 'enough'.
First born out of a sense of unease and unfavourable geography, years later the Russian imperative by default became a search for further expansion, colonisation, and the imposition of its own will on subordinate nations. This was doctrinally accepted as the solution to every geopolitical challenge. In parallel, of course, Moscow was creating an ideological interpretation for its imperialism. The concept of Moscow as a 'third Rome' emerged. Moscow was to be a successor to the Western and Eastern Roman Empires. Every Russian expansion in the West and South was motivated by the desire to "protect" the Orthodox population in these areas which… sounds rather familiar given today, doesn’t it?
This is also how we arrive at the Russian paradox. Russia was the largest, consolidated in one piece, state in the world. Almost all its borders were based on an impressive natural barrier: mountain range, desert, or sea, and it had thousands of kilometres of buffer zone. Also, according to many, a bright future. However, this was still not enough for Moscow. A mere glance at the map aroused the imperialist arrogance of the Kremlin tsars.
An arrogance that, as it later turned out, was not as deeply embedded in reality as the Kremlin thought. Territory by itself does not constitute any power but can mean a huge burden. The Russians had more than 100 different nationalities within their borders, and many, if not most, of these emanated pure hatred towards Moscow.
According to the 1897 census, Russians became a minority in their own state. Tsarist Russia was inhabited by an impressive 125 million people, of whom only 55 million were Russians or 44%.
Moreover, the empire, although awe-inspiring on the map, was overstretched, poorly communicated, and chronically underdeveloped, all of which contributed to gigantic corruption, poor equipment, non-existant military training and an abysmal command.
At the end of the 19th century, Tsarist Russia was at the height of its territorial power. This gave birth to imperial arrogance which in turn led to poor strategic calculation. The whole thing, in retrospect, was a recipe for disaster, and that’s what actually happened. At the beginning of the 20th century, Tsarist Russia entered two wars that exposed its weaknesses and marked the beginning of the end of Moscow as a world hegemon, or superpower, or perhaps even a state as we know it today. The Russians first became embroiled in a war with Japan in 1904-1905 which, in practice, they lost. Russia's defeat gave new hopes of independence to many nations oppressed inside the empire, including the Poles.
The empire began to boil internally and civil unrest swept through the country. However, Tsar Nicholas II did not stop and, in line with the doctrine of his predecessors, considered attack to be the best defence. With the entrance to the Central European Plain secured by controlling Poland, Tsar Nicholas II took the Balkans as his target. A conflict with Austria-Hungary was instigated, resulting in the outbreak of the First World War. After that, it only took three years for Tsarist Russia to cease to exist. This vividly demonstrates the fragility of the Russian colossus then and is an important lesson for today.
Military disasters and economic meltdown in the early 20th century led to a revolution that was supposed to bring the end of the aristocracy and equality for all people. All it brought was death, starvation, and even more suffering. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was Act One of Russia's downfall.
The Fall: Act Two
However, Bolshevik Russia managed to retain most of its controlled territories. Those on the periphery of the empire - Poles and Finns, among others, managed to escape from under Moscow's boot. Overall, the Soviets lost only 3.6 percent of Tsarist Russia’s territories.
The Soviet Union made up for this loss twenty years later. Despite being the aggressor and initiator of the Second World War, Moscow ended up on the victors' side thanks to a favourable balance of power that had already changed during the war. Nevertheless, if it had not been for American military and industrial support in the form of the Lend Lease Act, the Soviets would probably have lost to the Germans.
After the war, Moscow, in line with its implicit imperative, expanded its sphere of influence again. Now, in addition to the Soviet republics, Moscow included satellite states such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in its imperial reach. Perhaps not surprisingly, this massive gain still did not satisfy Russian appetites. The Soviet Union had grasped deep into continental Europe and there was a legitimate risk of conventional aggression against Western Europe. However, Europe was saved from war by the growing power of the United States and the development of nuclear weapons, the use of which was feared by both sides.
Despite Moscow's successes, the general trend of state decay initiated after the wars of the early 20th century, had not been reversed. The bright demographic prospects of the early 20th century had turned to dust. Let us recall that, according to the 1914 prognosis, Russia was supposed to have a population of 344 million in 1948. In actuality, it ended up with half of that, some 175 million. An incalculable number of people died because of famine, war, and slave labor. The number of lives lost is likely to be well over 100 million.
Russian weakness during the Second World War was countered by American aid and the sheer mass of the Red Army. However, the sea of bloodshed hollowed out the large parts of the male population, and the extremely inefficient communist social contract remained thus ensuring that the potential emanating from this powerful area was systemically wasted.
After almost five decades of the Cold War - the hegemonic rivalry with the United States that saw the space race, nuclear tests, threats of World War III - the redressed Empire, the Soviet Union, collapsed again, this time almost overnight. Act Two of the Fall had revealed itself.
This time the scale of losses was much greater than in 1917. Moscow lost almost 24% of its territory, nearly 50% of its population and more than 40% of its GDP.
Did anyone in the 1980s foresee such a scenario? The subject was practically non-existent, the territorial integrity of the colossus was taken for granted. Nevertheless, there were a few forecasts accurately predicting the future. For one, Andrei Amalrik's 1969 essay with the telling title, "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" Similarly, US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan predicted that the collapse of the USSR would be the most important event of 1980. However, these voices were singular and generally ignored.
When the Soviet giant did actually collapse, the world was shocked. Western leaders did not follow the course of events fast enough. Instead of shaping and moderating the USSR’s collapse, key decision-makers were caught totally unprepared, while George H.W. Bush, even publicly warned against Ukrainian independence.
In retrospect, it is difficult to understand how Western decision-makers could have been so short-sighted. Moscow was mired in a failed war in Afghanistan, burdened by decades of an inefficient system that had led to economic stagnation and, once again, left Moscow struggling to maintain control of its continent-wide colonial empire. As Casey Michel noted in the Financial Times that although the cracks were visible as day, Western officials and politicians, focused on their narrow area of interest, and failed to see the bigger picture.
Recurring Cycle
After the collapse of the USSR, Moscow quickly went under a different banner, as it had after the fall of Tsarist Russia, and attempted to, once again, redefine itself. Seventy years before this had been totalitarian communism, while in the 1990s it was to become a market economy. Yet, this transformation failed and state assets were looted by a narrow group of individuals who divided power among themselves - the Oligarchs. The one to blame for this state of affairs, in popular opinion, was of course the West and capitalism. Not only did ordinary citizens continue to be poor - or even poorer - but they were also deprived of their pride provided by Soviet superpower.
This pride, as well as the improving economic situation, was restored by Vladimir Putin and his entourage. The country embarked on a path of economic growth fueled by the sale of endless natural resources to Europe and China. This combination provided an almost inexhaustible source of funding for the Kremlin's plans.
Again, not surprisingly, these plans are merely an evolved version of the classic Russian modus operandi: the reconquest of lost lands and the potential conquest of new ones. Georgia, Crimea, and the Donbas. And on the eve of war with Ukraine, threats against NATO and the countries that voluntarily joined the alliance after 1999 emerged.
The Kremlin, as it did at the end of the nineteenth century, has once again fallen prey to delusions of grandeur. It overconfidently believed both in its own prowess and in the weakness of other international actors. In a word, the arrogance that accompanied Tsar Nicholas II has now affected Tsar Vladimir Putin in essentially the same way.
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The result of all this now in 2023 is a country plunged into a war quagmire while deep into the greatest economic isolation of modern times. Literally, all prospects are bad. In the short-term, Russia faces a deficit running into hundreds of billions of dollars in 2023 alone, while long-term, according to the Russian energy ministry, they are running out of profitable to extract oil reserves. We discussed both of these issues more extensively in one of our recent reports on the state of the Russian economy. To top this all off, Russia has lost its most important customer, Europe, while any quick turn to Asia is wishful thinking and will realistically take the better part of 15 or 20 years.
The other 'Ace' in the Russian deck besides natural resources, the world's second best army, has faced a huge - and negative - status check. After the Serdyukov and Shoigu reforms, the Russian military was supposed to be a professional, modern army; one that breaks with the historical stereotype of the poorly equipped Russian soldier. As it turned out, the Russian army is a mirror of the Russian social model, one steeped in corruption and disorder for centuries.
A byproduct of both is Moscow's ever-diminishing credibility on the international stage. Even its usually humble neighbours such as Armenia and Kazakhstan are showing blatant insubordination towards Moscow. Not even long ago, this would have been unthinkable.
An even more dangerous offshoot is the Kremlin's increasingly weak authority inside Russia itself, in particular among local warlords, Moscow's elite, or even ordinary people. Until now, the social model was based on pride of being able to live in a superpower that the whole world feared. Together with the meeting of basic needs, this was enough for many to not question the social contract. These days, the economic crisis and the identity crisis are changing the dynamic of the Tsar-People relationship. Although the current order is not yet openly challenged, however when it is, this could bring consequences similar to those of 1917 or 1991.
This is all the more so because Moscow traditionally wages war with the resources of the provinces, meaning almost everyone dies en masse at the front - just not the people of Moscow. Although this last fact does not change that for more than 20 years, Russians have been one of the fastest-dying nationalities in their own country. Between 2002 and 2020, the number of people declaring themselves Russian shrank by nearly 10 million. That's equivalent to a country the size of Czechia or Hungary disappearing in 20 years.
However, one could ask the question - if Russia is to break up, why do we not hear about the secessionist inclinations of individual regions or nations?
As Bugajski points out, ethnic minorities in Russia will not suddenly seek secession. Whoever rears his head first runs a high risk of danger. As one exiled, Tatarstan government official recently said: "Our struggle for independence has not yet begun." However, when the time comes and the province senses the weakness of the core, we may witness a domino effect and independence movements in many parts of the country. We will talk more extensively about this in the next episode.
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A journey through the history of the state located around Moscow allows us to see a certain recurring cycle.
A rise of the state's position in the world, followed by a rise of imperialist and expansionist sentiments, leading to a misreading of the international and domestic situation, the entanglement in war (both kinetic & trade), and finally rapid collapse.
Moscow's current situation forces us to conclude that the Russian Federation is once again reliving this cycle. What is especially bad for the Kremlin is that it is in its penultimate stage.
The two great falls of Moscow in the last century were different in character and dynamics, but taking a broader perspective they can be seen to have followed a similar pattern. As we are making this report, the Kremlin's third great gambit is underway and its outcome could be similar to - or worse than - the other two.
No one has a crystal ball to predict when - or if at all - Russia will collapse. But the multitude of problems and repeated historical patterns mean that the West, and the world in general, must be ready for any scenario, including a possible Soviet-style break-up. Historian Michael Khodarkovsky wrote in 2016: "We should not be surprised if one day Russia implodes on its own, as the USSR did. All empires eventually collapse. To think that Putin's - and Russia's - will be any different is just another failure of imagination.”
