- Hubert Walas
Nagorno-Karabakh Artsakh.
Since September 27th, intensive fighting has been going on in the South Caucasus between Azerbaijani troops and the Armenians living in the separatist Republic of Arach. More than a month has passed since the conflict broke out, and so the first conclusions can start to be drawn. What is the origin of the conflict? What are the interests of individual players in the region? Who does a possible peace rely on?
The Caucasian melting pot
Before we get to the specifics of the confrontation and current events, let’s first outline the historical context of the whole situation. The area of the South Caucasus has always been a place where various ethnic groups, cultures, and religions met. For centuries, Armenians, Georgians, and Turkish peoples competed for influence in this area. The melting pot was made up of Orthodox Georgians, Armenian Christians and Catholics, Shiite Muslims in Azerbaijan, Sunni minorities, Yezidis and much more. All this in an area about the size of half of Poland and with a population of 17 million people. Such diversity has always been the source of disputes.
Current leaders go back 2,500 years in arguing their claims for territories. These lands were subject to the Armenian, Georgian, Persian, and Turkish empires. Yet, in the last few hundred years the Russians have had the greatest influence there. However, to understand the context of current events, we must go back at least 100 years. As World War I ends in 1918, Europe celebrates the end of the bloodiest conflict in history. However, at this point, the Armenians are trying to shake off what could be called a prelude to the Holocaust - that is, the Armenian genocide by the Turks. In the years 1915-1918, according to various estimates, they murdered between 1/3 and 1/2 of the entire Armenian nation. The burden of those events and the fear for the nation's existence cast a shadow on the collective psyche of Armenians to this day. Yerevan, under the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, received huge territorial areas reaching deep into Turkey, but the Turks quickly took back these areas. Without the intercession of the then world powers, Armenia, facing a much larger Turkish force, surrendered the war five months after its start, agreeing to all the conditions of Ankara.
A few months earlier, there was a short war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh or the Artsakh, as Armenians call it. Even though Armenia won and took control temporarily, it was a Pyrrhic victory at best. 20% of the inhabitants of Artsakh died, of which the vast majority were Armenians. Moreover, shortly after this conflict, Russian troops intervened and, as a result, the Soviets were to decide about the future of this area.
Artsakh & Nagorno-Karabakh
Artsakh covers an area of over 4,000 km2 and is inhabited by about 150,000 people. For 200 years, almost 100% of Armenians, Artsakh is an area of almost mythological importance. For 400 years, the Catholicos of All Armenians, the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Pope's equivalent for Catholics, was based there. Furthermore, it was one of the few areas where Armenians created their own landed gentry and their own self-government under the Persian rule.
The Azeris also cite history demanding control over Nagorno-Karabakh. It was once an area under the jurisdiction of the Karabakh Khanate of Muslims. Tens of thousands of Azerbaijani nomads traveled the lowlands and mountains of Karabakh, so if this area fell under the jurisdiction of Armenia, it would be a disaster for them. Moreover, in terms of economy, Karabakh was much better connected with Azerbaijan. Most of the roads led east to Baku, not west to Yerevan. From Baku's perspective, however, the geostrategic argument is key. With no control over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan finds itself in a very difficult situation in the event of a potential offensive from the west.
Nevertheless, both sides, along with their arguments, remained at the mercy of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. At least in theory, because in practice the decision was made directly in the office of Joseph Stalin. On June 4, 1921, the Central Committee of the Party, taking into account the victory of the Armenians a year earlier and the undeniable fact that the Armenians constitute almost 100% of the population of Artsakh, admitted this area to Armenia. However, a day later, Joseph Stalin intervened personally in this matter and placed this area into the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic. It was one of many similar decisions by Stalin, who by artificially dividing the territories in the territory of the Soviet republics heated the existing conflicts, weakening the power on the empire's periphery, thus strengthening Moscow's power. We can still see the effects of these decisions today.
Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Soviet Azerbaijan for the next 70 years. Despite the passage of time, the conflict did not die out, but continued to smolder, albeit remaining mostly hidden. The Azeris gradually expanded their presence in an area still dominated by the Armenians. The collapse of the USSR was the moment when the Artsakh flared up again. In 1991, both Azerbaijan and Armenia declared independence. Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh also announced a referendum to obtain autonomy as an independent state, however, as it was not previously one of the separate Soviet republics, but only part of the Azerbaijani SSR, it had no right to do so under the Soviet constitution. The vacuum caused by the absence of a big brother from Moscow inevitably contributed to the war. As a result, in 1992–1994 one broke out. In May 1994, Armenia controlled about 20% of Azerbaijani territory, which led to negotiations and a ceasefire moderated by Russia. The real result was the occupation of Karabakh by the Armenians and its seven border regions and the creation of the Republic of Artsakh inside Azerbaijan. Internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, it was a de facto separate state with the capital in Stepanakert. And it is between the Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan that the war is currently taking place. This is a very important distinction.
The High Porta challenges the Russian Empire
The apparent confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh may have been frozen since 1994. However, this only appeared to be the case. Both countries are officially at war and this is the longest lasting conflict on the periphery of Europe. Statistically, almost every day for 30 years one person has been dying in this area. Not counting the moments when the conflict heated up again. Thus, assuming large simplifications, we come to the present moment in 2020. The two nations once again face each other to take control of the epicenter of the Caucasian cauldron. However, the cards at the disposal of both sides are completely different this time.
In recent decades, Azerbaijan has grown enriched in the trade of hydrocarbons, thus establishing its economic position in the region. The dry numbers also leave no room for doubt. Azerbaijan with a population of 10 million is a country 3 times more populous than Armenia. However, it should be remembered that the confrontation is aimed directly at the Artsakh, which numbers 150,000 people. This shows the disproportion faced by the Artsakh Armenians. Moreover, Baku, as one of the Turkic nations, has very close relations with Ankara. Abulfaz Elchibey , the president of Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, advocated the "one nation, two states" model of cooperation. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current president of Turkey, is now returning to this slogan, declaring his full support for Baku in this conflict. At the same time, he calls Armenia "the greatest threat to peace in the region" (Politico). In the 1990s, Turkey was unable to play a significant role in this conflict. Today, at a time when the world and regional order is cracking in many places, Ankara wants to be a major player without which it is impossible to establish a stable security architecture throughout the Mediterranean.
The Russian card remains the strongest on the Yerevan side. In the city of Gyumri, 120 km north of Yerevan, the Russians have the 102nd military base where the Russian Air Force with 3,000 to 5,000 personnel and soldiers are stationed. Armenia also belongs to the "Russian NATO" that is to the Collective Security Treaty Organization. This alliance has the equivalent of NATO’s Article 5, so an attack on one of its members is considered an attack on the entire organization. Baku, despite solid relations with Moscow, does not belong to the alliance. However, it should be remembered that officially the attack is not aimed directly at Armenia, so Russia theoretically is not obliged to provide aid.
In practice, however, Yerevan's expectations of Moscow, which has ruled the area for 200 years, are clear. Diplomatic, financial and, above all, military aid to Artsakh. At stake is not only regional stability and retaining influence, but also Russia's credibility as an ally in the eyes of other Eurasian heartland countries. And it must be remembered that the military strength card is in reality the only strong card in Moscow's deck, on which the entire perception of the strength of the Russian Federation persists. The Kremlin's worst-case scenario is to raise doubts about its agency.
This is where the problems for both Moscow and Yerevan begin. The geography of the region makes providing such assistance extremely difficult. Georgia is an important player in the puzzle. The only land routes connecting Armenia with Russia pass through its territory. After a month of war, it appears to be heading towards stalemate and trench warfare. In such a scenario, Baku's goal is to destroy the enemy's military potential and force surrender. To do this, Azerbaijan needs to cut the communication lines connecting Artsakh with Russia. So, in practice, exclude the territory of Georgia. This goal was achieved by Baku as Tbilisi announced that its territory was closed to both sides of the conflict, de facto hitting only the Armenians. There is still a road through northern Iran, which seems to be on Armenia's side in this conflict. However, what is important, ⅙ and according to unofficial estimates, up to 1/3 of Iran's population are Azeris, who mostly live in its northern part. Thus, we recently could hear about demonstrations by the Azeri minority demanding the closure of the northern border between Iran and Armenia, which would mean a full blockade. In theory, Azerbaijan also seems to be blocked, but the Russian media have accused Baku of planned operations and stockpiling of ammunition several months before the escalation. Given the conflict scenario, such presumptions are not without logic. The more so because a few months before the war, large Turkish-Azerbaijani exercises took place in Azerbaijan. The Turks left, among others, F-16 fighters in Azerbaijan.
In fact, Moscow's expansionist policy has backfired in recent years. It is no secret that Tbilisi with a key decision wants to hit Russia. Unofficial information says that Turkey has obtained Georgia's approval to fly its cargo planes to Azerbaijan. Armenia also accuses Ukraine of supporting Baku as a channel for the supply of spare parts and ammunition. The conflicting interests of Kiev and Moscow also seem clear here. As if that was not enough, despite being looser than with Armenia, Russia has good bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, so to speak out against Baku would mean their immediate break.
What does the ruler of Russia, Vladimir Putin, do in such a situation? …calls for peace. On October 10 and 17, Moscow theoretically succeeded in negotiating a ceasefire. In practice, however, it never entered into force. Putin, meandering diplomatically, stated that at the root of the conflict were the ethnic issues, the crimes against the Armenians, which took place. On the other hand, he supported Azerbaijan's rhetoric saying that a situation in which a country does not control part of its territory cannot last forever.
Proxy or not?
One must be careful also in rashly considering the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as a proxy war between Turkey and Russia. The interests of these countries are inevitably clashing here, but Ankara is taking many more multi-vectored offensive actions. Although Erdogan clearly declares the possibility of military interference in the conflict, Putin continues to describe the Turkish president as a decisive and flexible partner with whom it is nice to cooperate. Ankara and Moscow are already clashing on many fronts: Libya, Syria, plus the Turks have recently been trying to tighten relations with Ukraine. Another edition of this rivalry is not convenient for Putin, all the more so as it is being done on Ankara's initiative and the Turks control this game to a large extent. Erdogan wants Turkey's presence in this area not to be ignored, pushing out Moscow's sphere of influence. One such sign could be the inclusion of Ankara as one of the chairmen of the OSCE Minsk group, the international body for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the moment, those countries are Russia, France and the United States. The presence of Turkey in the format would fulfill one of Baku's postulates and would be a strong concession by Moscow to Ankara.
Failure to describe the US influence on Artsakh is also a sign of the times. Washington used to be involved in almost all contentious issues in the world by acting as a mediator. Theoretically, it is in the Minsk group. In practice, however, the United States is distancing itself from this war. The American administration, preoccupied with elections, internal problems and strategic rivalry with China, has begun to let go of less important foreign policy directions. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict clearly shows this. As a result, a safety vacuum is again starting to form in many places around the world. Ankara is trying to immediately exploit this vacuum with its aggressive regional policy. In turn, the apathy of the European Union seems to require no comment.
Hybrid war
What is the situation on the ground? How did this war even begin? According to Azerbaijan's president Aliyev, Baku responded to Armenia's provocations, but the political reason behind the fighting was the Armenians' decision to move the capital of the Republic of Artsakh from Stepanakert to Shusha, which the Azerbaijanis recognize as a city that is part of their historical heritage. The real cause was a change in the regional balance of power, which was to be shown by the fait accompli method. Aliyev himself admitted this in an interview. According to information coming from the region, Azerbaijani troops had been mobilized a week earlier. Military activities were also preceded by the difficult situation in Armenia in connection with the coronavirus pandemic, as a result of which the country was in a state of actual isolation. Recently, there have also been many resignations in Armenian law enforcement departments, which could suggest internal chaos and favor a potential Azerbaijani offensive.
Many experts believe that the fighting itself has all the hallmarks of a new generation of war, otherwise known as a hybrid war. Baku's initial goal was to cut off control from the air domain. Already at the start, many OSA anti-aircraft batteries were destroyed using combat drones and circulating ammunition. To this end, Azerbaijan used the Israeli Harpia kamikaze drone system. Similarly, drones were efficiently used to destroy Artsakh artillery, which created an asymmetry of losses for both sides. The demonstration of the Turkish F-16 in the battle prevented Yerevan from using the Russian Su-30 fighters in their arsenal. Moreover, Azerbaijan, using the Israeli LORA missile systems, cut communication lines connecting Artsakh with the proper Armenia, thus selectively chose the main areas of operation.
The southern areas near the border with Iran have become these, for many reasons. Among other things, they are sparsely populated areas, so the risk of losses among civilians is lower. Moreover, Baku has a military advantage in the southern plains, as opposed to the strongly fortified position in the mountains. At the same time, Azerbaijan cut Artsakh off from Iran, which is one of the potential allied destinations.
The conflict also highlights mistakes in Armenia's modernization policy in recent years. Yerevan decided to purchase very expensive Russian fighters and S-300 systems. These are the proverbial white elephants that serve more to enhance one's prestige. In the present situation, their loss would be extremely costly and accelerate defeat. To be precise, Armenia has occasionally used the S-300, but using extremely expensive rockets to fight small drones is a short-sighted strategy. Russian experts believe that the funds for the modernization could have been allocated to the Orlan-10 or Forpost-R unmanned vehicles, which were more effective in Artsakh. Similarly, the 2s19 and 2s19m2 self-propelled howitzers would be much better. This is a lesson for all decision makers to allocate funds for modernization into systems tailored to precisely defined tactical scenarios. Yerevan did not do this and is currently paying for its poor decision.
Baku's meticulously thought-out war of destruction resulted in asymmetrical losses for both sides. Being in a terrible situation, Armenia attempted to escalate the conflict by attacking civilian targets in Azerbaijan, probably counting on a symmetrical retaliation by Baku against targets in the Armenia proper, which would lead to the case of Moscow joining the war. However, Baku is pursuing a strategy of "strategic restraint".
Although we have entered the era of drone domination on the battlefield, this does not mean that traditional geostrategic calculation has ceased to count. Still, the overriding goal is to capture and hold enemy territory, maintain strategically important points and your own lines of communication while cutting through those of your opponent. The goal of the war remains the achievement of the political goals set before the conflict. Baku is now much closer to their achievements. However, it seems that the fate of Artsakh or Nagorno-Karabakh this time will play out mainly not only in the Moscow Cabinet, but also of the one in Ankara.
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Richard G. Hovannisian. The Republic of Armenia, Volume I: 1918-1919. — London: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 81-82
