- Hubert Walas
Russia's Collapse. Part 3.
States plunged into endless chaos or the emergence of new and democratic structures in the region? Russia's collapse would be heard - and felt - like a shockwave rolling over the Earth’s surface. It would certainly be epochal, both at the level of the great powers' game as well as for the ordinary inhabitants of the post-Russian space and beyond.
Nuclear weapons, internal chaos, struggle for resources - the list of problems is long. Are there any prospects for prosperity? How would the potential break-up affect the hegemonic rivalry between Washington and Beijing? How would the regional balance of power change?
Pandora's Box
In the previous two episodes, we outlined the motives that make a hypothetical collapse of the Russian Federation possible and why they should not be underestimated, as well as the causal model that could lead to such a collapse given current conditions in Russia.
The outcome of these events is the final and most important piece of the puzzle. The Fall of Moscow would be one of the most important events defining the 21st century, comparable in its impact to the two world wars or the fall of the USSR in the 20th century.
At the outset, it should be noted that the collapse of Moscow’s empire can be considered on several levels and at each one, the effects and conclusions can be different. What levels are we talking about? The following two seem the most important.
• First, TIME with considerations on the short-term and long-term.
• Second, PEOPLE on the state, supra-state, and individual levels.
That said, the short-term predictions are the clearest. They are at the same time the most worrying, as the - likely rapid - potential collapse of the Russian Federation would have the prospect of being one big Pandora's Box.
The absence of a core authority, as we discussed more in the previous episode, would set in motion a struggle for supremacy within the crumbling colossus. Without any supreme power, any tricks would be fair game. In the first instance, there would be attempts to seize post-Russian military equipment with the aim of taking control of key things: natural resources, power stations, military bases, or nuclear weapons. We will cover these in greater depth shortly.
Naturally, this leads to disputes and wars between rival centres of influence, nations, and/or new elites. The emergence of paramilitary groups and militias with veterans of the Ukrainian war playing key roles is almost certain. In fact, these already exist as exemplified by the Wagner Group. Such an environment is a natural ecosystem for autocrats, whose populist slogans would appear as an antidote to the war-ridden region. Several regions may resemble a mini-Russia, where local leaders build personal kingdoms through control of the legislature, law enforcement, and judicial system combined with repression and censorship.
The situation can quickly escalate into ethnic and territorial conflicts in which minorities may be subject to repressions or even ethnic cleansing as during the 1990s in Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavian Scenario
It is the war in the Balkans that Janusz Bugajski, author of book, Failed State: A Guide to Russia's Rupture, cites as a potential break-up scenario. The Jamestown Foundation analyst reminds us that the 'Yugoslavian scenario' was varied with limited armed skirmishes in Slovenia, a small guerrilla war in Macedonia, a brief NATO bombing campaign in Serbia, and no fighting in Montenegro. In contrast, the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people and displaced millions more. In the event of Russia's collapse, we would also likely see some fierce fighting, as well as places of relative calm.
Furthermore, in the Balkan scenario, Moscow may step into the role of Serbia by mobilising ethnic Russians to carve out ethnically homogeneous regions from rebellious republics. This is particularly likely if ultranationalist and imperialist circles take power in Moscow during the collapse. Thus an outright war may occur between the centre and peripheral republics and regions. Moscow may finance, arm, and direct militia groups and volunteer movements, akin to Milošević's Yugoslavia, to kill and expel non-Russian populations.
On top of all this would be the looming threat of nuclear weapons in uncertain control. This is the darkest scenario: the Yugoslav War on steroids. An uncontrolled break-up scenario, especially in the short term, would be very dangerous at the levels of the individual, the wider populace, and the global order. The keyword here is "Uncontrolled".
Because this darkest scenario has the greatest chance of coming true in the absence of moderation by external actors. We are not only talking about the West, the USA or the European Union, but also about China, the Middle East, or Turkey. Each of these states should have a plan for action in the event of a Soviet-style break-up.
Geopolitically, the potential collapse of the Russian Federation is, arguably, undesirable for most major international actors, since it presents a host of dangerous uncertainties. It is not wanted by policymakers in Beijing, who would lose a key ally in the fight against the US-led global order. The supply of energy resources - crucial - to the Chinese economy would also be threatened. The prospect of such an event would also prove controversial in Washington. An uncontrolled period of chaos following the opening of the Russian Pandora's Box is an unequivocally negative scenario for major powers.
First and foremost, though not only, because of the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was no coincidence that George H.W. Bush warned of Ukrainian independence at the time of Soviet collapse. Hypothetically, this could be one of the reasons for the rigidly controlled US military aid to Ukraine in the current war. The obvious reason is a lack of desire to escalate and be dragged into a direct war. Nevertheless, US strategy may also be motivated by a reluctance to hit the Russian Federation's structures too hard, so that they don’t collapse completely.
That said, it should be noted that the hypothetical break-up of Russia might be independent of internal and external preventive actions. In other words, it could happen regardless of Moscow’s measures, or even outside ones from China or the United States. No one, including the Americans, directly sought to break up the USSR and yet… the colossus fell.
This means two things. First, such a scenario cannot be 100% ruled out however unlikely. Second, it is possible to prepare for it. In fact, it is in the interest of the whole world, or at least its key international actors, to prepare for such an event. Of course, each of these actors has its own interests to pursue on this occasion, but there are several converging interests.
The Nuclear Problem
The first and most glaring is the issue of nuclear weapons. This would make the fall of Russia a tangible concern even in the Solomon Islands. Uncontrolled proliferation is the last thing humanity needs at this point, and we have a convergence of interests between the US, China, and, in fact, the world. And indeed , there are a number of remedial factors at play here.
As we have already mentioned, the control of nuclear weapons will be the goal of many groups fighting for power during the initial period of chaos. The reason would not necessarily be to use them, because as a military resource, nuclear warheads are neither very practical nor easy to use: they need an appropriate carrier meaning a rocket or a plane. Nonetheless, their possession would be traced as the most important exchangeable resource.
It is important to remember that the new states that would emerge from a dissolved Russian Federation would be very vulnerable. They will struggle for international recognition which will not be at all obvious. The neighbourhood will be very dangerous, like their internal situations. Leaders of the new entities will quickly seek support abroad and solicit aid from various world power centres. But their words may not always be heeded, especially if there are many rival factions. However, if they bear information about nuclear warheads, which they control… then global decision-makers will be all ears. In such a situation, the most legitimate and mutually beneficial deal would be denuclearisation in exchange for international recognition, primarily by the US, China, and the EU, as well as trade contracts and inter-state agreements.
This would be a two-for-one stabilising solution. Not only would nuclear proliferation be avoided, but the internal situation in the new state would be calmed relatively quickly through the conclusion of trade agreements allowing the new authorities to gain legitimacy on the international level. Examples could include the extension or renegotiation of oil or gas exports to China or the import of products from the EU and USA on favourable terms.
Security guarantees could also be given, although these might not carry enough weight, since previous arrangements of this kind had not been fulfilled. The collapse of the USSR meant that almost 30,000 warheads found their way into the four newly formed states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine gave away its warheads to the Russian Federation in exchange for guarantees of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, after 20 years, Kyiv was attacked by the signatory to the memorandum, the Russian Federation. First just locally, but after eight years, on full-scale.
And so, this bargaining chip has been made significantly weaker by this event. There is little to no incentive for the various actors to relinquish their warheads to any new Moscow-run state, as had been done 30 years earlier by Ukraine.
The bitter fact is full denuclearisation of the area would likely be impossible. Moscow's economic and social potential would be severely depleted, but the state would most likely remain a nuclear power.
Yet, controlling and dealing with the topic of nuclear proliferation is only part of the work that would need to be done in the event of the Fall of Russia.
Cushioning the Fall of a Colossus
It is not about military intervention but rather monitoring the situation, following the newly emerging elites, and helping them to control the situation on the ground. However, here, the issue becomes more complex as various states will want to play the game and steer these elites in a direction consistent with their interests and values. The EU and the US may support the new leaders on a democratic path and in helping them create new institutions. China most likely would prefer autocratic client states, which it could quickly depend on and control. Inevitably, a period of chaos is more conducive to the latter option.
Yet, it would seem that it would be in the interests of both rivals to support cross-regional initiatives, confederations, etc. Such structures would stabilise the region and increase the chances of positive long-term development, a goal of each of the big players.
In the event of a Russian break-up, questions would arise about Chinese military intervention in the Russian Far East and Siberia with the aim of expanding the Chinese population space and securing control of key resources. While such an event cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, such a move would most likely force the Americans to intervene militarily and would eventually lead to a world war. Secondly, China is a huge country that’s largely uninhabited and with a population that could be three times smaller in a hundred years. So the population space argument is a dead end. Whereas, natural resources can be secured on the same or even better terms as China has now with Russia. This would be Beijing's aim, to subjugate the new countries as much as possible along the lines of the Chinese strategy in Africa. Especially those in the Far East and Siberia.
For the Chinese and Americans, the most important issue would be nuclear weapons, but if this could be resolved, Washington's overriding objective would be to prevent any new states from totally falling into Beijing's sphere of influence. All the more so because geographically, much of the Siberian regions are closer to the US and Canada than to China. This is counterintuitive given the traditional map projection, but this would be the new reality for Kamchatka, Chukotka, or even the northern ports of Sakha. The ports of Seattle, Vancouver, or Anchorage would be crucial for Americans and Canadians in such a situation.
Europe would face a different problem. Internal unrest would trigger an avalanche of migration whose destination would inevitably be the Old Continent. Namely the countries of Western Europe: France, Germany, or the Netherlands. Insofar as this would lead to ethnic unrest, Brussels, given its poor demographic prospects, would probably open its borders to newcomers from the East. On the other hand, The Union as a bureaucratic power would have a key task in administrative assistance and the creation of new institutions which would be one of the most important state-building tasks in the post-Russian countries.
As far as individual countries are concerned, there is no doubt that a whole range of post-Soviet bloc countries - the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine or even Finland - would feel relieved at the division of Russia. This would most likely mean a reduction, or even complete disappearance, of the eastern threat that has hung over the region for centuries. Moreover, the reform experience of these states would provide a model starting point for the new republics and inspiration to their people for a better tomorrow. While Germany would most likely treat the break-up as a new order, which would lead to renegotiating and restoring gas and oil imports from the post-Russian countries.
Also towards democracy and the West would inevitably follow… Belarus. Without Moscow’s looming power, Belarusians would finish what they started in the summer of 2020: ousting Lukashenko. If Russian nuclear weapons were in Belarus, Minsk could be the first and model example of a state to successfully denuclearise in exchange for favourable trade and related agreements.
Kazakhstan would gain a lot of importance, although this position would also come from being proactive and moderating the fall and rise of new states. Just like Central and Eastern Europe, Astana would have a lot to gain in such a situation: their northern threat would be reduced and the country would become the strongest and biggest player in the area. But there is also a lot to lose in the short term as unrest could spill over into Kazakhstan itself.
In the interests of Iran, Turkey and, more broadly, of the Middle Eastern states, would be to moderate the statehood of any new Islamic nations. Uncontrolled smuggling of weapons extracted from Russia's hard-to-evaluate stockpiles would risk the emergence and resurgence of radical and terrorist groups in the Middle East or Africa. Of course, there would be many more regional and global repercussions, as here we only have a selective part.
A Chance for a Better Life?
In the introduction, we talked about several levels of analysis of this event. On this channel, we usually aim to take a broad view of the subject, but it should not be forgotten that there are tens of millions of people in the arena of these events and would be directly affected by them.
In the case of the bleakest scenario described at the beginning, the outlook for residents would be much worse than the current situation. Many would find themselves in an area plunged into war and lawlessness or, in a better case, a situation of high unemployment and low income.
However, if the breakup of Russia were to be a phenomenon carefully moderated by major international actors, the emerging elites would not veer towards autocracy and despotism, and the newly formed states would have sufficient economic and human potential to survive as independent entities. The life prospects of the inhabitants of these territories would look much brighter than in the present Russian Federation.
Decentralisation by itself would lead to better management of available resources. These resources would now serve the area in question, rather than a narrow group of stakeholders at the centre of the empire. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that such a negative arrangement would continue to operate, just on a smaller scale. As is usually the case, the potential for change would be exploited better in some regions and worse in others.
In this situation, comparisons to the collapse of the Soviet Union are unavoidable. The European countries that emerged from its collapse and left Moscow's sphere of influence recorded the world’s highest economic and wealth growth in the last 30 years. Naturally, proximity to Western Europe was very important here, but it was not the only reason. Better use of their resources, directing them to the vital needs of a given country, and the systemic sociopolitical changes unleashed potential previously suppressed. The example of Belarus and Estonia well illustrates this relationship. Belarus is geographically closer to Western Europe than Estonia, but the economic indicators and quality of life speak for themselves.
The rest of the post-Soviet states did worse after the breakup. Partly for geographical reasons and partly because they continued to remain within the sphere of influence of the inefficient centre remaining in Moscow. In the event of another break-up, much will depend on whether Moscow retains indirect control over the lost territory or whether the new countries follow an independent path. In the latter case, hypothetical new states such as the Siberian Republic, the Ural Republic, or the Far Eastern Republic could potentially repeat the success of e.g. the Baltic Republics and in the long term - especially given their territorial potential - of surpassing it. In time, they have the chance to become large economies with growing populations. Indeed, work in the extraction and processing of valuable natural resources will be an economic driver of migration for many people, as well as for businesses. Trade routes such as the Northern Corridor, also called the Arctic Route, could serve as a commercial artery of supply for East Asia, Europe, and the United States.
After the collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917, of Soviet Russia in 1991, this third disintegration of a Moscow-centered state would carry great risks: the proliferation of nuclear weapons, wars and unrest within the collapsing empire, and their spillover across the Eurasian continent and even into Africa. In principle, however, this is an uncontrollable event and may well come to the fore despite countermeasures from outside. This makes it necessary to prepare for it today while potential new elites must count on support to help them contain the situation in the period of chaos that would inevitably follow.
In the event of a successful moderation and peaceful break-up - akin to the Soviet Union’s dissolution - the new states and their inhabitants would have the chance to start their own path towards a better life. Thus, the centuries-long imperial project of the Moscow tsars would come to an end. Nations and people who have not been given the opportunity to do so for the last few hundred years would finally begin writing their own history.
We have made frequent use of Janusz Bugajski's work in developing this series. Free access to his latest book "Failed State: A Guide to Russia's Rupture" - can be found in the description.
