- Hubert Walas
Visegrad split.
The Visegrad Group recently celebrated its 30th birthday. The last 3 decades for Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary have been a time of increasing wealth and continuous growth. However, what is the Visegrad format input in this? With the international balance of power shaking, can the V4 play a significant role in Europe?
The path to prosperity
The name Vysehrad comes from a small town in Hungary, wherein 1335 the leaders of Bohemia (the historical region of Czechia), Poland and Hungary agreed to create a new trade route bypassing Vienna and guaranteeing easier access into Europe. Over 650 years later, eager to find their place in the post-communist reality, the leaders of Central European countries wanted to find the foundations of their countries for better integration with the rest of Europe.
The escape in the 1990s from the yoke of communism of the backward economies of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, did not automatically mean the willingness of developed countries to cooperate with them. Thus, the challenge itself was to convince the rest of Europe to cooperate more closely with the countries of Central Europe. However, in order for this to happen, an internal dialogue must first be built, because, in communist times, talks were held only with the participation of Moscow. This is how the Visegrad Group was created, the first post-communist multilateral format in Central Europe. The group was established on February 15, 1991, between Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In 1993, after the collapse of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the format as separate entities.
Establishing this informal group was guided by the goal of fostering mutual cooperation, improving regional security, and making up the distance between these countries to the much more prosperous - Western Europe. This was the overarching goal for all members of the V4 and these goals have largely been achieved. In 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined NATO, while five years later Slovakia followed. In 2004, all the "Visegrad countries" joined the European Union. It was undoubtedly a successful time for all four economies. Over the last 30 years, Poland's average growth has been second only to that of China in the world. The GDP per capita of each V4 country has grown at least 6 times, and GDP per capita measured by the purchasing power parity of Visegrad 4 is approaching the southern European countries. The Czechs have already overtaken the Spaniards in this respect, and will soon overtake the Italians.
However, is this success story the result of cooperation within the Visegrad Group? 30 years have passed since the format was founded, and it seems that now there are more divisions within Visegrad than unity. Why is this happening? The short answer is - because of each country’s different interests. But to analyze the format deeper, it is necessary to look at the group through the prism of four main players - Germany, Russia, the United States, and the European Union. Both from an economic and geostrategic perspective.
A conflict of interest
The V4 countries are geographically neighbors and come from a similar cultural group. As a result, some analysts look at these countries collectively, assigning them the same goals and challenges. However, the countries of the Visegrad Group differ radically from each other in many respects. Starting from potential, through economic issues, to strategic challenges resulting from geography.
Poland, located in the Central European lowland, is larger than the other three taken together, both in terms of population and GDP. Moreover, it is the only one that borders Russia. The revisionist policy of the Russian Federation causes anxiety in Warsaw, which overlaps with the centuries-old history of wars and conflicts. All this means that for Warsaw, the policy towards the Russian Federation is often an overriding issue and determines the foreign policy. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, even though they were also on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, have completely different optics. It is true that Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks, just like Poles, are critical of the times of communism brought from the east. However, they are not afraid of Moscow at present, and this is not the main prism through which they view regional affairs. Geographically, they are separated from Russia by hundreds of kilometers of a buffer zone and high mountains - the Carpathians and the Sudetes. This makes their view of the Russian Federation quite different. They are not antagonistic towards Russia, and even use the Russian card to balance the influence of other regional players - which is mainly practiced by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.
The Hungarian prime minister actively opposed EU sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. What is more, this was followed by the contract for the expansion of the nuclear power plant in Paks, which the Hungarians signed with Russia's Rosatom without a tender, financing the project mainly with a Russian loan of $ 10bn. However, the causes of good Hungarian-Russian relations should be sought deeper. The policy of Orban's government has its source in the Treaty of Trianon of 1920 - the day of mourning for the entire Hungarian nation. It was then that the Hungarians, once part of the powerful Austro-Hungarian kingdom, were forced to give up ⅔ of their territory. This story is remembered in Budapest to this day, and Orban's balancing between the EU, Russia, and even China serves the hope that one day the effects of Trianon will be reversed. It would be highly incorrect to talk about it in the European Union, but supporting the revisionist policy of the Russian Federation is an indirect action in this direction. This results in a lack of trust in Hungary, including on the part of Romania, Ukraine, or the partner in the Visegrad Group - Slovakia, where there is also a large Hungarian minority. All this means that in this aspect the interests of Warsaw and Budapest are diametrically opposed, despite the natural friendship between the two nations.
The attitude of Czechs and Slovaks towards Russia lies somewhere between the attitudes of Poles and Hungarians. Prague and Bratislava often criticize Moscow's policy, human rights violations and the aggressive attitude of Russians in the east. However, criticism usually ends with diplomacy and does not affect the business sphere, where both sides want to deepen trade. It was no different during the recent diplomatic crisis between the Czech Republic and Russia. The Czech Republic has for some time been a popular destination for the Russians. That had a positive impact on the revenues to the Czech budget. However, according to Jiři Pehe, an advisor to Václav Havel and a Czech analyst, such loose policy has led to the Czech Republic becoming a hub for Russian espionage in Europe. A recent investigation revealed that the Russian GRU intelligence was responsible for the explosion at the Vrbietice weapons depot. The accusations of the Czech counterintelligence were softened by the pro-Russian president Milos Zeman, who suggested that an unintentional accident is still possible. Some Czech experts indicate that the Russian disinformation offensive contributed to the election of Zeman as president. Some time ago Zeman was threatened with impeachment on the charge of working for another power, but the charges were eventually dropped.
As a result of the scandal, Prague expelled 70 Russian diplomats and embassy employees, of whom there were as many as 160 before the scandal. Moreover, Prague excluded the Russian company Rosatom from the expansion of the Dukovany nuclear power plant, but stronger steps are unlikely. Although the prime ministers of the Visegrad Group issued a laconic statement on solidarity with the Czech Republic, more decisive steps, especially from the Hungarians, are again - unlikely.
The more so as the Czechs themselves do not oppose the flagship project that divides the EU unity, i.e. Nord Stream 2. Prague benefits from the transmission architecture created as a result of the first line of Nord Stream. The Slovaks, after the initial criticism, also softened their position as part of the redistribution that will take place through Slovak territory. Hungary, on the other hand, will benefit from another Russian gas pipeline that goes deep into Europe, namely the Turkstream. Thus, Poland remains the only country of the Visegrad Group that directly opposes Nord Stream 2.
The shadow that falls on the Visegrad Group countries, however, comes not only from the east but also from the west. Over the last 3 decades, the member states of the Visegrad Group have enjoyed strong economic growth. Although all four countries usually are among the top 10 of each trading partner, the vital point is that the Federal Republic of Germany is by far the most important trading partner for each Visegrad country. The size of the trade exchange of each V4 country with Germany is several times bigger in each case. The V4 countries are usually subcontractors of the German automotive sector, and this trend is likely to continue to grow as the German giants consider shortening their supply chains and relocating production from China to Europe. Central European countries are natural alternatives for Berlin.
This provides Berlin with huge economic leverage on each V4 capital. Even if the Visegrad Group states were planned to create a coherent bloc of states whose potential would be similar to that of France and would negotiate with Berlin and Paris on equal terms, Germany would easily break the cohesion of such an entity. Clearly, economic relations with Germany are of much higher importance for each country of the Visegrad Group than relations within the V4.
Troublesome
Nonetheless, there are topics on which the countries of the Visegrad Group have a similar view. Since 2004, the activities of the Visegrad countries take place within the European Union. Most of the time, the countries of Central Europe were unable to jointly develop and implement a specific initiative or project that would affect the direction of the Union. This partially changed in 2015, when the V4 countries rejected the EU's refugee relocation system. Hungarians were more affected by the migration wave from the south than other V4 countries, which is why this topic influences the direction of Budapest's agenda much more than other V4 countries. Yet Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia shared similar concerns and backed Hungary. Since then, in the perception of Western countries, the V4 countries tend to be seen as "troublesome".
The troublesome nature of the V4 was also strengthened by the close cooperation of the current Polish and Hungarian governments within the European Union, where the difference in stance towards Russia did not prevent the formation of an unofficial alliance. Warsaw and Budapest support each other in EU votes, each other vetoing bills that could harm them. The West accuses PiS and Fidesz, the parties that currently rule Poland and Hungary, of undemocratic activities. Some attribute this feature to the entire Visegrad format, which irritates the Czechs and Slovaks.
What’s more, the perspective on the American presence in Europe is also changing inside the V4. Only Poland continues to base its security firmly on the Americans. The rest of the V4 is gradually losing interest in Washington due to the lack of a specific US policy for the region. Although members of the Visegrad Group still declare themselves as unwavering members of NATO, the perception of the goals and threats of the alliance varies. The Hungarians' perspective is based mainly on the migration policy and a favorable attitude towards Moscow. The Czechs and Slovaks would like to play a mediating role between Russia and the West. Poland, on the other hand, sees Russia as the main threat.
The recent repeal of the sanctions on Nord Stream 2 by Washington was a blow to the unwavering confidence of Polish politicians in American guarantees. Therefore, from the geostrategic perspective, the Polish government seems to start to understand the need to strengthen its own strategic independence, which has long been suggested by bottom-up analytical centers from Warsaw.
Due to the breaking international order, future multilateral formats or alliances will only survive in one case - having a common interest. Due to a series of destabilizing actions by the Russian Federation in the east, Poland's natural allies in the region in the coming years will most likely be Ukraine, Romania, Sweden, and Turkey. Czechs and Slovaks, who share a close historical and cultural bond, naturally focus on deepening cooperation with each other. But also with the governments of Bavaria, Saxony, and Austria, which are economically vital to them. While Viktor Orban's Hungary will assertively try to balance in search of opportunities to strengthen Hungary's position in the international arena.
With this lack of unity, the Visegrad Group loses its importance more and more. The basic goal of the group, to make all members join multilateral formats - NATO and the EU has been fulfilled almost 20 years ago. Since then, the V4 has been a forum for dialogue, with no real power to influence Europe.
