- Hubert Walas
War in the Pacific.
The Americans accidentally knock down a Chinese fighter. The Chinese ram an American frigate. - the current tense situation in the Western Pacific means that even a small incident can escalate rapidly and turn into a hot war on a global scale. What could we expect if this worst-case scenario became reality? What are the advantages of both sides?
Tyranny of distance
The report is based on analysis of the Strategy & Future and Rand Corporation think tanks. The first, unchanging aspect that we must always consider is geography. The area of great competition over the communication routes in the Western Pacific is enormous. The American Pacific Command operates in the range of 169 million square kilometers, which is nearly ten times the size of the largest country in the world - Russia. That is why the first major challenge facing Washington is the tyranny of distance. Logistics and operating in such an area are inherently devastating. In addition to the United States, this region includes the 3 out of 4 world’s biggest economies and 6 of the world's largest armed forces. 50% of the world's population lives in this space.
The geography of the Western Pacific region means that any confrontation will take place mainly at sea and in the air - thus the American concept of AirSea Battle. There are two strategically crucial areas that delimit two island chains - the first covers the South China Sea and the East China Sea and runs from Japan, through the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo. The second chain covers the Philippine Sea and starts from the Bonin Islands, through the Mariana Islands, Guam, and Caroline islands.
Currently, the US Pacific Command has 330,000 military personnel, including 5 aircraft carrier strike groups, consisting of 180 ships and 1,500 combat aircrafts. Despite the fact that it is huge firepower, it is probably insufficient considering the breadth of the theater of operations. The United States since World War II has become used to the use of the so-called Sanctuaries, i.e. places of regrouping, bases, ports, logistic centers that are beyond the enemy's reach. In the event of a possible kinetic confrontation with China, this situation changes.
Bases
Major US bases will be exposed to Chinese missile attacks during the potential conflict with China. Their survival in the first days may be crucial to winning the entire war.
US bases at the Western Pacific Theater are divided into 3 types:
- Main operating bases: site of the stationing and storage of significant US forces. This is, for example, the Andersen Air Force Base in Guam or the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa.
- Forward operating bases: provide support for major bases. A small amount of personnel and military equipment are stationed there. The place of periodic US Navy exercise. An example is the Sembawang port in Singapore.
- Cooperative security locations: ports, bases, and airports used by allies on a daily basis, to which Americans have access in the event of hostilities. Eg bases in Australia - Darwin, Tindall.
The country that is extremely important operationally due to its proximity to China is Japan. Specifically the Okinawa, Yokosuka, or Sasebo bases. The Chinese cities of Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Xiamen are within range of tactical air force departing from the Okinawa base. However, the island of Guam is by far the most important American location in the Asia-Pacific region. Andersen Air Force Base is the largest base in the Pacific and can accommodate all of the aircraft in service with the US military. The island is also home to the largest number of bombs in the region (100,000) and a supply of jet fuel (66 million gallons). Guam is ideally located - out of reach of most, but not all, Chinese missile systems. The aircraft carrier journey from Guam to the Taiwan Strait takes only 3-5 days, while the journey from the US coast takes 17 days and from Hawaii 12 days. On the other hand, it shows once again how big a challenge the distance in the Western Pacific is.
This means that any operational plan in the Western Pacific must take into account the logistic asymmetry between Beijing and Washington. The Chinese operate on their own territory, while the Americans have to transport everything thousands of nautical miles. In addition, there are relatively few US military and logistics bases in such a large area. They are big and practically all of them within the range of the Chinese missile forces - which makes them very difficult to defend. A massive saturation rocket attack on a base can shut it down for a long time. Chinese ballistic missiles have a very short flight time, which makes reaction and defense extremely difficult and expensive. One anti-missile is more expensive than an offensive ballistic missile. The logical conclusion is therefore the need for the Americans to combat Chinese missile launchers. This task is very difficult due to the mobility of Chinese missile forces, their location - most often mountains and tunnels, Chinese ground anti-access systems, and the sheer number of launchers and rockets counted in thousands. The situation is different on the side of China - the Chinese air force has more than 40 airbases that allow hitting targets in Taiwan without the need to refuel in the air.
Allies
International treaties oblige the United States to defend Japan and South Korea, while American law calls for defending Taiwan in the event of an attack by China. All three do not have the necessary strategic depth, which means that they must be defended from the sea. From the group of US allies in the region, only India and Australia have appropriate strategic depth. In the Washington doctrine, Canberra would provide support on the periphery of major hostilities, patrol and control the area of the very important Indian Ocean, including the region of the Malacca Strait and part of the South China Sea. In the event of a potential war with China, however, Japan is by far the most important ally. The fundamental premise of the American concept is to defend Japan at all costs. It is crucial due to the military bases and ports located there, as well as great economic and arms industry potential. Tokyo also has a very serious military that complements US forces.
Then we have South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, which would inevitably also become parties to the conflict. The American doctrine assumes the installation of A2AD capabilities on the territory of allied countries in the area of the first island chain, which is a very important element of the military balance of power in the region. India would potentially be an important player as well. If the tension between Beijing and Delhi continued to grow, India could join the anti-Chinese crusade, dragging the Chinese towards the mainland. This, in turn, could draw Pakistan into the war, given the history of both countries. A domino effect is very likely.
Russia would be the pivotal state in this situation. Moscow, using its large territory and military forces, would also have to side with one of the powers, which would entail meeting its conditions for joining such an alliance. Even though Russia is currently perceived as an ally of China, this situation may change. There is already a party in the US advocating for flipping Russia. If Washington followed this path, Beijing would be in a full circle. It should be warned at this point that it would certainly come at a price, e.g. for Americans to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe and to recognize this region as Moscow's sphere of influence. Warsaw and the Baltic states in particular should be careful about such a change in the balance of power in the region.
On the other hand, China does not focus on finding allies but is trying to convince all countries in the region that it would not be profitable for them to act against Beijing.
Diminishing advantage
The declining American advantage over the Chinese is confirmed in the American Rand Corporation's September 2015 report - “The U.S. - China Military Scorecard. Forces, Geography and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996–2017 ”commissioned by the US Air Force. The report simulated the confrontation in the South China Sea and the changing balance of power on the battlefield in 1996-2017. The analysts took into account a number of variables, including time-varying combat capabilities, supplies, course and time of confrontation, geography and combat distances.
Rand's report showed that the American advantage still exists. Yet once great is now much smaller. The Americans generally still have a decisive advantage in combat systems, in the ability to perform air strikes against land targets, and in submarine warfare. However, China has a huge geographic and operational advantage that effectively neutralizes the US advantage. The change in trend therefore shows that it is only a matter of time before China catches up with the US military potential.
Getting down to business - the area of the first island chain is exposed to constant Chinese rocket and air attacks. The US forces coming to the aid of their allies must be able to survive and conduct warfare in such conditions - this is a great challenge. To illustrate the scale of the challenge, Rand's report showed that in the case of a rocket saturation attack on the Kadena base in Okinawa, Japan, only 36 Chinese ballistic missiles would be enough to shut down this key airport for 4 days for tactical aviation and 11 days for tanker aircraft. As the offensive systems currently dominate the defensive systems, one should take into account very large losses in infrastructure in the first days of a potential war.
It seems that the most important task at the start of the war will be to maintain the situational awareness system. This includes reconnaissance, communication, command, cybernetic network, targeting combat systems, and the ability to assess the damage. In the first hours of the war, both sides will aim at destroying each other's systems. Blinding the enemy would be based primarily on the destruction of space installations and other long-range detection systems. However, the Chinese will be less dependent on space reconnaissance. Due to favorable military geography, they can use land-based communication, command and control systems. Some of them are probably also located underground, in fortified mountains and tunnels. One should also not forget about the huge commercial and civilian fleet that Beijing could also use for this purpose.
In the air, Americans have a great technological advantage thanks to the new generation F-22 and F-35 aircrafts, but again their capabilities would be greatly reduced by the tyranny of distance. They would probably have to operate from the Andersen base on Guam, as the other, closer bases would be too vulnerable to destruction. As a result, RAND calculates that the current US capabilities allow only 6 F-22 fighters operating from Guam to continuously patrol the airspace over Taiwan. If the Kadena base were not disabled, this number increases to 12 aircraft. In turn, the Chinese air force is able to maintain the constant presence of 36 4th generation Russian bought Su-27 fighters in the airspace over Taiwan. The dominance of the F-22 over the Su-27 is beyond doubt, but the 6-fold difference in numbers strongly undermines the fact that Americans dominate the air. In addition, the Chinese would probably send older generation aircraft into battle, which would also occupy the F-22. It is also important that Beijing intends to introduce a new generation aircraft - J-31 and J-20.
The combat suitability of American aircraft carriers is also debatable. According to increasingly credible sources, the Chinese have the ability to destroy aircraft carriers in the open sea, which would be a technological breakthrough. At the same time, it would make these floating giants a burden that requires constant protection. At the beginning of the conflict, the carriers would withdraw behind the second island chain, pending eventual destruction by the Americans of Chinese A2AD capabilities.
The domain of submarine war is an unquestionable advantage of the Americans. The United States has the most modern and quietest submarine fleet in the world, manned by well-trained personnel. American submarines at the beginning of the war would have the aim of destroying enemy submarines, neutralizing the enemy's sensors, pipelines and communication cables, and mining the entrances to Chinese ports. Next, we can add to this the fight against land targets with cruise missiles, and in the case of nuclear war - launching ballistic missiles. At the moment, the US submarine fleet has the freedom to operate even in Chinese coastal waters, which is probably the area of greatest advantage for the US in a possible Sino-US war. Geographically, the American submarine fleet would be located close to the Taiwan Strait, where, using its own technological advantage, it would wait for the Chinese fleet in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. The simulations show that during a week-long invasion of Taiwan, the actions of the US submarine fleet could sink 40% of the Chinese invasion fleet. The fight at sea will also include a swarm of drones capable of long-term patrolling the seas and oceans that would be used by both sides.
Chinese Fire Rain Survival
The Chinese side would probably be interested in a short-term, intense conflict - a knock-out blow, in which space and the cyber domain would be very important. Beijing would launch a massive attack on space reconnaissance systems and on US and allied bases in the region. The goal would also be to destroy the US and allied fleets in the first and second island chains. Ultimately, this would lead to the loss of key infrastructure by Americans, ships, and command centers, which would mean that the Americans would withdraw from further conflict, thus giving China primacy in this part of the world, which would permanently change the balance of power. If the American side, after accepting the initial strike, continued the war - then ChaLW would go into strategic defense, which would be extremely difficult to break due to the geography and strategic depth of China. Washington would face huge human, material, and, above all, social costs in the form of public reaction. China's task would be to defend its own ports and cut American and Japanese communication lines and prevent Americans from coming to the aid of their allies - mainly Taiwan and Japan.
In a simplified scenario, more sympathetic to the US - Americans manage to survive China's first massive attack by maintaining their situational awareness system and basing it on unmanned drones. US submarines block and intercept Chinese attempts to move beyond the first island chain, particularly in narrow straits, crossing Chinese communication lines. Cyber and electromagnetic combat units will win the initial competition and begin to dominate this domain. At the same time, Washington itself is carrying out a massive attack on China's integrated situational awareness system. This will allow for calmer operations in the first chain of islands, in particular from Japan, where an effective air battle would take place, in which the potential of Chinese aviation would be greatly reduced. This would allow the Americans and the Japanese to start bringing reinforcements and replenishment to the island while continuing to combat and rollover Chinese A2AD systems. In the next step, the United States could launch an attack on China from the Northeast, where air defense is not as dense and integrated as over the rest of the coast. The US would go over to the tactic of shutting down China in the first island chain, long-term wasting, and completely wiping out the Chinese fleet and aviation. China would be cut off from the world by a trade blockade and forced into peace negotiations on Washington's terms. However, taking into account all the challenges and problems mentioned above, as well as China's constantly growing military potential, such a scenario seems to be very optimistic.
Kevin Rudd, in his text "Beware the Guns of August — in Asia How to Keep U.S.-Chinese Tensions From Sparking a War" warns against repeating the First World War scenario when the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand led to a world conflict within a few weeks. This time, the incident could take a different form, but lead to similar consequences. To prevent this, it would be necessary, as during the Cold War with the Soviets, to establish the principles of the de-escalation protocol. The most recent agreements of this kind took place during Barack Obama's tenure, before the collapse of relations, and their current effectiveness is questionable. This could be the first joint step by Beijing and Washington to tackle unmanageable escalation.
Si vis Pacem, Para Bellum - If you want peace, prepare for war. Both China and the United States now seem to be putting this Latin maxim into practice. While trusting in the peaceful development of the events of hegemonic rivalry in the Western Pacific, we must stay aware of the threats it poses.
