- Hubert Walas
After a long defense of Severodonetsk, the city finally fell prey to the Russians. A week later, Lysychansk suffered a similar fate. However, after these captures, the Russians stood down. Meanwhile, with the retreat of the Ukrainians to fortified positions and a steady flow of new HIMARS rocket artillery, tanks, and trained recruits, Kyiv believes in and desires a counteroffensive and to liberate the occupied territories. What is the current situation on the front? Let's see.
The Kharkiv Front
There has been little change in the situation near Kharkiv for a month. The Russians are likely still in control of Rubizhne, but they do not appear to have successfully advanced on Staryi Saltiv. Some Ukrainian sources indicate that the Russians may still be interested in trying to encircle Kharkiv. However, no such event is currently anticipated by Rochan. The Russians appear to be satisfied with their current gains. The fundamental purpose of the Russian presence near Kharkiv is to engage and tie down enemy forces so as to prevent their deployment to other areas. The constant threat of a Russian presence in Kharkiv fulfills this objective. More worrisome from Kyiv's perspective are Moscow's plans to establish a military-civilian administration in the Kharkiv area, which could eventually lead to an attempt of annexation.
Donbas
Since our last episode showcasing wartime progress on the map, there have been two significant events: the seizure of Severodonetsk and the subsequent fall of Lysychansk. Following these events, the Russians announced an operational pause to replenish their losses. And this pause… still drags on. Kremlin forces have made almost no progress in the area within the past three weeks. One of the main reasons for this is the effective use of high-precision rocket artillery in the form of HIMARS M142 and M270 launchers by Ukraine which now operates 12 launchers of this type with 4 more "on the way" and this number could eventually double. According to the chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Forces Committee, Adam Smith, the current goal is to increase the number of HIMARS and M270 systems deployed in Ukraine to 25-30 units. These systems have been used with great effect to neutralize Russian C2 command centers, headquarters, and most importantly, against logistics bases and weapons storage facilities. Since the beginning of July, the Ukrainians have destroyed 50 ammunition and weapons depots and warehouses of various types - the vast majority of these attacks were carried out with the new weapons. The Russians are trying to counter the HIMARS by dispersing their ammunition depots, but this negatively affects the logistics of Russian operations.
The Izyum Front
There has been no change in this axis over the past few weeks. On July 20th, the Russians launched an attack in the direction of Krasnopillya and Dolyna. The attack proved fruitless, still, the 2 villages and another, Bohorodychne, still remain targets for the Russians. However, they are likely to be further controlled by Ukrainian formations. In contrast, Ukrainian attacks west of Izyum have stalled.
We estimate that Russia maintains about 33-35 BTGs between Kharkiv and Lyman. Of this number, 20 units may be near Izyum. However, the aggressors are unlikely to move until the wooded areas near Bohorodychne, Krasnopilia, and Dolyna are completely cleared of Ukrainian units. The Russians are having a big problem pushing the Ukrainians out of these areas. The Ukrainians are also conducting guerrilla operations in the surrounding forests.
At this point, all indications are that there is a stalemate on both sides, and that Bohorodychne, Krasnopilia, and Dolyna will be further contested.
The Lysychansk/Severodonetsk Front
On June 24, the Lugansk Region Governor, Serhiy Haidai, announced that defending Ukrainian units had been ordered to withdraw from Severodonetsk and just two days later, the Russian Defense Ministry reported that Russian forces had fully occupied the city. The decision to abandon Severodonetsk was likely prompted by the collapse of Ukrainian defenses south and southeast of Lysychansk. The capture of Toshkivka, Myrna Dolyna, and Pidlisne in one day had a domino effect on the Ukrainian defenses south of these settlements. Ukrainians were forced out of Mykolaivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka, in effect allowing the aggressors to close in on Ukrainian defenders in Zolote and Hirsk. Some of Rochan's sources in Ukraine report that the purpose of the defense of Severodonetsk was to gain time to prepare defenses in the Siversk-Bahmut line.
Equally a week after the fall of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk was seized. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Ukrainians chose not to defend the city and decided to withdraw deliberately. The purpose of defending the areas around the city was probably related to the need to gain time for the main Ukrainian formations to withdraw from Lysychansk in the direction of Siviersk.
Following these events, the Russian command announced an operational pause to replenish losses. The order to resume the offensive was issued 2 weeks later on July 16. However, although more than a week and a half has passed since that date, the intensity of the attacks has not increased though the Russians have launched several ground attacks in the direction of Siversk with the goal of approaching the city from both north and south. To this end, they attacked Hryhorivka and Serebrianka, as well as Spirne and Ivano-Darivka. However, these attacks proved unsuccessful.
Farther south, the Russians still do not control the T1302 road connecting Lysychansk and Bakhmut. There were reports that they have captured Bilohorivka and Berestove, but this has not been confirmed. Meanwhile, Rochan sources in Ukraine say the defenders are reinforcing the Siversk-Bahmut line. So even if the Russians eventually breakthrough, they will be facing a highly fortified area.
Although vehicle traffic in the Luhansk region has increased (as indicated by publicly available videos and photos), it was mostly limited to trucks or other logistical vehicles. We did not observe any increase in armored and combat vehicle traffic. If this picture accurately reflects Russia's preparations to resume attacks, we assess that Moscow is not yet ready to resume its offensive. The Russian strategy in this war, or at least since the start of the so-called “second phase,” is to conduct massive shelling to weaken the enemy's defensive lines. Ground units then conduct reconnaissance of these areas. If the lines are not sufficiently softened, further strikes are ordered, followed by reconnaissance on the ground. This process is then repeated over and over again.
The Russians are only able to push forward if they create a local imbalance of firepower and personnel in their favor. This was the case with Popasna, Lysychansk, and Severodonetsk. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Russians will not move forward until they receive equipment and manpower reinforcements. Added to this is the very significant impact of HIMARS and M270s. It is worth noting that the Ukrainians have not yet attacked Russian bases in Russia proper, probably at the request, or even order, of the United States. Many bases in Russia near the Ukrainian border provide rear support to Russian formations fighting in Ukraine. Taking them on target could dramatically affect the course of events.
The Donetsk Front
There are still no new developments in Donetsk. The Russians have tried to push on Marinka and Avdiivka, but these attacks have been repulsed. Most Russian forces are engaged elsewhere, leaving Moscow with no way to breakthrough Ukrainian defensive lines around the city.
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Overall, despite the Ukrainian setbacks with the fall of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, Rochan still maintains the view that while the short-term forecast favors Russia, in the medium to long term, the Ukrainians have a real chance to halt Russian advances in the wider Donbas area and, in time, regain the areas lost after February 24. However, the time window for this is running out, and Kyiv today has two major problems: a shortage of armored vehicles and an insufficient number of trained men.
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that from the Ukrainian point of view, the situation is moving in the right direction. On June 21, Andriy Yermak, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, said that Kyiv hopes to turn the tide of the war before winter, but "a lot depends on the training of our soldiers." Yermak's statements suggest that the problem of trained personnel could be reduced as Ukraine may soon gain access to a large pool of trained servicemen.
On the other hand, 4 days later, the same Yermak reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are in possession of Polish PT-91 Twardy tanks, which are a modernized version of the T-72. It is not known how many PT-91s Ukraine has received from Poland, but it can be suspected that eventually, Warsaw will transfer its entire PT-91 inventory, or 232 vehicles, to Kyiv. Together with previous deliveries, Poland will thus transfer nearly 500 tanks to Ukraine. Warsaw is supplementing its own stock with American M1A2 Abrams tanks and Korean K2 tanks. Meanwhile, British Challengers are also stationed in Poland.
These are all indications of a coming offensive by the Ukrainians, but if it does not materialize by the end of September, and if the Ukrainians do not delay Russian attacks nor go on the counterattack; the medium and long-term outlook, which today points to Kyiv, will then tilt to favor Moscow.
The Zaporizhzhia Front
In the Zaporizhzhia direction, there have also been no significant, recent changes. According to pro-Ukrainian sources, the Russians have deployed three companies in Vasilyevka to strengthen their defensive positions in the area and have turned the engine room of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant's (NPP) power units into a military storage facility. At least 14 units of heavy military equipment with ammunition, weapons, and explosives are stored at the facility. Meanwhile, according to Vadym Skibitsky, a representative of Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, the Russians are setting up polling stations in Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions in preparation for a referendum on joining Russia.
The Kherson Front
Since our last report, the Ukrainians, who are some 15 kilometers from the center of Kherson, have not advanced significantly. Recent reports indicate that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have surrounded Russian units in Vysokopillya. The Ukrainians are making tactical gains, but so far, these are not translating into operational successes. However, if the Ukrainians are to achieve operational success in this war in the medium term, it will be on this front. There is a growing insurgent and guerrilla movement in the region, which is hampering Russian operations, improving the morale of Ukrainian citizens, and complicating Russian attempts to establish a civil-military administration in the region.
As we predicted, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, using rocket artillery, shelled the Antonovsky Bridge, most likely making it impassable for military movement. According to the public channel, Kherson Telegram, the Russians asked local companies to repair the bridge, but all refused to carry out the necessary work. The use of high-precision weapons and the damage they inflicted on the Antonovsky Bridge will hamper the supply of Russian forces operating in this theater.
The Russians are increasingly concerned about the presence and capabilities of US-supplied HIMAR systems. There is a general belief in Russia that MGM-140 ATACMS missiles with a range of 300 km are already in Ukraine and may have already been used. According to Eduard Basurin, a representative of the DRL People's Militia, the Russians allegedly found missile fragments with a range of 120 km, which could indicate a GMLRS ER missile. Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force for the Joint Air Defense System Lieutenant General Aitech Bizhev confirmed the presence and use of ATACMS missiles by the Ukrainians. While he stated that the Russians must adapt to the current conditions, he downplayed the threat to targets such as the Crimean Bridge. He claimed that Ukrainian positions are too far from the bridge, even though this is not true - the bridge can be reached from southern Zaporizhia. Bizhev also added that Russia's multi-layered air defense network should deal with such threats, primarily through the use of Buks and Pantsirs. The massive destruction of Russian depots by HIMARS, however, indicates otherwise.
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On July 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that a "special operation" in Ukraine was inevitable. While he did not feel "joy," he was "relieved" when it happened. More importantly, Lavrov added that against the backdrop of the delivery of Western-made equipment to Ukraine, the geographic scope of the "special operation" has changed. It now includes not only the puppet republics but also Kherson, Zaporizhia, and other regions. Lavrov added that the goal of denazification and demilitarization is still in effect and will remain in effect as long as Ukraine threatens the security of the Russian Federation.
Lavrov's comments suggest that despite the significant degradation of military capabilities, Moscow's goals in Ukraine remain total. The goals of the second phase of the "special operation," even if achieved, are unlikely to end the war. Russia will seek to cripple Ukraine economically, socially, and militarily. It will seek to annex the territories it currently occupies, especially those south of the Dnieper, in the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. The territories around Kharkiv are disputed. The war will have its "hotter" and "colder" phases and, according to the Rochan Consulting analysts, with whom this series is being conducted, will last for many years.
