Bakhmut Ties Russians as Ukrainians Prepare For The Next Counteroffensive

Bakhmut continues to stand strong, but the decision to defend the city is being met with less and less understanding, as its defenders are suffering heavy losses. The prospect of the first Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023 looms in the background, with pro-Russian sources reporting that the Ukrainians have amassed 40,000 troops in the Zaporizhia direction.

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Recently, leading analysts following the Russian-Ukrainian war: Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, Franz-Stefan Gady, as well as Rochan Consulting founder Konrad Muzyka, with whom we are making this series, went to Ukraine to look at the situation on the ground. We will present Konrad's observations and conclusions from the trip at the end of the episode.

Kharkiv Direction

Two weeks ago, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that Russian forces had taken Hryanykivka. Since then, however, no visual evidence has been produced to confirm this information. Moving further south, Kremlin forces continued attacks towards Masiutivka and Synkivka, but all were repulsed. One could conclude that the Russian offensive potential in this part of Ukraine had reached its peak were it not for the fact that the aggressors lacked sufficient offensive capabilities from the start.

The Russians have not carried out any ground attacks on Ukraine from Russia proper in the past two weeks.

Luhansk Direction

Although Russian forces continued to launch ground attacks across the entire front, there have been no confirmed frontal changes in the Luhansk region over the past two weeks.

Unofficial sources claimed that the Ukrainian 25th Airborne Brigade and 92nd Mechanised Brigade had defeated the Russians in the Nevske - Chernovsk area and advanced east of the R-66 highway. However, these claims were not supported by any visual evidence. The Russians may have advanced slightly west of Ploshchanka, but the veracity of this claim also has not been confirmed.

In addition to these advances, Russian attacks around Stelmakhivka, Kuzemivka, Makiivka, Nevske, Terny, and Yampolivka had no effect.

Overall, the Russians are underperforming in the Luhansk region. At this stage, we are probably behind the peak of Russian military offensive capabilities. For the Russians to succeed in re-entering the Kharkiv region, significant reinforcements would be needed. However, there are no signs that such reinforcements of Russian positions are taking place. Although, there has been a recent increase in the number of attacks in the direction of Bilohorivka and Kreminna, some Russian forces have withdrawn to replenish reserves.

Russian difficulties in the Luhansk region will hamper Russian progress in the Donetsk region. Without progress through Lyman towards Lysychansk, the Russians will have to rely on only one or two axes of advance towards Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which are heavily fortified along their entire length. Reaching Sloviansk from the Lugansk region is currently unattainable for Russian units.

Donetsk Direction

The Donetsk region remains the only region in Ukraine where the Russians have achieved any confirmed territorial gains. In the past two weeks, they have captured several villages and advanced deeper into Bakhmut. The Donetsk region is Moscow's priority, but objectively speaking, Russian progress in the region has been very incremental. Still, while the Russians have an advantage in artillery fire, this is not evenly distributed across sectors, let alone the entire oblast or country. The Russians are using a lot of ammunition, and it is not at all certain that they will be able to maintain this pace of strikes after the fall of Bakhmut. In the past two weeks, the Russians have captured about 23 square kilometres (or nine square miles).

The Russians made no progress in the northern part of the region. Spirne and Verkhokamyanske were attacked almost daily with the intention of reaching Siversk. However, all assaults were repulsed.

The same applies to areas north of Soledar. Similarly, attempts to advance towards Rozdolivka, Fedorivka, Vesele and Vasyukivka failed. Particularly after the fall of Soledar, there were fears that Russian attacks would spill over into neighbouring settlements and their advances would be more rapid. This did not happen, probably because all available capabilities were directed towards Krasna Hora and Bakhmut. Nevertheless, the northern part of the front is certainly not being prioritised, at least until Bakhmut is taken.

Two weeks ago, the Russians captured Berkhivka and Yahidne and entered the northern part of Bakhmut in Stupki. These moves also brought the Russians into the vicinity of Khrmovoe. A week ago, their line of control was about 800 metres from the main road connecting Bakhmut to Chasiv Yar. Despite this, Ukrainian supplies flowing into the town have continued and are continuing. The biggest problem, however, is the eventual withdrawal. With the Russians operating so close to the road, their teams equipped with anti-tank weapons can quickly hit slow-moving Ukrainian vehicles retreating from the town. Artillery strikes are also a major challenge. With around 4-5 brigades and several territorial defence brigades deployed to defend the city and with a corridor width of around 8km (5 miles), an organised withdrawal (defensive retreat) while engaging the Russians can be very difficult.

Despite this, the political and military leadership seems fully committed to defending the city. On the 3rd of March, the Ukrainians destroyed the bridge in the centre of Bakhmut, marking their withdrawal from the eastern parts of the city. The Bakhmutivka River is now the main line of defence, but only south of Yahidne. In fact, the Ukrainian positions in northern Bakhmut are difficult to defend. There are no cellars in this part of the town, making it difficult for the defending and attacking forces to hide from artillery strikes. The quality of Ukrainian forces in this sector is also questionable. Both of these factors contributed significantly to the Russian capture of northern Bakhmut.

The Ukrainians have opened some additional overland transport lines from Chasiv Yar to Bakhmut, but the quality of the roads is deplorable, especially during transient weather.

There has been no changes in the south-eastern parts of the city. The Ukrainian defensive lines are just south of the T0504 road, as the Russians cannot push the defenders behind the road.

On the 25th of February, Ukrainian media reported that Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Commander of the Eastern Group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, had arrived in Bakhmut. There, he reportedly “checked the situation in units, listened to unit commanders speak regarding problematic matters, assisted in resolving them and supported the soldiers there”. Syrskyi reappeared in Bakhmut on the 11th of March. An official memo said that "the commander constantly holds the operational situation at the frontline under control and takes necessary measures to keep Bakhmut under Ukrainian control”. It added, “it is necessary to buy time to build reserves and launch a counteroffensive, which is not far off.”

In fact, few people understand why the Ukrainians are still defending the town at this stage. The High Command's decision to defend the city for so long is being met with less and less understanding, especially as it is widely understood that its collapse will not bring significant changes on the battlefield. The Ukrainians have also established defensive lines just east of Chasiv Yar, but there are no signs they are being prepared for active use.

Secondly, historically speaking, the fall of a significant city is unlikely to propel the Russians to further conquests. On the contrary, the Russians in the second phase of this war always stood still after capturing a major city. This was clearly evident with the capture of Popasna at the beginning of May and of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk at the end of June. In fact, Popasna is some 23km (14 miles) east of Bakhmut, which just shows how slowly the Russians made progress over a period of several months.

The Bakhmut area is where all Russian progress ends. Last week, no territorial gains were made in other parts of the Donetsk Oblast.

Zaporizhia Direction

The last few weeks have brought no change in the situation in the Zaporizhia region or in southern Ukraine more broadly. Positional fighting has continued but has not had any impact on the front line. Both sides are apparently focused on conducting military operations in other parts of the country, particularly in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, where most of their forces are located. A by-product of these engagements is subdued military activity throughout southern Ukraine.

But, two interesting news appeared last week that spoke of a possible increase in Ukrainian forces in the region. On the 6th of March, Vladimir Rogov, a member of the main council of the Zaporizhia regional administration, stated that Kyiv had assembled a 12,000-strong component for an upcoming offensive, reportedly to take place in late March/early April. The target of this offensive would be Melitopol or Mariupol.

A few days later, on the 9th of March, Yevgeny Balitsky, acting governor of the Russian occupation of the Zaporizhia Oblast, claimed that the UAF had concentrated around 40,000 troops in the northern parts of the oblast.

We expect that Russian and pro-Russian sources will continue to warn of a possible Ukrainian counterattack in the area regularly. So far, however, we see no signs of a Ukrainian build-up in the area.

Kherson Direction

The situation in the Kherson region also remains relatively calm. The types of operations have not changed either: artillery strikes, interception attempts, reconnaissance and infiltration missions.

According to Natalia Humenyuk, spokeswoman for Ukraine's Southern Operational Command, Kyiv forces recently destroyed seven Russian warships that were trying to reach islands in the Dnieper Delta. Neither side controls the islands in the area, although regular reconnaissance attempts are ongoing. On the other hand, on 7 March, the Russian 126th Coastal Defence Brigade (based in Crimea), repelled a Ukrainian attempt to land on the island of Velykyi Potomkin.

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That said, let's move on to Konrad Muzyka's conclusions from the field trip mentioned in the introduction. We will present them in a direct way, point by point, as presented by Konrad.

1. The battle for Bakhmut is increasingly unpopular among Ukrainian soldiers. There is little understanding behind the political-military leadership’s decision to hold the town. Although defensive positions were set up west of the city, no indications were there suggesting that they would be used soon;
2. We assess an internal struggle within the Ukrainian political-military leadership. Zelensky is at odds with General Zaluzhny (Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces), while General Syrsky (Ground Forces Commander) is the president’s protégé. Zaluzhny’s presence in the reported meeting with Syrksy and Zelensky last week was probably to sanction the continued defence of Bakhmut and show unity within the command structures.
3. Ukrainian losses are significant. Over the past month, we assess that the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian losses stood at 1:1 or 1:2. In some areas and days it may have even been greater. The battle greatly attires Ukrainian units, while the impact on Russian military formations is tiny. The battle for Bakhmut is mostly done by Wagner fighters supported by Russian 106th Airborne Division elements. So Ukrainians are attiring Wagner, while Wagner is attiring Ukrainian ground forces.
4. We also need to stress Russian artillery expenditure, which is very high. Thus, one could claim that another point of holding Bakhmut is forcing Russians to use up as many shells as possible, which will hinder its operations throughout spring. As of last week, the ratio in artillery fires stood at 1:5.
5. Russians use aviation over Bakhmut, but only at night. Polish Piorun MANPAD is the only tool available to engage aviation after sunset.
6. There are two Wagner forces. Convicts man one, and they are essentially an expandable force. Their objective is to move forward; unless they are severely wounded, it would be better if they didn’t return. Often they are used as a breaching force. The second Wagner is a well-trained and well-equipped force with a very flexible approach in offence and defence. They are equipped with thermal cameras, night-vision goggles and any equipment necessary for urban warfare;
7. Ukrainians are preparing for a counteroffensive. During the previous visit to Ukraine, we were told three army corps were being established to facilitate the breakthrough.
8. The current war is a war of reservists. The core of both armies is not destroyed (killed), and the quality of their reserve force will be key in how the war develops; At the same time, both commands are increasingly focused on Soviet-era operations, and there seems to be little appreciation of flexibility and decentralised command and control;
9. We are probably behind the peak point of Western military supplies to Ukraine. Although more equipment will undoubtedly come (Leopards, Abrams, Patriot, etc.), the number of pieces of equipment the west can offer to Ukraine is increasingly small;
10. Both Ukrainians and Russians suffer from shell hunger, but Russians generally enjoy the preponderance of force. However, not everywhere. With the focus on Bakhmut, as stated above, the artillery ratio stands at 1:5, but near Vuhledar, it is closer to 1:1. Russians need to prioritise as well;

For the rest of the conclusions, as well as much more detailed data on the current situation on the frontline, see the Ukraine Conflict Monitor report prepared by Rochan Consulting. Links, including the substack newsletter, are in the description.