- Michał Nowak
The bloody war in Syria, which began in 2011, has claimed the lives of more than 600,000 people and left more than 13 million people internally displaced or forced to flee Syria. The war, which initially appeared to be an internal conflict, has evolved over time into a proxy war fought by a number of regional and global powers and involving smaller states in the region, making it one of the most complex armed conflicts in history.
In recent years, the conflict has, so to speak, disappeared from the world media's radar. This was due to several years of relative stability in the country and the end of a period of intense fighting. The Islamic State has been crushed, Bashar al-Assad has regained control of the western and central parts of the country, the north is controlled by pro-Turkish jihadists or fighters once linked to al-Qaeda, and the east of the country has been subjugated by the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. What is the situation in this Middle Eastern country today? Could the wave of unrest sweeping the Middle East unleash another avalanche of violence in this blood-soaked land? Let’s look at current events in Syria in an attempt to untangle the Gordian knot of the place and answer the question of what the future may hold for the country in the near future. Could the Syrian cauldron explode again?
In the early years of the war, even before the emergence of Islamic State, there were essentially two sides to the conflict - the Syrian Army loyal to President Assad and backed by Iran and Russia, on the one hand, and the Free Syrian Army, backed by parts of the West, Arab states and Turkey, on the other. In essence, however, it was a conglomerate of hundreds of different armed organisations, mostly of Sunni jihadist origin, which not only failed to cooperate closely but fought each other bloodily for influence. Before 2015, the Islamic State emerged as the dominant force fighting Assad, joined by a few other jihadist organisations, and in the same year Russia's armed intervention began. The following years, until 2020, saw successive campaigns, the final result of which was the subjugation of western Syria by the Syrian president, who controlled all the country's major cities. Islamic State was crushed by the combined efforts of the Russian-backed Syrian army and the Kurds, backed by the Americans. The country's dividing line began to run roughly along the Euphrates.
However, the conflict did not end in the north of the country. Al-Qaeda-linked jihadists from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham continued to control Idlib province and parts of neighbouring provinces, while remaining close to cities such as Aleppo and Hama. In subsequent offensives, the Syrian army regained control of a large area by entering Idlib province, but further advances were blocked by the intervention of Turkey, which has since become a key player in the conflict. Since 2011, Ankara had sought to topple Assad by supporting a number of Sunni organisations through arms supplies or training. Over time, as this model proved ineffective and the Syrian president failed to fall, the nature of Turkey's involvement changed. However, another threat began to loom in the Turkish perspective - a Kurdish parastatal entity on Turkey's borders. Between 2016 and 2019, Turkey carried out three major offensive operations in northern Syria to counter Kurdish aspirations. In addition to the Turkish army, these operations involved Syrian Sunni fighters subjugated by Ankara, from whom the so-called Syrian National Army was formed in 2017. This force would later be used by Turkey not only for operations inside Syria itself, but also in support of Turkish allies. They were thrown into the battle for Tripoli in Libya or used during the Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh against the Armenians.
The Syrian National Army still exists today in the Turkish-occupied areas of northern Aleppo province. It is not a monolith, however, as there are regular bloody battles between the smaller organisations that make up the army over territory or the division of spoils and benefits.
As a result, by the second half of 2024 we now have several major powers on the Syrian scene. The west of the country will be controlled by President Assad and the Syrian army, backed by Iran, Russia and Hezbollah. Idlib province is controlled by the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has close ties to the Turks but is not interested in full subordination to Ankara; the north of Aleppo province is controlled directly by Turkey through its supporters in the Syrian National Army (SNA); and the east of the country is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose core is the Kurds, but who also remain divided.
As a result of Turkey's 2018 operation, codenamed Olive Branch, Ankara and the SNA captured the northwestern part of Aleppo province, namely the Afrin area, which is inhabited and controlled by the Kurds. Despite limited support from Assad, the Kurds were defeated and had to evacuate south to the area around the town of Tal Rifaat, historically controlled by factions now part of the SNA. Did I say it was a complicated conflict?
The city and the Kurds were taken under Assad's 'protection', and Syrian troops appeared in the area.
The last major military operation of the Syrian war took place at the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020, leading to the approach of Syrian troops near Idlib. However, this operation ended with the direct intervention of Turkey and a ceasefire guaranteed by Turkey and Russia. Large-scale military operations ended, but this did not mean the end of the war and further casualties. In the years that followed, there were repeated skirmishes in the frontline areas and several bloody internal conflicts in areas controlled by jihadists of various origins in the north of the country. The ceasefire between the forces backed by Russia on the one hand and Turkey on the other is still in place, even though it has not been honoured. How long can this unnatural state of suspension last when the hatred between the warring parties has not disappeared?
The cessation of hostilities has been used by the Syrian president to improve his standing on the international stage. Syrian diplomacy, not without the help of Moscow or Tehran, managed to re-establish diplomatic relations with some Arab states that had been severed years ago, and the seal on these measures was Syria's return to the Arab League in 2023. In this way, Assad won the acceptance of his power from capitals that had previously been hostile to him. However, Ankara and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remained in opposition to him. Although there has been much speculation over the past two years about Turkey's willingness to reconcile with Syria, and thus between the presidents of these countries, this has not yet happened, and every statement by the Turkish leader or the Turkish Foreign Ministry indicating a willingness to normalise relations with Assad has ended in open revolts organised by pro-Turkish Syrian Sunni radicals.
As mentioned above, for years the Syrian president could count on the help of his close allies Hezbollah, Iran and Russia. Over time, the importance of the first two began to diminish and Russia dominated its Syrian partner, taking advantage of Iran's weakening and reduced potential. Moreover, the Syrian president himself, aware of the need to rebuild relations with regional partners, was not interested in maintaining his position as a close ally of Tehran.
Syria does not operate in a vacuum, and events in neighbouring Israel and Lebanon cannot remain unaffected. Israeli air strikes against Syria are nothing new and have been going on for many years, but their current intensification is linked to the presence in Assad-controlled areas of individuals and infrastructure directly or indirectly linked to Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran. The air strikes are intended to undermine the ability of Hezbollah, with which the Israeli army is fighting in southern Lebanon, to provide support. However, the killing of almost all the leaders of Hezbollah's military wing and a strain on group’’s capabilities, the extent of which was previously unknown, as a result of Israeli action, has led to the withdrawal of a number of the organisation's soldiers from Syria back to Lebanon. On the northern front, a breach in the defences was created by the lack of presence of Hezbollah and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps soldiers in the Aleppo area, among other places. In other words the weakening of their potential was tantamount to a weakening of the defence of this key Syrian city.
At the same time, mobilisation began in the structures of both Sunni forces in the north of the country. Available footage and information indicate greater activity than before in the ranks of both Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib and the Syrian National Army in northern Aleppo. These activities could not go unanswered by the Syrian side and the result was the redeployment of the elite 25th Special Forces Division, once known as the Tiger Force, north of Aleppo. Soldiers from this unit have taken responsibility for areas from which Iranian forces have withdrawn.
Both sides say the enemy is preparing for an offensive. Assad's forces would launch an offensive on Idlib, while a combined force of Sunni fighters would attack towards Aleppo. Minor clashes are taking place on the front line, with technical innovations from Ukraine, such as FPV drones, appearing on the battlefield. The Syrian artillery is intensifying its shelling of HTS positions in Idlib, while the Russian air force is carrying out more frequent air strikes on the HTS front line. So are we about to enter another bloody phase of the conflict? Not necessarily.
Let's start with Israel. The intensification of Israeli air strikes in Syria, as well as the assassinations of the leaders of Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah, have raised the question of whether Assad himself might not be Israel's next target. Throughout the years of Syria's bloody civil war, Israel has generally remained passive, offering very limited support to some rebel groups operating in the south of the country. Air strikes on targets linked to the Syrian army have caused some casualties, but overall they have not affected the Syrian army's ability to clash with its opponents. Tel Aviv has had plenty of opportunities over more than a decade to eliminate Assad or key Syrian army commanders, but it has not done so because it has not really wanted to topple him, rightly fearing what might come after him. Assad remains predictable and clearly weakened, so he poses no real threat to Israel's existence. His death could lead to the victory of Sunni radicals from HTS or Islamic State, who would almost certainly pose a more real threat, and it was never in Israel's interest to create a breeding ground for anti-Israel jihadists inside Syria. Israel's goal was to weaken Assad, but more importantly to regularly limit Iran's ability to deploy close to its borders.
On the front line in Idlib province, a fragile ceasefire is being maintained only through the efforts of Turkey and Russia, whose own military potential is preventing the warring parties from launching a major military operation. There have been sporadic clashes on this front for the past four years, with several attacks on joint Turkish-Russian convoys patrolling the disputed area, but this October saw a marked intensification, apparently with Russian acquiescence. In mid-October, Syrian artillery reportedly fired at least four shells that landed near a Turkish observation post near the village of Maarat Naasan. Although no casualties were reported, Turkish forces retaliated by shelling Syrian army positions. In the days that followed, Syrian artillery fire continued. The HTS did not remain passive either. This event is not new in itself and similar clashes have taken place many times before, but what is new is the much more intensive involvement of the Russian air force than in recent years, carrying out bombing raids in areas under Turkish protectorate but beyond its actual control. The Russian bombardments thus coincide with increasingly frequent, but still limited, Syrian artillery shelling of areas under HTS control.
Both sides blame each other. Assad and Russia for provocations that have caused casualties among both HTS fighters and civilians, and the Sunni militants for mobilising their structures and planning offensive actions.
At this stage, it is impossible to say whether these limited clashes will lead to a real explosion of military action in the province. There is no doubt that any wider action by the Syrian army will depend on Moscow's approval. The HTS, on the other hand, cannot afford wider activity without Ankara's support. However, decision-makers in both capitals are likely to want to avoid escalation. Turkey because of legitimate concerns about the influx of tens if not hundreds of thousands more refugees, and Russia because of its involvement in Ukraine, which clearly limits the potential of the contingent active in Syria. However, it cannot be ruled out that these limited clashes will at some point, by chance or not, cross an unwritten border and lead to a resumption of intense clashes against the will of the main players.
Finally, let us look at the areas actually occupied by Turkey in the northern part of Aleppo province, where the SNA troops operate. The fighters of this conglomerate would certainly like to occupy at least part of the area under the control of the combined Kurdish-Syrian forces, but the realisation of their aspirations depends entirely on Turkey's consent. All previous attempts to move further south have been blocked by Russia and the greater involvement of Assad's forces in this part of the country. The loss of one of the balance-of-power elements, Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian factions, weakens Assad's potential, which pro-Turkish forces may wish to exploit. Hence, perhaps, the aforementioned mobilisation within the SNA, to which the Syrian army has responded by strengthening its forces. The aim is to try to maintain a balance of forces on this part of the front, but in the event of Ankara's approval for the offensive, the Syrian government will be in trouble, given its current position.
Most significant, however, is the position of Turkey and its president. Erdogan appears to have abandoned his goal of forcibly overthrowing Assad and has not opposed Moscow's ongoing diplomatic efforts to normalise relations with Damascus since 2022. However, the dialogue process stalled as Assad pressed for the full withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria. The two presidents may be united by their hostility to the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, which have created a de facto autonomous area in northern Syria by the method of accomplished facts. However, joint efforts to dismantle para Kurdish statehood are and will continue to be blocked by the Americans, whose troops are stationed in the area of north-eastern and eastern Syria providing security against possible action by Syria or Turkey. However, Erdogan may be assuming that it will be simpler for him to dismantle Kurdish autonomy based on cooperation with Assad and Putin than solely through his possession of the trump card of the Syrian National Army. The allegiance of these fighters depends mainly on Ankara paying them their salaries, but could just as quickly be broken if Turkey decided to actually go with Assad. The SNA thus represents both an asset and a serious problem for Ankara, virtually preventing it from pursuing a fully sovereign policy towards Damascus.
Between July and September this year, talks between Turkey and Russia on normalising relations between Ankara and Damascus accelerated. A spokesman for the Turkish FA even declared, in response to journalists' questions, that 'Turkey welcomes Russia's efforts to establish cooperation between our country and the administration in Damascus'. President Erdogan himself said a few months ago that he would be ready to welcome Assad and his wife Asma to Turkey, as he did before the war in Syria began. The result was anti-Turkish protests in northern Syria.
Assad's intransigence in demanding a 'clear decision' from Turkey on the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria continues to stand in the way of eventual normalisation. The second obstacle is pro-Turkish Sunni militants who fear for their future. Moscow and Syria see normalisation with Turkey as an opportunity for Assad to finally gain legitimacy for his rule, while knowing that Turkey also has an interest in this normalisation. Reasons for this include the cost of occupying northern Syria, maintaining a force of Syrian fighters and, above all, the permanent presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey, which generates not only financial but also social and political costs. Erdogan may want to return the refugees to Syria, regardless of what fate awaits them in their homeland. But he needs Assad's consent. On the one hand, Assad is playing for his legitimacy, his possible return to the international chessboard, but also for the future stability of Syria. On the other hand, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees, some of whom took up arms against him years ago, could entail costs that Assad would prefer to avoid. So he wants it all - normalisation, withdrawal of Turkish troops and recognition of his authority - at no cost to himself. Compromise is therefore difficult.
The Syrian Gordian knot thus appears difficult to untie because of the existing interdependencies and the removal of even one piece of this intricate jigsaw puzzle of stability could have unpredictable consequences. Ultimately, however, events in Syria depend on the two main players, Russia and Turkey, and it is the decisions taken in their capitals that will determine the future not only of the Syrian state itself but also of hundreds of thousands of Syrians.
The war in Syria has been going on for more than 13 years now, and even if the last four years have been marked by a certain lull and stabilisation, the Syrian powder keg can explode at any time, even against the will of the main players directing events in the country. No scenario should be ruled out.
Sources:
- al-monitor.com
- middleeastmonitor.com
- middleeasteye.net
