- Tomasz Rydelek
Bypass Suez.
The Russo-Ukrainian War continues with the West and the Kremlin increasing pressure on each other. Moscow has a new fear of total isolation and its traditional one: being cut off from access to warm seas.
While the Arctic route could provide an alternative, there is still a long way to go in increasing its capacity. Meanwhile, with the failure of the 'special military operation' in Ukraine and the transition to devastating positional fighting, Moscow is preparing for the next stage of the war.
However, this time it’s reaching out not only for China’s helping hand. but also Iran’s by reactivating the concept of the so-called Persian Corridor. Thanks to which Russia, after almost 200 years of the Great Game, will have the chance to bypass the Suez Canal thus gaining direct access to the Indian Ocean.
The Great Game, or the Duel between the British Lion and the Russian Bear
A Russian-Chinese-Iranian coalition to challenge the collective West was not so long ago envisaged by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his geopolitical work, “The Grand Chessboard.”
“Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an "anti-hegemonic" coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower.”
Zbigniew Brzeziński, The Grand Chessboard (1997)
Nevertheless, the very idea of creating a transport corridor that would give Russia access to the Indian Ocean dates back to the first half of the 19th century and is inseparably linked to the so-called Great Game, the Russo-British rivalry for influence in Central Asia. The beginning date of the Great Game is considered to be 12 January 1830, when the British Governor of India, William Bentinck, was instructed to establish a trade route with the Khanate of Bukhara on the other side of the Hindu Kush. Behind this seemingly simple trade mission was a wider plan. The British were interested in blocking Russian access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and, at best, preventing Persia and Afghanistan, with every khanate and emirate along the way, from becoming Russian protectorates. That is because London was convinced that the Russians were planning to cross the Hindu Kush and snatch from the British crown its most precious jewel: India.
London's fears were by no means irrational. One cannot forget the numerous Russian territorial gains in Central Asia preceding 1830. These included not only Russian expansion into the Kazakh steppes, but more importantly, the two wars with Kajar Persia in the first half of the 19th century which resulted in the incorporation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Dagestan into the Russian Empire. The Kajars thus lost their hold over the South Caucasus, which had hitherto been the traditional zone of Persian influence. And so the balance of power in the Caucasus had clearly tilted in favour of Russia.
The British feared that Persia would serve as a corridor for the Russians to first reach the Persian Gulf and then the Indian Ocean. Ultimately, none of this happened, but the idea of an overland corridor linking Russia to the Indian Ocean not only stood the test of time, but even lived to see its realisation during the Second World War. However, the circumstances were quite different from those during the Great Game as Moscow and London were, for a time, on the same team.
Lend-Lease and the Persian Corridor
During the conflagration of World War II, Iran found itself in a very difficult geopolitical situation. Reza Shah Pahlavi who ruled the country, tried to remain neutral to balance between the Axis and Allied camps. However, after the May 1941 anti-British uprising in Iraq and the Third Reich's attack on the USSR in June of that year, Iran's neutrality was no longer an option.
In August 1941, just two months after the Third Reich’s invasion of the USSR, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran. Reza Shah Pahlavi was removed from power and exiled to British possessions in South Africa. He was succeeded by his son, the 22-year-old Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. However, his position was only symbolic.
The Allies divided the country into two occupation zones. The south of Iran came under British military control and the north under Soviet. Iran became a central logistics hub supporting the Allied war effort.
The Persian Corridor lived to see some rather unusual use. The American war aid through the Lend-Lease programme was unloaded at Iranian ports and then sent north by rail or truck to the Soviet Union.
A vital role in the Persian Corridor was played by the Trans-Iranian Railway which was built over a period of 11 years with the last section completed in 1938. The route is just over 1,400 km long, roughly the distance from Warsaw via Berlin to Paris. The Trans-Iranian Railway starts on the Persian Gulf at the Port of Shahpura (today the Port of Imam Khomeini) and runs all the way to the Caspian Sea to the Port of Shah (today Torkaman).
Although the Persian Corridor contributed less to the transport of goods than the route from the Soviet Far East, it still played a substantial role. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada were able to deliver a total of more than 5.2 million tonnes of a wide variety of goods to the Soviet Union (railway tracks, steam and diesel locomotives; also trucks, vans, and other motor vehicles; and finally nearly 50,000 aircraft). All this happened through the ports and sections of the Persian Corridor. Starting in January 1943, and in just 27 months, a total of 168,000 motor vehicles, the vast majority being Soviet trucks, were assembled at Khorramshahr just outside Abadan, which was then home to the world's largest oil refining plant. In total, it is estimated that as much as 30% of the US-provided aid to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease went through the Persian Corridor.
Stalin: Sustainer of Tsarist policy
As soon as the Second World War was over, old plans, ambitions, and strategic fears returned. Moscow intended to continue its expansion towards the Indian Ocean. According to Allied agreements, its troops were to leave Iran by March 2, 1946. Britain and the US honoured their side of this commitment. However, the Soviet Union barely even thought about it.
Not only Stalin did not withdraw his forces from northern Iran, but even sent reinforcements. In November 1945, Moscow established the puppet Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan in the north of Iran, followed a few months later by the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.
The Soviets, taking advantage of post-war turmoil, wanted not only to detach the northern Kurdish and Azeri territories from Iran, but most likely, to completely subjugate the government in Tehran and seize control of the entire Persian Corridor.
Only a lack of sufficient resources on the part of Moscow, which was now focused on the civil war in China, and the support the US gave the Iranians meant that the Soviet Union had to abandon its Iranian ambitions at the end of 1946.
The Shah and the Ayatollahs
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is widely regarded as a close US ally who unequivocally sided with the West during the Cold War. However, this is only one side of the story. The Shah was indeed closely allied with Washington, but tried - like his father - to pursue an independent foreign policy. For example, in 1959 he wanted to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the USSR, which he only abandoned after President Eisenhower's objections.
In 1963, the Shah began to carry out extensive economic and social reforms to modernise Iran. This also brought a thaw in Iranian-Soviet relations with Tehran and Moscow signing several agreements under which the USSR became involved in the expansion of Iran's industry and transport infrastructure. One of the most important projects completed with Soviet assistance was the Trans-Iranian gas pipeline, which stretched for more than 1,100 km from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Next to the Trans-Iranian Railway, the gas pipeline is the most important part of the Persian Corridor project.
Further Iranian-Soviet cooperation was interrupted by the Islamic Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Moscow initially hoped that anti-imperialist motives would prevail and it would succeed in forging close ties with the new revolutionary Iran. However, the ideological differences between Moscow's communists and Tehran's clerics, as well as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, ultimately annihilated Moscow's plans.
The Persian Corridor concept fell by the wayside, only to be revived more than 20 years later.
Persian Corridor 2.0
In the early 2000s, Russia was still recovering from the crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the so-called “'Yeltsin smuta,” or “Time of Troubles” associated with the chaotic and divisive presidency of Boris Yeltsin. However the new president, Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent previously unknown to the wider public, was set on making Russia a resurgent superpower.
Also at this time, the idea of reactivating the Persian Corridor emerged. In 2002, Russia, Iran, and India signed the Agreement for the Construction of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which provides for constructing a multi-modal trade route linking Russia with India and the Indian Ocean.
The route would start at the Indian port of Mumbai, from where the goods would go to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf and then be transported north by rail to Russia via Azerbaijan or the Caspian Sea. In this way, Russia, trading with India, could bypass Europe and the Suez Canal.
When first presented, the concept of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) was a very ambitious project that could certainly change the face of global trade. However, progress on the INSTC was relatively slow over the following two decades. This should come as no surprise: the entire route is approximately 7200 km long.
Work on the project has only accelerated in recent years with the impetus being the increasing isolation of Iran and Russia on the international stage. In 2018, US President Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement with Iran. Although Europe was still interested in trading with Iran, US pressure effectively excluded Iran from Western markets.
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and its inability to quickly subjugate Kyiv led to a strong reaction from Western countries which began to impose sanctions and gradually isolate Russia from global markets. In this situation, Moscow hastily sought alternative trade routes, suppliers, and intermediaries.
And this is where Iran came in not only supplying Russia with munitions and drones in 2022, but also intending to set up drone production lines in Russia. It was also Iran that pointed out to Russia the need to step up work on the Persian Corridor and get this key route up and running as soon as possible.
Iran-Russia Alliance
Today, Russia needs Iran like never before. Western sanctions and related economic problems, have forced Moscow to seek a creative partner for arms supplies, hydrocarbon swaps, and - most likely - black market goods and money laundering.
The Iranians, themselves beset by sanctions, have for several decades shown a very creative approach in circumventing them, strengthening economic self-sufficiency, and even sometimes cloning or reverse engineering Western products. At the same time, the Iranians are also keenly interested in creating an OPEC-like gas cartel which, from Moscow's perspective, is also a tempting proposition.
We are now witnessing a rapid acceleration in the formation of not only a Russian-Iranian alliance, but also, in practice, the Persian Corridor 2.0. As soon as it became clear in the spring of 2022 that the West had no intention of leaving Ukraine in its hour of need, Russia stepped up to Iran and put all its cards on the table. Let's examine some of the major recent events.
- June 2022: the first test rail shipment from Russia traveled via Iran to the port of Bandar-e Abbas, and from there via the Strait of Hormuz to its destination in India.
- September 9, 2022: Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan signed the so-called 'Baku Declaration', which sealed the decision to build the Rasht-Astara railway line, or the missing rail link between Russia and Iran. This approximately 150-kilometre-long link is expected to be operational in late 2023.
- December 2022/January 2023: The Russians and Iranians held a series of talks on expanding the Volga-Don Canal which connects not only the Volga and Don, but also the Sea of Azov with the Caspian Sea. The canal is currently capable of handling ships displacing 5,000 tonnes, but in some sections, only 3,000. Increasing the capacity is one of INSTC's priorities and Russia itself wants to invest more than $1bn in this.
- January 19, 2023: Iran and the Eurasian Union have signed a free trade memorandum that will enter into practice this September.
The Persian Corridor as a Regional Project
The primary beneficiaries of the Persian Corridor are three countries: Russia, Iran, and India. The corridor allows them to bypass the Suez Canal and Europe. It is estimated that transporting goods from India to Russia using the Persian Corridor can be about 30% cheaper and 40% faster than using the competing route through the Suez Canal.
The Persian Corridor represents an incredible opportunity for Iran. This is because it will finally be able to develop the logistics and transport infrastructure for hydrocarbons on the Makran Coast, located to the east of the Strait of Hormuz. This will allow Iran to be more firmly connected to the Indian Ocean and to be served by the future port of Chabahar.
However, many countries in the region, such as the Central Asian republics, also saw an opportunity for themselves in accelerating Russian-Iranian cooperation. Indeed, the project is to be synchronised with the so-called Ashgabat Agreement, which includes Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan among others.
The United Arab Emirates is also interested in investment and sees the greatest potential in expanding shipping in the Caspian Sea. In 2022, The UAE signed a series of agreements with Kazakhstan providing for the expansion of ports there.
Persian Corridor or Indian Corridor?
Although Russia and Iran are most often mentioned in the context of the Persian Corridor, India remains a key partner and the Delhi government considers it as one of its priorities.
Indeed, India sees the North-South Corridor as its answer to China's Belt and Road initiative, popularly known as the New Silk Road. In this way, the project is part of the rivalry between India and China. India's struggle with Pakistan is also crucial in this geopolitical context.
Since 2003, India has been investing in expanding Iran's Chabahar port. In the next 2 years, India and Iran want to build a railway link of more than 600 km between Chabahar and Zahedan, thus connecting Chabahar to the Iranian railway network. In addition, according to recent agreements, the port of Chabahar is to be included in the Persian Corridor project.
India wants the port of Chabahar to become India's gateway to markets in Central Asia. At the same time, it is to be in direct competition with Pakistan's Gwadar Port 150 km to the east, and with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
The importance of the port of Chabahar to India is best demonstrated by the fact that India managed to obtain an exemption for this investment from the US sanctions that Iran is under.
As an aside, it is worth mentioning that India's involvement in the project is very troublesome for Americans. Iran and Russia are countries openly hostile to America. However, India is a close US ally that the Americans count on for help in a possible conflict with China.
The New Great Game
The first phase of the war in Ukraine brought Russia a spectacular defeat. The invasion, aimed at quickly subjugating the authorities in Kyiv, turned into a drawn-out and devastating war. Despite Western sanctions and the extensive financial and military assistance the West has provided to Ukraine, Moscow remains convinced that it can be victorious in this war.
Victory is to be achieved not only by military mobilisation or by switching the economy to a war footing, but also by reactivating the idea of the Persian Corridor. Russia is preparing for a war that will not last weeks or months, but years. For even if the war in Ukraine were to turn into a frozen conflict, Russia could still not count on the rapid lifting of Western sanctions.
From this perspective, the New Persian Corridor appears as a factor that could fundamentally affect the Russo-Ukrainian war and, more broadly, Russia's conflict with the West. The sheer pace of implementation and the growing number of actors in the New Persian Corridor speak for themselves.
