- Hubert Walas
Kaliningrad threatened by Lithuanian blockade?
Kaliningrad - a tiny sliver of land squeezed between Poland and Lithuania, one that Stalin obtained by a bargain at the 1945 Potsdam Conference - has for decades projected itself across the entire spectrum of European affairs. In particular, it has caused sleepless nights for NATO strategists who plan how to limit the impact of Kaliningrad and defend the Baltic States from being cut off from the rest of the alliance via the narrow Suwałki Gap. As a result of recent EU sanctions, Lithuania has stopped the transit of some goods into the exclave from Russia proper which has caused hysteria in the Kremlin. In retaliation, Moscow threatened that the people of Lithuania “will feel the pain.” Meanwhile, Russian warmongers are demanding an extraterritorial corridor to Kaliningrad. So what is really at stake here?
The Policy of Threats
On March 15th, as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union introduced the fourth package of sanctions against Russia. Three months later, on June the 18th, Lithuania implemented these previously agreed-upon sanctions. The provisions of which deemed it necessary to halt rail transport of goods covered by EU sanctions to the Kaliningrad exclave. The sanctions cover the entire territory of the Russian Federation, so the Kaliningrad Oblast is no exception. As a result, the Russian exclave is severely threatened by the lack of supplies on which it depends. According to the governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast, Anton Alikhanov, the decision has halted about 50% of all transported goods, including building materials, cement, metals, and a whole range of finished products. Kaliningrad is fundamentally dependent on imports from Russia proper. Every month, about 100 trains go to Kaliningrad via Lithuanian territory. Thus, the only fully operational route to Kaliningrad is now the sea route through international waters from St. Petersburg ports. In a nutshell, this is the Kaliningrad impasse that we have been witnessing now for over two weeks.
Vilnius' move caused panic in Kaliningrad. [video] Similar, hysterical reactions could be visible among top Russian officials. Secretary of Russia's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev - who is according to some the No. 2 person in Russia and a potential successor to Putin - threatened that the people of Lithuania would "feel the pain" if Vilnius decided to put sanctions into effect. Dmitry Peskov - a Kremlin spokesman - called the Lithuanian move "a violation of absolutely everything." The Russian Foreign Ministry also threatened to retaliate with what Moscow calls "the right to defend national interests." Not surprisingly, we could hear the most extreme Russian opinions from media warmongers on state television. In this regard, Andrei Gurulyov, a State Duma deputy and former deputy commander of Russia's southern military district, has recently led the way. [video] In practice, he has demanded an extraterritorial corridor connecting Kaliningrad with St.Petersburg. This region of Europe remembers similar demands from history. Before World War II, Nazi Germany demanded an extraterritorial corridor through Polish territory to the Free City of Danzig. Aleksandr Lukashenko also joined the chorus of Russian outrage, stating that Lithuania had effectively declared war on Russia. Let’s also remember that two weeks before Lithuania introduced the restrictions, Evgeny Fedorov, a member of the United Russia party, submitted a proposal to the Russian Duma to revoke Moscow's recognition of Lithuanian independence. After more than a week of threats, the Russians moved to action when, on June 28, the Russian hacker group KillNet launched a DDoS, or distributed denial of service, attack of significant magnitude on Lithuanian public and private websites. The hackers threatened that the attacks would continue until Lithuania lifted the blockade.
Stalin's Revenge
Vytautas Landsbergis, the first Speaker of Parliament after Lithuania regained independence, calls Kaliningrad "Stalin's last annexation." Indeed, the enclave's status was sealed at the 1945 Potsdam Conference, when the Soviets, British, and Americans drew the new borders of the post-war map of Europe. It was at that time that Stalin laid claim to the easternmost German city of Königsberg. Churchill and Truman acceded to Soviet ruler’s demands which gave rise to Kaliningrad, named after the distinguished Bolshevik Mikhail Kalinin. At the beginning of its existence, Kaliningrad did not present much significant strategic importance, since Moscow controlled territories much further west. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially after Vladimir Putin took power and returned to a revisionist path, Kaliningrad's importance has increased diametrically. Describing the oblast squeezed between Poland and Lithuania as "Stalin's revenge" accurately captures the essence of the problem it poses.
Today, Kaliningrad is located some 500km from the borders of Russia proper and is a highly militarized territory. The Russians have deployed there, among others, nuclear-capable Iskander Missile Systems. The oblast is also a base for the Russian Baltic Fleet. However, the existence of the Kaliningrad exclave, first and foremost, dramatically complicates the strategic situation and creates a 100km-wide geographical bottleneck known as the Suwałki Gap. Kaliningrad effectively cuts off the three easternmost states of the North Atlantic Alliance - Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia - from the rest of the collective. As a result, they are the most vulnerable to hostile actions of the Russian Federation and exposed to a kinetic attack.
That's why U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price, after Russian threats, reaffirmed American commitments by saying that the U.S. strongly supports Lithuania and added that Washington's pledge to comply with NATO's Article 5, which treats an attack on one member state as an attack on all, is "ironclad." However, it should be clear that Lithuania did not decide to halt the flow of goods autonomously, but only implemented EU sanctions imposed on Russia back in March. The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry issued a statement stressing that "the transit of people and unsanctioned goods through Lithuanian territory remains unrestricted." Both Lithuania and the EU strongly emphasize that there is no question of a blockade but only the application of sanctions. [video] How does Brussels view this matter? It defends Lithuania, supporting Vilnius’s position, which only enforces EU provisions.
Nevertheless, the Times reports that many Western European capitals are pressing the European Commission to quell this dispute - possibly due to Kremlin blackmail - by easing restrictions. Landbergis mentioned earlier says this would be "pathetic." Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda emphasized that his country "must" and "will" enforce EU sanctions on Russian goods. Still, the latest reports indicate that the Lithuanians might be forced to comply with Brussel's new directives.
Sign of weakness
Moscow - albeit while conducting criminal actions in Ukraine, the latest manifestation of which was a missile attack on a shopping center - paradoxically laments that Vilnius is violating international law. "It is ironic to hear rhetoric about alleged violations of international treaties from a country that has violated probably every international treaty," Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrid Simonyte told Reuters. However, the Kremlin's frantic reaction, in addition to the apparent flow problems this situation creates, is motivated by other reasons. Moscow is constantly looking for ways to break NATO and, especially, EU unity on sanctions. The Kremlin already knows from experience that the game is worth the trouble. The first sign of weakness was the EU’s agreement to pay Russian gas bills in rubles. After announcing that Russia would only accept payment for delivered gas in rubles, the European Commission first said such action was illegal under EU regulations. However, it later changed its mind. Now, according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, already 95% of buyers of Russian gas pay in rubles through special settlement accounts at Gazprombank. By the way, a recent journalistic investigation revealed that Russian soldiers receive their payments for criminal actions from the same Gazprombank. And so, we’ve come full circle.
That's not all. The Kaliningrad standoff is embedded in yet another game, this time on the NATO level. Currently, on NATO's eastern flank, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have one multinational battalion, or 1,000 troops, stationed there in addition to their own modest forces.
Meanwhile, given the criminal nature of Russian power and these countries’ geostrategic position, the easiest step to break the North Atlantic Alliance would, in practice, be an attack on the three Baltic states. Of course, in assuming such a scenario, Moscow would calculate that Article 5 would not materialize because, for example, its main guarantor, the United States, would be preoccupied with other matters, such as rising tensions in the South China Sea. But even if the Kremlin miscalculated, Article 5 would be activated, and Western forces would join the war, this would not protect the Baltic States from destruction as the images in the Russian-Ukrainian War have shown. "My homeland would have been wiped off the map, and Tallinn's beautiful old town would have been razed to the ground," said Estonia's incumbent Prime Minister Kaja Kallas in an interview with the Financial Times. She was referring to the three countries' existing defense plans in the event of Russian aggression. Given the minimal forces stationed on the ground, incomparable, for example, to Ukraine's military potential, the Russians would undoubtedly pour quickly into the territory of the Baltic States. Margarita Šešelgytė, director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University, says that the Baltic States would be conquered within a week. According to NATO's current stance, this would constitute the first phase of the war. Only in phase two, 180 days after the start of the war, after NATO forces have mobilized, reached operational capability, and arrived on the ground, would the arduous liberation of the occupied territories begin. Kallas sadly admits that in such a situation, looking at the pictures from Bucha, Irpien, or Borodyanka, it would mean the destruction of the 3 countries, their culture, and the death of thousands of people.
That's why the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians would like to see the NATO forward presence in their countries dramatically strengthened. They would like to see the number of NATO troops bolstered from 1,000 to 20-25,000. British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace echoed Kaja Kallas, "we will not have 60 days to get our tanks to Estonia. Because after 60 days, there will be no Estonia given what the Russians have done in Ukraine." Germany, which is the leader of the NATO battlegroup in Lithuania, responded to the Balts' appeal and announced the posting of an additional 3,500 troops. While this is a move in the right direction, the rumor is that these German soldiers would continue to be stationed on German soil and only transported there in case of escalation. Of course, this does not satisfy the Lithuanians who would like NATO troops to be able to respond instantly to Russian aggression, and this is only possible with a permanent, on-site presence.
Nonetheless, Germany's proposal has found support in Western Europe, which sees it as the optimal solution in terms of costs and, notably, one that does not provoke Moscow. This last bit is critical. Russian pressure on the Union, Lithuania, and other EU countries during the Kaliningrad stand-off is aimed at discouraging NATO countries from more strongly supporting the Baltic States, particularly by establishing permanent bases there at the division level.
Russia is carefully exploiting every eventuality to sow division in Western countries. The Kaliningrad impasse is an ideal opportunity to deflect attention from the assault on Ukraine and present itself as a victim while also creating a breach in sanctions. In addition, the Kremlin is trying to dissuade the North Atlantic Alliance states from increasing their presence in the Baltic States by using the rhetoric of escalation growth while threatening war left and right. How will the West respond to this? The situation is fluid. NATO's presence in the Baltic States will undoubtedly increase, most likely to the level of a brigade with a non-permanent presence of soldiers, but with permanent, forward-deployed equipment. However, the best news for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would be the completion of the accession process of Sweden and Finland, as indicated by the latest information coming from the NATO summit in Madrid. This reverses the geostrategic situation in the region and makes “the Baltic three” no longer the alliance's lone island, which in turn spoils the plans of Moscow's strategists as they now must add to the equation a 1,300km border with Finland, two capable armies, and the fact that the Baltic Sea is becoming an internal NATO lake.
