- Hubert Walas
British alliance.
The last three months have clearly shown how difficult, and sometimes even impossible, it is for the European Union to reach an internal consensus on matters as fundamental as the war between Europe's two biggest countries. Reality proves once again that the particular interests of states stand above the collective interest of the Union, even when the common security of Europeans is at stake. Countries outside the EU - such as the United States, the United Kingdom, or Canada appear to be more interested in peace on the Old Continent than Europe's two mainland giants - Germany and France. It is a shame for Europe. Of course, we are talking about peace with respect for the victim's interests, that is Ukraine. Paris and Berlin also place peace in the first place, but even if it meant territorial losses for Kyiv. Ukraine should sacrifice whatever is needed, so "business as usual" returns as soon as possible.
"A friend in need is a friend indeed". This old proverb is also true in the geopolitical realm and well outlines the new division that we can observe in Europe since the outbreak of the war. Before, these dependencies were also visible, but it was only the war that raised the curtains and showed the true state of affairs on the Old Continent. In Europe, we can clearly see two blocs in relation to the Russian problem - and today this is the most important issue in Europe, defining best the common group of interests. The first bloc, which cares about preserving the current status quo, is based mainly on Germany and France, although Hungary, Austria, and Italy can also be counted among them.
It is in the interests of these states, or more precisely, in the interests defined by the central governments of these states, to end the war in a ‘neutral status'. Without humiliating Russia, as advocated by French diplomacy and Emmanuel Macron, with possible concessions to Moscow. Indeed, these countries are also helping Ukraine, but only to the minimum extent required by the pressure of their own societies and allied commitments. In other words, they are fiercely opposing Russian aggression in the form of verbal declarations, but in concrete actions, they do little in relation to the capabilities they have. Bundeskanzler Scholz continues to hold up the delivery of Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine, while resorting to philosophical disputations - "Can violence be fought with violence?" This question certainly keeps millions of homeless Ukrainians awake at night, not to mention those already dead in Bucha, Mariupol, or Irpen. So far, the business pragmatism of the Germans or the French is fighting an internal battle with morality and justice, which in this war undoubtedly are only on one side.
The second bloc does not have this dilemma because in their case, the two interests go hand in hand. United Kingdom, Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Finland, Sweden, and of course Ukraine form the core of the second bloc. All of these countries, except the British, share a real fear, based primarily on geography, of the increasingly visible, despicable imperialism of the Russian Federation. The historical experience of the Poles, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians has long dictated a far-reaching skepticism about Moscow's actions, which in Paris and Berlin was perceived as Russophobia and parochialism. This is why, even today, the countries that have broken free from Moscow's yoke form the core of aid to Ukraine. The British and Americans have slightly different reasons. According to the studies prepared a hundred years ago by the British geopolitician Halford Mackinder, a deadly threat to the naval power, which Albion then constituted, was the consolidation of the two land powers of the old continent, primarily Germany and Russia. Among other reasons, this is why the British and Americans fought in World War II. The last 30 years have also been a period of increasing rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow, the flagship example of which was the Nord Stream gas pipelines, the existence of which allowed the Russian Federation to start a war without the risk of losing access to the key German market. Today such a strategy of the British or Americans is called 'offshore balancing’. Therefore, at a time when the Americans have their most important strategic objective in the Asia-Pacific region, which is mitigating the power of China, Britain, with the blessing of Washington, has back on the agenda taking the primacy in the coastal waters of Europe and balancing peace on the Old Continent from beyond the English Channel.
Based on these divisions, the British, who after Brexit are somewhat on the margins of European politics, have developed a project for a new alliance, which they have tentatively named the "European Commonwealth". According to the Italian daily Corriere Della Sera, Prime Minister Boris Johnson, during his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski at the beginning of April, presented the Ukrainian with an outline of a new political, economic and military alliance, which would unite countries that are firmly opposed to Russia, but also distrustful of Berlin or even Brussels. According to Corriere journalists, the British alliance would potentially constitute a bloc alternative to the European Union. How would such an arrangement look in London's eyes? Obviously, as the largest economy, the British positioned themselves as a leader. Moreover, the collective would include many countries from the aforementioned 'anti-imperial' bloc - Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. And in the future perhaps also Turkey.
According to a few informed people, as Corriere journalists put it, Johnson is proposing an alliance of states that care about national sovereignty, that are economically liberal, and are determined to be extremely uncompromising in the face of the military threat from Moscow. Kyiv has so far taken no position on the London proposal but has not closed the door either. Much will depend on how the European Union approaches Ukraine's accession to the EU. On the 23rd of June, Kyiv hopes to officially receive the candidate status and formally begin membership negotiations. However, there is no shortage of opinions that for the time being Ukraine should only be granted the status of a 'European prospect' under the so-called Thessaloniki Formula, while membership itself should be considered in a 10-15 year perspective. This would be a huge blow for the Ukrainians and would make the British proposal more attractive.
As for another potential member, Poland, a rapprochement between Warsaw and London has been evident since the war broke out. Boris Johnson has recently visited Poland, and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has recently been a frequent visitor to Downing Street. The cooperation is primarily focused on the military field. The UK will provide Poland with the technology to build 3 Miecznik frigates, as well as the CAMM short-range air defense system. Together, these two orders will ultimately cost nearly $20 billion. A German manufacturer also took part in the tender for frigates, but apart from the technical issues, distrust towards Germans, which only grew after the war, condemned it to be rejected by Warsaw in advance.
That being said, London's proposal should be gauged with caution. Support for the EU project in Poland and the Baltic states still rates high. These countries, even if they stand lower in the European value chain than e.g. Germany, have benefited from the economic boom in the last 30 years and fundamentally reformed their countries. Suffice it to say that in the early 1990s, Poland and Ukraine started from the same low level in terms of GDP per capita. Today it is an abyss. Also Ukraine, even despite irritating voices from Berlin and Paris, would most willingly replace the United Kingdom as the 28th member of the European Union.
London does not have the economic or manufacturing potential to single-handedly provide an alternative to the European Union in Poland, the Baltic States, or even Ukraine. As an aside, it is cynical on the part of Britain to float in Kyiv a vision of an alternative to the EU that the British have left. While it is the European Union, not the UK, that offers Ukrainian refugees unhindered entry to their countries. In a word, London's offer is an opportunistic use of a convenient inter-regional situation, to strengthen its influence on the Old Continent, with little chance of success. Informal bilateral alliances between London and the capitals of Central and Eastern Europe will take place, but Britain is currently too weak to form a multistate alliance that would compete with the European Union.
The situation on the front remains tough for Ukraine, as we described in our recent material visualizing the war progress on the map. Nevertheless, there are also positive signs. First, on Sunday, the Ukrainians carried out a counteroffensive in the Kherson direction, which allowed them to regain territories near Andriyivka, Bilohrika, and Bila Kryntsia. Secondly, the Americans, as part of a $40billion lend-lease program, gave the green light to supply Ukraine with American-made rocket artillery systems. These are highly effective and precise weapons that can strike enemy forces at a distance of 30 to 500 kilometers. Recent vague communications from the White House seem to suggest that Kyiv will receive shorter-range missiles capable of accurately destroying Russian targets in occupied territories, but incapable of attacking facilities deep inside Russia. However, we still do not know the number of systems that Washington will provide to Ukraine, and this is a key variable for estimating the impact of rocket artillery systems delivered by Americans on the situation on the war front. We will look at the operational situation in more detail in the next material in our 'mapped’ series.
